CONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT GROUP

REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL



THE JULY 2026

DELHI YOUTH PROTESTS

AND THE RESPONSE OF THE INDIAN STATE

TRIBUNAL MEMBERS

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THE JULY 2026 DELHI YOUTH PROTEST

&

THE RESPONSE OF THE INDIAN STATE

Report of the People's Tribunal

Convened by

The Constitutional Conduct Group

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The July 2026 Delhi Youth Protest and the subsequent response of the Indian State raise serious questions about the protection of fundamental rights, the regulation of public assemblies, and the accountability of law enforcement agencies in a constitutional democracy. This report examines the response of the Delhi Police and other security personnel to the protests, with particular attention to the use of force, mass detentions, the treatment of women protesters, the deployment of crowd-control weapons, and the measures taken to restrict or prevent peaceful assembly. Drawing on witness testimonies, medical records, photographs, video recordings, police documents, responses to applications under the Right to Information Act, judicial directions, and secondary reporting, the Tribunal assesses the conduct of the authorities against constitutional guarantees, statutory provisions, police standing orders, judicial precedents and applicable international standards.

The report begins with the constitutional and statutory foundations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. These rights are integral to democratic participation and cannot be treated merely as privileges granted at the discretion of the executive. Although the State may impose reasonable restrictions in accordance with the law, its responsibility is to regulate assemblies lawfully and proportionately, not to prevent dissent through arbitrary or excessive measures. The Tribunal examines this obligation in light of judicial recognition of dissent as an essential component of democracy and the legal standards governing the policing of public assemblies.

A central finding of the report concerns the apparent failure of the Delhi Police to engage with protest leaders or undertake meaningful de-escalation before resorting to force on 20 July 2026. The evidence presented to the Tribunal indicates that the only attempt at dialogue described by the witnesses was a meeting between two protest leaders and Union Minister J. P. Nadda at his residence that morning. No police officer was reported to have participated in the meeting. The Tribunal found no evidence that the police leadership attempted to negotiate with the organisers before the use of force, or that the repeated public announcements and warnings required under Standing Order No. 309 were made. Although the police account, as reported from its affidavit, attributes the escalation to the conduct of the crowd and the breach of barricades, the Tribunal notes that neither account establishes that the police attempted dialogue with the protest leadership before force was deployed.

The Tribunal further finds that the police response did not follow the prescribed sequence of warnings, appeals, de-escalation and graduated use of force. Witnesses described lathi charges and tear gas being used against protesters who were walking in an orderly manner, sitting down, forming human chains, assisting injured persons, or attempting to leave. The evidence also indicates that force continued in circumstances where protesters had limited or no means of

escape. Closed gates, roads and metro access points, combined with the use of tear gas and baton charges, created stampede-like conditions and contributed to injuries. The Tribunal concludes that the force used in the circumstances described exceeded the limits of necessity and proportionality, and that medical assistance was not provided at the earliest possible moment in several reported instances. It also records that more than 240 police personnel were reportedly injured, while noting that injuries to police personnel do not justify the indiscriminate use of force against individuals who were not responsible for them.

Particular concern arises from the evidence concerning the weapons and methods used against protesters. The Tribunal finds that police personnel held nail-fitted batons at the protest site and, on the basis of witness testimony, that such batons were used to strike protesters. It also finds evidence of the use of electric batons and repeated tear-gas firing, including the use of expired tear-gas shells. Witnesses described tear-gas shells being fired in confined spaces, towards people who were moving away, and near individuals seeking medical assistance. The Tribunal concludes that these methods exposed protesters to serious risks of injury and were inconsistent with the applicable standards governing necessity, minimum force and safe dispersal.

The evidence concerning pellet-firing weapons is particularly significant. Four witnesses reported pellet injuries at different locations in Central Delhi, and medical records and an RTI response provided further support for their accounts. The Tribunal finds that personnel of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) fired pellets at protesters on the afternoon of 20 July 2026. The RAF General Diary records that two rounds of ballistic cartridges containing plastic pellets were fired on the orders attributed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone 1, to control the crowd. A report concerning a CRPF inquiry, as cited in the material before the Tribunal, reportedly identified at least seven rounds containing metal pellets. The precise number of rounds fired, the nature of the ammunition and the attribution of individual injuries remain unresolved. Nevertheless, the Tribunal finds that the evidence does not establish that the conditions required under the RAF's own standard operating procedure for the use of pellets—namely, a grave danger to life—were met. The findings raise serious questions concerning the legality of the deployment, the chain of command and the accountability of the officers who authorised or carried out the firing.

The report also examines the presence of men in civilian clothes who were seen assaulting protesters. Witness testimonies and photographs indicate that unidentified individuals, without visible police identification, participated in violence against students. The Tribunal acknowledges that the deployment of plain-clothes personnel for observation or intelligence-gathering is not inherently unlawful. However, the absence of identification made it difficult to distinguish police personnel from other individuals and impeded the attribution of responsibility for acts of violence. The Tribunal does not conclude that these individuals were deployed for the purpose of facilitating unlawful force, as the evidence does not establish their

identities or the purpose of their presence. A separate section, based on secondary sources, examines the reported involvement of right-wing groups and unidentified persons in attacks on protesters on 10 October 2026.

The treatment of women protesters forms another important part of the report. Witness accounts describe the deployment of women RAF personnel against women demonstrators, sexually explicit threats and physical contact that allegedly exceeded what was necessary for dispersal. The Tribunal emphasises that compliance with the requirement to deploy women personnel does not, in itself, make their conduct lawful or proportionate. The report also considers subsequent allegations of sexual assault and harassment, including digital harassment, and the reported escalation of assaults against women during the protests on 10 October 2026. The latter findings are based on secondary reporting and are distinguished from evidence directly presented to the Tribunal.

On mass detentions, the Tribunal finds that the Delhi Police undertook an organised and concerted effort to detain people in order to prevent them from gathering at Jantar Mantar, thereby restricting their fundamental rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Based on lawyers' testimonies, the Tribunal concludes that detentions were arbitrary, lacked lawful cause or disregarded statutory safeguards, and were accompanied by efforts to conceal detainees' locations and transport them across state boundaries. It further finds that students and Muslims were disproportionately targeted. The report identifies additional concerns regarding invasions of privacy and the disproportionate criminalisation of detainees.

The report also places these findings in the context of subsequent protests against the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and alleged irregularities in the Election Commission's functioning. Drawing on online and published reports, it identifies an apparent intensification of pre-emptive and mass detentions, including the interception of buses, trains and other vehicles entering Delhi; the detention of journalists despite their identification; the denial of access to detained clients to lawyers; prolonged detention; and the reported withholding of food, drinking water, medical assistance and legal representation. The reports also describe violence and humiliation during detention, the concealment of detainees' whereabouts, sexual assault allegations against police personnel, the detention of women and minors in circumstances raising serious legal concerns, and the detention of trans women alongside men. These developments are presented as findings based on secondary sources rather than direct testimony before the Tribunal concerning the July protests.

Taken together, the findings indicate that the response to the July 2026 protests cannot be assessed solely in terms of isolated confrontations between the police and demonstrators. The evidence raises broader concerns about the use of coercive measures to prevent assembly, the failure to exhaust less restrictive alternatives before using force, the deployment of potentially unlawful weapons, inadequate medical assistance, the identification and accountability of personnel, and the use of mass detention as a means of restricting participation in public protest.

The subsequent reports concerning anti-SIR demonstrations suggest that these concerns extend beyond a single protest episode and warrant further scrutiny of policing practices and safeguards for civil liberties.

The Tribunal records important limitations to its findings. It did not hear police officers directly and could not obtain the original of the Delhi Police affidavit, relying instead on a published account of that document. Certain conclusions, particularly those concerning the protests of 10 October and the subsequent anti-SIR demonstrations, rely on secondary sources. Some matters—including the identities and authority of men in civilian clothes, the precise number and composition of pellet rounds, the orders governing the closure of particular routes, and the full records concerning the use and disposal of tear-gas shells—remain unresolved. These limitations are material to the assessment of individual responsibility but do not negate the concerns established by the evidence available to the Tribunal.

The report concludes with recommendations aimed at ensuring the democratic policing of peaceful assemblies. These include strengthening compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards; enforcing requirements for prior engagement, repeated warnings and de-escalation; ensuring that force is necessary, proportionate, limited and directed solely towards lawful dispersal; prohibiting weapons and methods that are inconsistent with applicable standards; guaranteeing prompt medical assistance; ensuring the visible identification and accountability of all deployed personnel; preserving and disclosing relevant operational, ammunition and medical records; and safeguarding detainees' access to legal representation and judicial oversight. The report also calls for effective safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory detention and for appropriate accountability mechanisms where allegations of violence, sexual abuse or other unlawful conduct arise.

Ultimately, the events examined in this report raise a fundamental question for Indian democracy: whether the State will treat peaceful protest as a constitutionally protected form of public participation or increasingly approach dissent as a threat to be suppressed. The protection of democratic rights requires more than the formal recognition of constitutional freedoms. It requires law enforcement agencies to respect those freedoms in practice, to exercise coercive powers within clearly defined legal limits, and to ensure that violations are investigated transparently and remedied effectively. Democratic policing must preserve public order without extinguishing the right to dissent.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Protests against leakages, delays and corruption in public examinations for entry into public professional colleges and government jobs erupted into a massive confrontation with the Delhi Police and paramilitary forces in the national capital of Delhi on 20.07.26. The protests spread rapidly to cities and towns across the country and continued for five days until 25.07.26 when the central government acceded to the principal demand of the protesters, which was the resignation of the union education minister.

In the aftermath of these youth protests, the Constitutional Conduct Group - a collective of retired civil servants committed to the defence of the constitution - decided to constitute a People's Tribunal to examine the legality, necessity and proportionality of police action on student and youth protestors between 20.07.2026 to 25. 07 .2026. The tribunal evaluated these in the light of constitutional guarantees of peaceful assembly and dissent. It also examined the consequences of the police action on the affected protesters. This report is the result of tribunal's finding as a public record of what happened between the said dates, and also make recommendations for the handling of peaceful protests in the future, in accordance with the principles of democracy and constitutional guarantees of peaceful assembly and dissent.

The Tribunal was chaired by Justice **Anjana Prakash** (senior advocate at the Supreme Court and former Judge of Patna High Court). Other members of the jury (in alphabetical order) are **Aditi Mehta (**former civil servant), **Gopal Krishna Pillai** (former Union Home Secretary), **Mohan Gopal (**former Director of the National Judicial Academy of the Supreme Court of India), **Radha Kumar** (feminist academic and author) and **Tanika Sarkar** (former professor of history in Jawaharlal Nehru University and author). **Harsh Mander**, peace and justice worker and author, was the convenor of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal met at its secretariat, 24, Adhchini, New Delhi, 110017, on 27.09.26 and 28.09.26 for the hearings. A total of 25 persons testified in person, online or in writing before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal heard the testimonies of protesters who were injured as a result of the action by the police and other security forces, including alleged pellet gun victims, alleged victims of sexual harassment by the police and other security forces, alleged victims of mass detention and mass surveillance, etc. Those who testified before the Tribunal, apart from alleged victims of police actions and violence, included eyewitnesses who were protesters or onlookers, on the ground reporters and YouTubers, student leaders, investigative journalists, doctors (who treated the injured victims), on the ground lawyers, former retired police officers and independent field experts on various relevant themes.

The Tribunal recorded testimonies in three forms, most of the testimonies were presented before the Tribunal in-person, but some people appeared virtually to testify and few testimonies were presented in the written format.

In particular, the Tribunal benefited from the expert opinions of the following: Chander Uday Singh, senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India, made a persuasive and comprehensive presentation on the issues of police actions, the law and court rulings. This report draws from his insights on several points, particularly about what constitutes lawful and unlawful assemblies and appropriate and inappropriate use of force. Navya (name changed), advocate in the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court, who coordinated with many young lawyers to extend legal aid to the detained persons, spoke to the Tribunal on legally questionable aspects of mass detention during peaceful protests. Maja Daruwala and Devika Prasad spoke on police actions and reforms. Filmmaker Varrun Sukhraj and investigative journalist Tanushree Pandey also presented forensically verified and geo-tagged videos of the police actions before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal invited representatives of the Delhi Police and Rapid Action Force to appear before the Tribunal, but they did not reply or appear.

2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDENT PROTEST EVENTS OF JUNE AND JULY 2026: THE UNDISPUTED FACTS

This section covers the events that unfolded before and after the 20.07.26 youth protest. This account is taken from official records, court orders, public statements, and media reports. Every fact is attributed to its source. If a statement is made by one side, it is attributed to that side only. Disputed facts, such as whether the assembly was peaceful or unlawful, whether the force used was proportionate, what actions were taken by particular officers or units, detention, internet suspension, and surveillance were lawful, are not included here. Where there is any allegation rather than an established fact, only the person making allegations and the statement itself is mentioned; whether it is true or not is not decided in this section. By and large, this section tries to lay out what the Tribunal sees to be undisputed facts.

2.1 Background

The NEET-UG 2026 examination was conducted across India on 03.05.2026.[1] On 12.05.2026, the National Testing Agency (NTA) cancelled the exam, with the approval of the Government, following the allegations of a paper leak, and referred the matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).[2] On May 15th, it was announced that the exam would be conducted again on 21.06.2026.[3] A few weeks after the paper leak, there were reports that a number of students had committed suicide as a result of it.[4]

On 15.05.2026, the Chief Justice of India, Surya Kant, made oral remarks referring to certain unemployed youth as "cockroaches": *"There are youngsters like cockroaches; they don't get any employment, they don't have any place in the profession, some of them become media, some of them become social media, some of them become RTI activists, some of them become other activists, and they start attacking everyone… let people understand I am going to teach them what is the meaning of discipline in the profession. I have dealt with so many of these*

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[1] National Testing Agency. (2026, February 8). *Public notice: Inviting online application form for National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET (UG)) 2026*. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s37bc1ec1d9c3426357e69acd5bf320061/uploads/2026/02/20260208399987696.pdf

[2] National Testing Agency. (2026a, May 12). *Press release: Decision on the examination of 3rd May 2026*. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s37bc1ec1d9c3426357e69acd5bf320061/uploads/2026/05/202605122066418251.pdf

[3] National Testing Agency. (2026b, May 15). *Public notice: Conduct of re-examination for National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET (UG)) 2026*. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s37bc1ec1d9c3426357e69acd5bf320061/uploads/2026/05/20260515960654684.pdf

[4] Biswas, S. (2026, August 2). 'What was my fault?': How India's exam paper leak ended young lives. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crl7jl1d95eo

kinds of characters in the past…. There are already parasites in society who attack you, who attack the system, and you want to join hands with them…."[5]

On 16.05.2026, Abhijeet Dipke, a postgraduate from Boston University, posted on X (formerly Twitter) *"What if all cockroaches come together?"*[6] This led to the formation of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). The party released its manifesto on May 19th, which included five demands: jobs and accountability, education reform, press freedom, judicial dignity, and radical transparency.[7]

On 21.05.2026, the CJP's X account was blocked in India under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "IT Act"). The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (hereinafter referred to as "MeitY") cited national security as the reason for blocking the account.[8] On 07.07.26, the Delhi High Court ordered the restoration of the handle.[9]

2.2 Chronology of Events

01.06.2026: All India Students' Association (AISA) and Krantikari Yuva Sangathan (KYS) protested outside the Ministry of Education against the NEET paper leak and irregularities in CBSE/CUET, demanding accountability.[10]

06.06.2026: Abhijeet Dipke returned from the United States of America and called for a protest demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan.[11]

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[5] Express News Service. (2026, May 17). 'Misquoted by media': CJI Surya Kant clarifies 'cockroaches' remark on unemployed youth. *The Indian Express*. https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/cji-surya-kant-clarifies-cockroaches-remark-fake-degrees-row-10692979/

[6] Dipke, A. [@abhijeet_dipke]. (2026, May 16). *What if all cockroaches come together?* [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/abhijeet_dipke/status/2055493761912741903

[7] Cockroach Janta Party. (2026, May 16). *The official manifesto*. https://cockroachjanatapart.com/manifesto.php

[8] Internet Freedom Foundation. (2026, May 22). *IFF's statement on the blocking of X account of the Cockroach Janta Party*. https://internetfreedom.in/iffs-statement-on-the-blocking-of-x-account-of-the-cockroach-janta-party/

[9] Delhi HC orders restoration of Cockroach Janta Party's X handle. (2026, July 7). *The New Indian Express*. https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/delhi/2026/Jul/07/delhi-hc-orders-restoration-of-cockroach-janta-partys-x-handle

[10] *India: KYS and AISA activists protest outside Education Ministry amid NEET, CBSE exam controversies*. (2026, June 1). Reuters Connect. https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/india-kys-and-aisa-activists-protest-outside-education-ministry-amid-neet-cbse-exam controversies/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX01UMVNJUEEwMDBZVlY4VTA

[11] 'Time has come for all of us to come together': CJP founder Abhijeet Dipke to return to India on June 6. (2026, June 1). *Deccan Herald*. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/time-has-come-for-all-of-us-to-come-together-cjp-founder-abhijeet-dipke-to-return-to-india-on-june-6-4023218

28.06.2026: Sonam Wangchuk joined the protest and sat on an indefinite hunger strike.[12] Aameen Amitoj, Neha Bora, Manish Kumar and Danish Ali from All India Student Association (AISA) sat on a parallel hunger strike.[13]

07.07.2026: The Delhi High Court ordered the restoration of CJP's social media account.[14]

17.07.2026: Anurag Kumar, IPS, became the Delhi Police Commissioner, replacing Satish Golcha, a few days before the beginning of Monsoon Session of Parliament. On the same day, the CJP and Wangchuk announced a march to Parliament.[15]

18.07.2026: At around 7:40 in the morning, on the 21st day of Wangchuk's hunger strike, personnel of Delhi Police, some in uniform, some in plain clothes, used white bedsheets to screen while removing him from the protest site, and took him to Safdarjung Hospital. Police said they did so in compliance with an order of the Delhi High Court and on the advice of doctors. After that, the Delhi High Court ordered regular medical check-ups of Wangchuk, stating "every life is important."[16]

Abhijeet Dipke alleged that police used excessive and undignified force while removing Sonam Wangchuk, and that he was attacked while on his way to Jantar Mantar. On the same day, Dipke began a hunger strike.[17]

19.07.2026: People began gathering at Jantar Mantar after Wangchuk's removal. A prohibitory order under Section 163 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as "BNSS") was issued by Delhi Police, prohibiting assemblies of five or more persons, marches, and demonstrations, except at the designated protest site and with prior permission.[18]

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[12] Sonam Wangchuk joins CJP protest, begins indefinite fast over alleged exam irregularities. (2026, June 28). *The New Indian Express*. https://www.newindianexpress.com/india/2026/Jun/28/sonam-wangchuk-joins-cjp-protest-begins-indefinite-fast-over-alleged-exam-irregularities

[13] Butani, A. (2026, June 29). Sonam Wangchuk begins hunger strike at Jantar Mantar, six students join. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sonam-wangchuk-joins-cjp-protest-begins-hunger-strike-at-jantar-mantar/article71157421.ece

[14]The Hindu Bureau. (2026b, July 7). Delhi High Court orders restoration of Cockroach Janta Party's X account. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/delhi-high-court-orders-restoration-of-cockroach-janta-partys-x-account/article71192795.ece

[15]The Hindu Bureau. (2026a, July 17). Anurag Kumar appointed Delhi Police Commissioner. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/anurag-kumar-delhi-police-commissioner-satish-golcha-who-is-he/article71233299.ece

[16] TOI News Desk. (2026b, July 18). 'Happened so fast that . . .': Protesters recount how police took away Sonam Wangchuk in 5 minutes. *The Times of India*. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/happened-so-fast-that-protestors-recount-how-police-took-away-sonam-wangchuk-in-5-minutes/articleshow/132480712.cms

[17] TOI News Desk. (2026a, July 18). CJP founder Abhijeet Dipke claims assault, detention as cops shift Sonam Wangchuk to hospital. *The Times of India*. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cKaushik, S. (2026, July 22). Protesters march ahead, only to be met with lathis, tear gas. *The Hindu.* https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/protesters-march-ahead-only-to-be-met-with-lathis-tear-gas/article71247923.ece jp-founder-abhijeet-dipke-beaten-detained-as-cops-shift-sonam-wangchuk-to-hospital/articleshow/132472654.cms

[18] Jeelani, G. (2026, July 19). Delhi Police say no permission for CJP's Parliament march tomorrow, warns of action against violators. *Mint*. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/delhi-police-sonam-wangchuk-no-permission-for-cjps-parliament-march-monday-violators-will-face-action-11784470372550.html

Wangchuk, from Safdarjung Hospital, said that if a political leader met him and assured him that the issue of education accountability would be discussed in the Monsoon Session, he would break his hunger strike.[19] Dipke and Wangchuk both appealed to students to join the 20.07.26 "Sansad Chalo" march. According to reports, security was tightened on the night of 19.07.26, including tear gas shells and water cannons. Non-standard barricades were also used; and at that time, entering or existing the protest site was not restricted.[20]

20.07.2026: On the first day of the Monsoon Session, the "Sansad Chalo" march was scheduled to take place. Delhi Police deployed more than 5,000 personnel, including Delhi Police and paramilitary forces, across New Delhi district. At around 4 a.m., more than 25 Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) battalions were also posted at strategic locations. Vijay Chowk, Parliament Street, Transport Bhawan, Rashtrapati Bhawan, India Gate and nearby areas were declared out of bounds areas for gatherings and demonstrations.[21] Anti-riot vehicles, water cannons, and special equipment were deployed, metro stations were closed, internet and mobile services were restricted in nearby areas. A number of metro-stations were closed.[22] Internet connectivity was suspended in the vicinity of the protest site.[23]

The number of young people who gathered despite all barricades and closure of metro stations far exceeded the highest estimates of the organisers and possibly of the police. Soon after the march started, police used force.[24]

According to witnesses and media reports put before the Tribunal, this included tear gas, pellet weapons, and batons; some police personnel were without uniform or identification; and witnesses testified that no prior warning was given before the use of force. Reports also indicate that injured protesters were not provided medical assistance. Whether these accounts are true, and whether the force used was lawful and proportionate, and whether proper warning was

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[19]Deep, A. (2026, July 20). Thousands gather at Jantar Mantar ahead of CJP's march to Parliament. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/thousands-gather-at-jantar-mantar-ahead-of-cjps-march-to-parliament/article71242178.ece

[20] Kaushik, S. (2026, July 22). Protesters march ahead, only to be met with lathis, tear gas. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/protesters-march-ahead-only-to-be-met-with-lathis-tear-gas/article71247923.ece

[21] Rajagopal, K. (2026a, August 19). Student protests: Delhi Police affidavit in Supreme Court is rich with numbers, but quiet on fixing accountability. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/neet-protests-delhi-police-affidavit-in-supreme-court-is-rich-with-numbers-but-quiet-on-fixing-accountability/article71361703.ece

[22] Mahto, S. (2026, July 20). Delhi Metro closes five stations due to CJP protest march. *YoMetro Blog*. https://yometro.com/blog/post-delhi-metro-closes-five-stations-due-to-cjp-protest-march

[23] Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, July 17). *Order* (No. 22016/12/2019-CIS-IV) [Order suspending mobile internet services within a 1.5 km radius of Jantar Mantar, New Delhi]. https://origin1504-mha.nic.in/files/circulars_documents/Suspension_order_18072026.pdf

[24] Lakhera, V. (2026, July 21). Delhi Police crackdown turns CJP protest into a national challenge for Modi. *Frontline*. https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/delhi-police-cjp-protest-crackdown-sonam-wangchuk-modi/article71250209.ece

given, are examined in Section 4.3. On the same day, CJP members Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka were invited by Union Minister J.P. Nadda for negotiations.

People again gathered at the protest site from the night of 20.07.2026.

21.07.2026: Protesters assembled again at Jantar Mantar, and as the day began, thousands reached the protest site. The crowds continued to swell at the protest site even in the night. The protesters resorted to satirical posters, slogans, music and dance in what resembled a carnival of protest.[25]

22.07.2026: Protesters reinforced their position at Jantar Mantar and Parliament Street. According to reports, surveillance, CCTV cameras[26], and portable jammers were heavily deployed. The Supreme Court declined to initiate *suo moto* proceedings. According to media reports, when a lawyer sought to present video evidence of the police action to the Court, claiming excessive use of force, the Chief Justice of India declined to watch it, saying, *"Don't waste our time, and don't waste yours… your time is more precious than ours… we are not interested in videos. We don't have time to watch."*[27]

23.07.2026 – 24.07.2026: The hunger strike and sit-in continued with the help of student groups and activists. Legal scrutiny on police conducts also intensified.

25.07.2026: Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan resigned.[28] The Government assured the nation that FIRs and cases against protesters would be quashed, victims would get compensation, and administrative reforms would be carried out.[29] Following this, the CJP officially called off the agitation.

2.4 Scale and Duration

The events detailed above ran from 01.06.2026, to 25.07.2026, around eight weeks, centered mainly around the Ministry of Education and Jantar Mantar. Protests during this period spread

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[25] Babu, N. M. (2026, July 22). Thousands brave rain and regroup at CJP protest site, day after police crackdown. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/braving-rain-thousands-re-group-at-cjp-protest-site-at-jantar-mantar/article71250187.ece

[26] Barik, S. (2026, July 24). Live video feeds, AI-aided facial recognition: How police are surveilling protesters at Jantar Mantar. *The Indian Express*. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/delhi-police-facial-recognition-ai-surveillance-jantar-mantar-10801778/

[27] Bhaumik, A. (2026, July 22). 'Don't waste our time': CJI Kant declines to take cognisance of police violence during CJP's Parliament march. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-declines-urgent-listing-of-plea-against-police-action-during-cjp-protest-march/article71252429.ece

[28] Mishra, A. (2026, July 26). Dharmendra Pradhan's resignation: Why the Modi government backed down. *Frontline*. https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/dharmendra-pradhan-resignation-bjp-modi-youth-protests-cjp/article71268617.ece

[29] Rajagopal, K. (2026b, September 2). Supreme Court quashes FIRs against Gen Z NEET-UG protesters under Article 142. *The Hindu*. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/neet-protestors-fir-delhi-police-supreme-court-hearing-september-1-2026/article71414058.ece

to cities and towns across the country, but these are outside the scope of the investigation of this Tribunal.

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATION: PROTEST, EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

This section sets out the constitutional and international law related to protest, peaceful expression of dissent and freedom of assembly, on which the later Sections of this Report rely. Part A describes the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly. Part B describes how the courts have treated protest and dissent as part of a democracy. The limits within which the State may restrict these rights, and the legal distinction between peaceful and unlawful assembly, are set out in later Sections.

3.1.1 Free Speech and Peaceful Assembly: Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) and International Law:

Article 19(1) of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens, among other freedoms, the right "to freedom of speech and expression" (clause (a)) and the right "to assemble peaceably and without arms" (clause (b)).[30] These are fundamental rights. A citizen can ask the Supreme Court to enforce them directly under Article 32,[31] and a law or an executive act that violates them can be set aside.

Two related rights in the same Article also are germane to public assembly to protest. Article 19(1)(c) protects the right to form associations or unions, and Article 19(1)(d) protects the right to move freely throughout the territory of India. The second is the right that allows a person to travel to a protest site, and it is engaged when a person is stopped or held on the way.

3.1.2 Free speech and expression

Article 19(1)(a) covers what a person says, writes, publishes or otherwise communicates, and the right to receive and share information.[32] In *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*,[33] the Supreme Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement, and held that mere discussion or advocacy of a cause, however unpopular, is at the heart of the right. The right is not limited to the spoken word. In *Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India,*[34] the Court held that freedom of speech and expression is protected when it is exercised through the internet.

3.1.3 Peaceful assembly

Article 19(1)(b) is the right to gather with others.[35] The Constitution attaches two conditions to it: the assembly must be peaceable, and it must be without arms. A violent or armed assembly

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[30] Constitution of India, art. 19
[31] Constitution of India, art. 32
[32] Constitution of India, art. 19
[33] (2015) 5 SCC 1
[34] (2020) 3 SCC 637
[35] Constitution of India, art. 19

is outside the Article. A peaceful and unarmed assembly is inside it, whatever the cause for which people have gathered and whether or not the cause is popular. In *Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re*[36], the Supreme Court stated that "Citizens have a fundamental right to assembly and peaceful protest which cannot be taken away by an arbitrary executive or legislative action."

3.1.4 How the two rights work together

A protester uses both rights at once, since those who assemble to demand something are also expressing a view. In *Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police and Ors.*[37], a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court said: "Article 19, one of the cornerstones of the Constitution of India, confers upon its citizens two treasured rights i.e. the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to assemble peacefully without arms under Article 19(1)(b).[38] These rights, in cohesion, enable every citizen to assemble peacefully and protest against the actions or inactions of the State. The same must be respected and encouraged by the State, for the strength of a democracy such as ours lies in the same." The Bench went on to say that these rights are subject to reasonable restrictions and to regulation by the police authorities concerned. The limits are set out in Section 8 of the report.

3.1.5 Forms of protest

The same Court in *Ramlila Maidan*[39] held that a hunger strike "cannot be termed as unconstitutional or barred under any law" and that it "is a form of protest which has been accepted, both historically and legally in our constitutional jurisprudence of India."

3.1.6 International law

India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as "ICCPR"). Article 19 of the Covenant protects the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers".[40] Article 21 of the Covenant recognises the right of peaceful assembly.[41] The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 37 (2020), describes this right as one that enables individuals "to express themselves collectively and to participate in shaping their societies"[42] The Committee has also

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[36] (2012) 5 SCC 1
[37] (2020) 10 SCC 439
[38] Constitution of India, art. 19
[39] (2012) 5 SCC 1
[40] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights
[41] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights
[42] Human Rights Committee. (2020). *General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21)* (CCPR/C/GC/37). United Nations.

stated that isolated acts of violence by some participants do not, by themselves, make an assembly as a whole non-peaceful, and that the State must separate those who act violently from those who do not.[43]

3.2. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DISSENT AS INTEGRAL TO DEMOCRACY

3.2.1 The founding idea

On 25.11.1949, in his last speech to the Constituent Assembly, Dr B.R. Ambedkar said: *"Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life."*[44] The freedoms of speech and assembly are among the means by which people take part in the life of a democracy between elections.

***Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad*[45]**

The Supreme Court said that "Freedom of assembly is an essential element of any democratic system. At the root of this concept lies the citizens' right to meet face to face with others for the discussion of their ideas and problems, religious, political, economic or social." It said that such assemblies are no less important than in the past "for the education of the public and the formation of opinion". It also said: "Public streets are the 'natural' places for expression of opinion and dissemination of ideas. Indeed, it may be argued that for some persons these places are the only possible arenas for the effective exercise of their freedom of speech and assembly." A protest in a public place is therefore not a departure from ordinary civic life. It is a recognised way of taking part in it.

***Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re*[46]**

The Supreme Court examined a police action at night against a gathering of people who had assembled to protest. It held that the right to assemble and protest peacefully cannot be taken away by arbitrary executive action, and that a hunger strike is an accepted form of protest. The

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https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=WEtyW87uznJql0nPB0R%2BjvIANofAyBdf7Aw9oQ77nX58%2Fy%2BuM8cxMUWb93tupOebEKl%2FMANbswS4GcF1CgqyOg%3D%3D

[43] Human Rights Committee. (2020). *General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21)* (CCPR/C/GC/37). United Nations. https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=WEtyW87uznJql0nPB0R%2BjvIANofAyBdf7Aw9oQ77nX58%2Fy%2BuM8cxMUWb93tupOebEKl%2FMANbswS4GcF1CgqyOg%3D%3D

[44] Supreme Court of India. (n.d.). *Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's speeches in the Constituent Assembly*. https://api.sci.gov.in/AMB/Speech.php

[45] (1973) 1 SCC 227

[46] (2012) 5 SCC 1

case is the Court's most direct statement on a police action against a sleeping or peaceful gathering.

Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police and Ors.[47]

In the passage quoted in Part A, the Bench traced the right to protest to the freedom struggle. It observed that "the erstwhile mode and manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self-ruled democracy", and that "Our constitutional scheme comes with the right to protest and express dissent, but with an obligation towards certain duties." The Court thus recognised the right and duties attached to it. The case concerned a long occupation of a public road, and the limits it set are noted in later sections.

Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India[48]

The case concerned a ban on protests at Jantar Mantar. The Supreme Court held that the authorities may regulate demonstrations in order to maintain public order, but cannot extinguish the constitutional right to protest altogether. This is the same site as the one with which this Report is concerned. The State's power over a protest at Jantar Mantar is a power to regulate it, and it does not include a power to prevent it.

3.2.2. Dissent and the free flow of ideas

In *Khushboo v. Kanniammal*[49], the Supreme Court said that "The free flow of opinions and ideas is essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. An informed citizenry is a pre-condition for meaningful governance." In *Romila Thapar v. Union of India*[50], Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, in a dissenting opinion, wrote: "Individuals who assert causes which may be unpopular to the echelons of power are yet entitled to the freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution. Dissent is a symbol of a vibrant democracy. Voices in opposition cannot be muzzled by persecuting those who take up unpopular causes." In *Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.*[51], Justice K. Subba Rao, also in dissent, wrote that "movement under the scrutinising gaze of a policeman is not free movement. The whole country is his jail." The nine-judge Bench in *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*[52] later endorsed the minority view in that case, and said that neither life nor liberty is a bounty conferred by the State.

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[47] (2020) 10 SCC 439
[48] AIR 2018 SC 3476
[49] (2010) 5 SCC 600
[50] (2018) 10 SCC 753
[51] AIR 1963 SC 1295
[52] (2017) 10 SCC 1

3.3 What does the law so far establishes

The two parts above establish the starting point for the rest of this Report. The Constitution protects both what people say and their right to gather peaceably and without arms, and a person who protests uses both rights at once. The Supreme Court has said that this protection is not a favour of the State. Public streets are natural places for expression, dissent is a sign of a working democracy, and a hunger strike is an accepted form of protest. The State may regulate a protest at Jantar Mantar, but it may not extinguish it. Those rights are not unlimited. Whether the State's restrictions on the protest, and the force used against it, stayed within the limits that the law sets is the question that the remaining law in this report addresses. Those limits are the reasonable restrictions that Articles 19(2) and 19(3)[53] permit, the test that any restriction must meet, and the legal line between a peaceful assembly and an unlawful one.

[53] Constitution of India, art. 19

4. THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL

4.1 WAS THE POLICE CORRECT IN DEEMING THE PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AS UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY?

The Delhi Police have said that the gathering of 20 July 2026 was an unlawful assembly, and that force followed for that reason. This Section asks whether that description was correct. It states the law on when an assembly is unlawful, sets out the evidence before the Tribunal, and ends with the Tribunal's conclusions. It does not examine the validity of the prohibitory order, the closure of routes or the degree of force. The Tribunal heard no police officer. The position of the Delhi Police is taken from its public documents of 19.20.26 and from a published report of its affidavit[54] before the Supreme Court, whose original copy the Tribunal could not obtain.

4.1.1 The Legal Position

Article 19(1)(b) protects the right of citizens to assemble "peaceably and without arms".[55] An assembly that is peaceable and unarmed has this protection even if it is large, noisy, inconvenient or critical of the Government. It loses the protection only if it is an "unlawful assembly". The term has a statutory meaning in section 189(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023[56] (hereinafter referred to as "BNS"), formerly section 141 of the Indian Penal Code[57] (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"). That meaning is narrow, and it is not enough that the police regard a gathering as unwelcome, unauthorised or disruptive.

Five or more persons with a common object

Section 189(1) requires two things. There must be five or more persons, and they must share one of five common objects. The objects are: (i) to overawe, by criminal force or a show of it, the Central or a State Government, Parliament or a State Legislature, or a public servant exercising lawful power; (ii) to resist the execution of any law or legal process; (iii) to commit mischief, criminal trespass or any other offence; (iv) to take possession of property, to deprive a person of a right of way or the use of water, or to enforce a right or supposed right, by criminal force or a show of it; and (v) to compel a person, by criminal force or a show of it, to do what he is not legally bound to do or to omit what he is legally entitled to do.[58] Three of the five objects need criminal force or a show of it. The other two, resisting a law or legal process and

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[54] Jain, D. (2026, August 18). No excessive force used against student protesters, Parliament march was illegal: Delhi Police to Supreme Court. LiveLaw. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/no-excessive-force-used-against-student-protesters-parliament-march-was-illegal-delhi-police-to-supreme-court-546209

[55] Constitution of India, art 19

[56] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

[57] Indian Penal Code, Act No. 45 (1860). (India).

[58] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

committing an offence, do not need force, but the second needs an offence. The list does not include marching, shouting slogans, carrying banners, being numerous, causing inconvenience or criticising the Government. An assembly of five or more persons with none of these objects is not unlawful, however large or loud.

The object must be shown, and each member must share it

Under section 189(2), a person is a member of an unlawful assembly only if, "being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly", he "intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it".[59] Knowledge and intention are part of the offence. The Supreme Court has said that the question is whether the persons in the assembly entertained the common object, and that a person who is merely present, without sharing it, is not made a member by his presence. In a large crowd the courts have asked for care in deciding who was a member, and have asked for proof of the common object for each person charged. Section 190 of BNSS, 2023[60] (formerly section 149 Code of Criminal Procedure) makes every member liable for an offence committed by any member in pursuing the common object, but it applies only once the assembly has been shown to be unlawful. It does not decide whether it is.

An assembly can change its character

The Explanation to section 189(1) says that an assembly "which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly".[61] In *Moti Das v. State of Bihar*[62] a lawful gathering became unlawful after its members acted violently. A gathering that began peacefully is not unlawful from the start because of a later violent episode, and the law looks at the common object of the assembly at the time. The international standard to the same effect is that isolated violence by some does not make the whole assembly non-peaceful, and that the State has to separate those who act violently from those who do not.

Lack of permission, and disobedience of an order

Neither the absence of permission nor the existence of a prohibitory order under section 163 BNSS[63] is an object listed in section 189(1)[64]. The State may argue that those who assembled

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[59] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[60] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Act No. 46 (2023). (India).
[61] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[62] AIR 1954 SC 657
[63] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Act No. 46 (2023). (India).
[64] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

against such an order shared the object of committing an offence, which is disobedience of an order of a public servant under section 223 BNS.[65] For that argument to succeed, the order must have been in force, it must have been lawful under Article 19(3)[66], and those present must have known of it and shared the object of disobeying it. The common object, and not the absence of permission as such, is what section 189(1)[67] looks at.

What follows if an assembly is unlawful

Knowing membership is punishable with up to six months' imprisonment, a fine, or both (section 189(2)). Staying on after the assembly has been commanded to disperse "in the manner prescribed by law", or being a member while armed with a deadly weapon, carries up to two years (section 189). A separate offence applies to a person who stays in any assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb the public peace after it has been lawfully commanded to disperse (section 189).[68] If force or violence is used in pursuing the common object, every member is guilty of rioting (section 191), which a peaceful assembly cannot commit. A command to disperse that was not given in the manner the law prescribes cannot found the offence of staying on.

The power to disperse

An Executive Magistrate, or the officer in charge of a police station, may command an unlawful assembly, or one of five or more persons likely to disturb the public peace, to disperse. If it does not, it may be dispersed by force, and the armed forces may be called in only in the cases and manner the Code provides (sections 148 to 151 BNSS, formerly sections 129 to 132 CrPC). Force may be used only after the command, and only as much as is needed. In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*[69] the Supreme Court said: "In those cases where assembly is peaceful, use of police force is not warranted at all. However, in those situations where a crowd or assembly becomes violent it may necessitate and justify using reasonable police force."

Who must show it

The label "unlawful assembly" is a conclusion that evidence must support. In a criminal case the prosecution must show the common object beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State relies

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[65] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[66] Constitution of India, art. 19
[67] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[68] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[69] 2016 INSC 597

on the label to restrict a peaceful assembly, the Constitution requires it to show that the restriction is lawful, necessary and proportionate. A declaration by the police that an assembly is unlawful, or the existence of a prohibitory order, does not in itself establish that it is.

RAF Manual

Under the Manual, the commander declares the assembly unlawful and orders dispersal with a warning, only after negotiation has failed (para 13.7).

4.1.3. The Evidence

The position of the Delhi Police

The Public Advisory of 19 July 2026 said that no permission had been sought or granted for the march, that a prohibitory order under section 163 BNSS was in force, and that anyone who disobeyed would be prosecuted under section 223 BNS. As published, the affidavit[70] says that about 30,000 persons were spread over three kilometres, that about 5,000 police personnel were deployed, that the barricades were breached, that the assembly was unlawful because no permission had been given, that force was graded, and that about 240 police personnel and about 200 protesters were injured. It also says that 2,873 persons face criminal charges. The affidavit[71], as published, says that the object described in the videos as a baton fitted with nails was a protester's flag stick.

The prohibitory order

The order of 24 June 2026 was made by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Parliament Street. It was posted on the X account of the DCP, New Delhi, at 8:49 PM on 19 July 2026, about fifteen hours before the march. It covers the sub-division, while the Advisory describes an order across the district. Both documents are addressed to the public and not to the organisers.

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[70] Jain, D. (2026, August 18). No excessive force used against student protesters, Parliament march was illegal: Delhi Police to Supreme Court. LiveLaw. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/no-excessive-force-used-against-student-protesters-parliament-march-was-illegal-delhi-police-to-supreme-court-546209

[71] Jain, D. (2026, August 18). No excessive force used against student protesters, Parliament march was illegal: Delhi Police to Supreme Court. LiveLaw. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/no-excessive-force-used-against-student-protesters-parliament-march-was-illegal-delhi-police-to-supreme-court-546209

The character of the assembly, in the witnesses' accounts

The witnesses who were at different places described a crowd that was unarmed and was walking in an orderly way. Sunny Tomar a youtuber and Avni (name changed) stated that the police made way for the marchers and then charged them. Witnesses described persons who had sat down, a human chain, students who had fallen, and persons who were leaving, on whom tear gas and lathis were used. Kaira (name changed) stated that the police continued to charge while the marchers said they were leaving. Gawande stated that no warning was given before the charge. No witness described an attempt by the marchers to take possession of property, to compel any person, or to overawe the Government by force.

Conduct of some protesters

Vishal (name changed) stated that protesters threw stones at Central Park after tear gas had been fired. The Delhi Police state that barricades were breached and that police personnel were injured, and the injuries of about 200 protesters are not disputed. The Tribunal has seen no video, medical record or other document that shows who breached which barricade, or when, or who injured police personnel.

Declaration and command to disperse

No witness described hearing a declaration that the assembly was unlawful, or a command to disperse, before force was used. Standing Order No. 309 requires repeated announcements on the public address system, videographed, and a recorded warning before force. The Delhi Police have not produced any such record.

4.1.4. The Tribunal's Conclusions

Absence of permission does not make the assembly unlawful

The Delhi Police's stated ground is that no permission was given. Section 189(1)[72] does not list that as a common object. The question the law asks is what the persons assembled intended to do. The Advisory describes the event as a proposed march to Parliament, and the witnesses spoke of walking, sitting down and forming a human chain. None of this is one of the objects in section 189(1). The Tribunal finds that the lack of permission did not, by itself, make the gathering an unlawful assembly.

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[72] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

The prohibitory order does not fill the gap on the evidence before the Tribunal

The State may say that the persons assembled had the object of disobeying the order. That depends on the order being lawful, and on those present knowing of it and sharing that object. The order was published about fifteen hours before the march, it is addressed to the public and not to the organisers, and its scope is stated differently in the Advisory. Whether the order was lawful is considered later part of the report. On the knowledge and object of those present, the Tribunal has seen no evidence. Persons who were seated, walking in order or leaving cannot be said, on the testimony, to have shared an object of defying it. Even if all this were shown, the offence would be one of disobedience under section 223 BNS, and not one involving force. The Tribunal finds that the State has not shown that the persons assembled shared the object of committing an offence.

No evidence of force or a show of force by the assembly as a whole

Three of the five objects need criminal force or a show of it by the persons assembled: overawing the Government, Parliament or a public servant, taking possession or enforcing a right, and compelling a person. The witnesses describe an unarmed crowd that did not resist, and the Tribunal has seen no evidence that the assembly as a whole had an object of that kind. The Delhi Police's account of 30,000 persons and of breached barricades speaks to the size of the crowd and to conduct at certain points. It does not show a common object. The Tribunal finds that the evidence does not show that the assembly had any of the objects that need criminal force.

The breach of barricades and the throwing of objects

The Tribunal does not discount the statements of the Delhi Police that barricades were breached and that police personnel were injured, or the testimony of Vishal that stones were thrown. These matters could make out the third object, to commit mischief or an offence, against the persons who did these things. And, under the Explanation and *Moti Das v. State of Bihar*,[73] an assembly may change its character. But what the law then asks is who acted violently and when, and whether the others shared the object. The Tribunal has seen no evidence on who breached the barricades, when and where, and no sign that the police separated those persons from the rest of the assembly, many of whom, on the testimony, were seated, walking or leaving. Violence by some, at some points, does not make the whole

[73] AIR 1954 SC 657

assembly unlawful, at the beginning or later. The Tribunal finds that the State has not shown that the assembly as a whole changed its character, and that conduct by some persons, if established, could be acted on against those persons only.

No declaration, and no command to disperse that the witnesses heard

The power to disperse an assembly by force depends on a command to disperse given in the manner the law prescribes, and the offence of staying on depends on it too. No witness described such a command or a declaration that the assembly was unlawful, and the Delhi Police have produced none, although Standing Order No. 309 requires one to be recorded. The Tribunal makes its finding on warnings in Section 4.3 of the report, and notes here only that the label was acted on in the absence of the steps that give the label its legal effect. The Tribunal finds that the Delhi Police have not shown that the assembly was declared unlawful and commanded to disperse, in the manner that the law requires, before force was used.

The police were not correct, on the evidence, in treating the assembly as unlawful

The Tribunal finds that the Delhi Police have not shown that the gathering of 20 July 2026 was an unlawful assembly within section 189(1) BNS.[74] On the evidence it heard, it was an assembly that was unarmed, that did not resist, and that was peaceable within Article 19(1)(b)[75], in which some persons may have acted otherwise. The Tribunal makes no finding that every person at the protest was peaceful, and makes no finding on the guilt of any person who is charged.

Limits of the evidence

The Tribunal heard no police officer, and could not obtain the original of the affidavit[76]. It has not seen the video, medical or other records on which the Delhi Police rely for the breach of barricades, and may not have seen all the material that the officers had before them. These conclusions are recorded on the evidence presented to the Tribunal.

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[74] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[75] Constitution of India, art.19
[76] Jain, D. (2026, August 18). No excessive force used against student protesters, Parliament march was illegal: Delhi Police to Supreme Court. LiveLaw. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/no-excessive-force-used-against-student-protesters-parliament-march-was-illegal-delhi-police-to-supreme-court-546209

4.2 DID THE POLICE LEADERSHIP ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEADERS OF THE PROTESTERS BEFORE THE PROTESTS AND/OR BEFORE THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE?

This section examines whether the police leadership tried to talk to the leaders of the protest, either in the days before 20.07.26 or on the morning of that day before force was used. Talks and de-escalation are the first stage of the graded response that the law requires. Section 4.3 deals with the warnings given to the crowd, and Section 4.4 with the stages of force that followed. This section refers to them only where they bear on negotiation.

4.2.2 The Law and the Standards

Talks are part of the constitutional test

As Section 8 of the report explains, a restriction on a peaceful assembly must pursue a legitimate aim, must be a suitable means of reaching it, and must be the least restrictive means available. A conversation with the leaders is the least restrictive step there is. Where it has not been tried, the question whether a less restrictive course was open arises at once.

The courts and international standards

In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*[77], the Supreme Court said that where an assembly is peaceful, the use of police force is not warranted at all. In *Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re*,[78] the Court examined a police action taken against a gathering without a proper opportunity to disperse and held that preventive action cannot be an excuse for disproportionate force. The Supreme Court has itself preferred dialogue to force. In the *Shaheen Bagh case*,[79] it appointed two interlocutors to talk to the protesters about the blocked road. Principle 4 of the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) provides that officials shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to force. The Resource Book on Human Rights and Law Enforcement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights advises officials to consider in every situation whether force can be avoided altogether and, where it is needed, whether de-escalation is

[77] 2016 INSC 597
[78] (2012) 5 SCC 1
[79] Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police and ors., AIR 2020 SC 4704

possible. The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 37, encourages dialogue between law enforcement officials and the organisers of an assembly.[80]

Talks come first in the Delhi Police's own instructions

Standing Order No. 309 sets out how a demonstration is to be handled. It requires constant liaison with the leaders and organisers, and repeated appeals on the public address system, which are to be videographed, asking the leaders and the demonstrators to remain peaceful and to come forward with a memorandum or deputation. Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules,[81] which applies in Delhi, requires that all attempts to disperse a crowd by warning and exhortation be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly. The power to command an assembly to disperse under section 148, BNSS, 2023 comes only after that stage.

RAF Manual

The Manual places the duty on the RAF contingent commander also: to address the leaders over a public address system, invite them to talk, and involve the local police and magistracy (para 13.7). The Tribunal has no evidence that this was done.

4.2.3 Evidence Before the Tribunal

The Tribunal heard two witnesses on whether talks or de-escalation were attempted before force was used on 20.07.26. Both were close to the leadership of the protest.

Anish Gawande stated that he reached Delhi on 19.07.26 and was asked to join the “Sansad Chalo March”. He reached Jantar Mantar at 1:00 AM on 20.07.26. He stated that at that time the police stopped checking identity cards and barricades were put up.

He stated that on the morning of 20.07.26, Mr J.P. Nadda, the Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare, invited CJP’s Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka to his house. By the time the two left, the internet had been suspended, and phone calls were jammed. The protesters at the site were agitated and wanted to begin the march. An ambulance then tried to pass through the middle of the crowd towards the stage, and people thought that Sonam Wangchuk had returned.

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[80] Human Rights Committee. (2020). *General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21)* (CCPR/C/GC/37). United Nations. https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=WEtyW87uznJql0nPB0R%2BjvIANofAyBdf7Aw9oQ77nX58%2Fy%2BuM8cxMUWb93tupOebEKl%2FMANbswS4GcF1CgqyOg%3D%3D

[81] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

He had not, and the ambulance made a U-turn and left. Gawande said that they then understood it to have been an attempt to create a stampede. Aameen also testified about this ambulance in his testimony.

Abhijeet Dipke was on the third day of a hunger strike. The father of a student who had died by suicide after the NEET examination asked him to break his fast and proceed with the march, and he did so. The protesters formed a human chain around the truck on which Dipke, Gawande, Geetanjali J Angmo and others were standing. Dipke and his team decided to move from the Kerala Bhawan side.

Gawande stated that as the march proceeded, the Delhi Police, without any warning or negotiation and without trying to de-escalate, began to charge with lathis and to fire tear gas. To let the march move smoothly, he got down from the truck. The driver of the truck was also beaten and dragged out of the vehicle. With no internet or phone network, the group had no way of contacting Das and Ranka.

Saurav Das stated that he and Ashutosh Ranka were invited to Mr Nadda's house for negotiation, but were "house arrested". When they arrived, their phones were taken, which they protested, and the phones were returned after a while. In the meantime, they discussed their demands with the minister. When they got their phones back, they learnt of the situation at the protest site and raised it with him. He replied, "*Kuch nahi hoga, mai baat karta hun Delhi police se*" (nothing will happen; I will talk to the Delhi Police).

4.2.4 Administrative Response

The Delhi Police filed a counter-affidavit before the Supreme Court, sworn by Mr Sachin Sharma, Deputy Commissioner of Police. It answers a writ petition, *Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India*,[82] and is intended as a common reply in four connected petitions that seek a Court-monitored investigation into alleged police excesses. The Tribunal was not able to obtain the original affidavit. What follows is taken from a published account of it in the media report[83] dated 17.10.26. It is set out so that the position of the police is before the reader, and it is not treated as proof of any fact. The affidavit states that more than 30,000 protesters were present around Jantar Mantar on 20.07.26, spread over about three kilometres, and about 5,000 police officers were trying to manage them. The protest ceased to be peaceful after sections of the crowd breached multiple layers of barricades and tried to move towards Parliament. The police say they used force only after that, and that the force was graded and was in line with the permissible modes of controlling violence. The published account does not state that the police

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[82] (W.P.(C) No. 280/2026)

[83] https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/no-excessive-force-used-against-student-protesters-parliament-march-was-illegal-delhi-police-to-supreme-court-546209

leadership approached the organisers before 20.07.26, spoke to them on the morning of the march, invited them to seek permission, or made any appeal to them at the site. It also does not mention the announcements, warnings or recordings that Standing Order No. 309 requires. The Tribunal cannot say from a media account whether or not that affidavit is silent on these points.

4.2.5. The Tribunal's Finding

The only talks held were with a minister, not with the police

The one attempt at talks that the witnesses described was the invitation to Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka to Mr J.P. Nadda's house on the morning of 20.07.26. The invitation did not come from the police leadership, and neither witness said that a police officer took part. Standing Order No. 309 places the duty of liaison on the police, and a meeting with a minister does not discharge it. Das said that when the two learned of the situation at the site, the minister replied that nothing would happen and that he would talk to the Delhi Police. The Tribunal has no evidence that he did, or that anything followed. The Tribunal finds that this meeting did not involve the police leadership.

The police account and the witnesses' account do not meet, but they agree on one point

The police case, as described in the published account of the affidavit, is that the crowd breached the barricades and turned violent, and that force followed. The witnesses' case is that force came without warning or talks as the march moved off. The Tribunal does not decide that disagreement here. The two accounts agree on one point: neither the witnesses nor the published account describes any approach by the police leadership to the leaders of the protest, before 20.07.26 or on the morning of the march. The police case rests on the conduct of the crowd, and not on any attempt at talks.

The size of the crowd does not remove the duty

The police say that 30,000 people were spread over three kilometres and that about 5,000 officers were managing them. A crowd of that size is the case in which the Standing Order's requirement of liaison with leaders and repeated appeals is most useful, because the leaders are the means by which a large crowd can be reached. The numbers explain why the task was hard. They do not answer whether the steps that come before force were taken.

The two leaders were away and out of contact when the march moved off

Two leaders went to the meeting, and their phones were taken for a time. By the time they left, the internet had been suspended and calls were jammed (Section 6 examines the suspension and jamming). The march then set off from the Kerala Bhawan side, and the charge and tear gas followed. The leaders could not reach the group, and the group could not reach them. The two people best placed to speak for the protest were therefore away from the site when it moved off. If the Delhi Police wished to speak to them, the same loss of communication stood in the way. If the police did not try, nothing in the evidence shows it.

No warning or de-escalation at the march

Gawande stated that the Delhi Police gave no warning, held no negotiation and made no attempt to de-escalate before they began to charge with lathis and to fire tear gas as the march moved off. Standing Order No. 309 requires repeated, videographed appeals on the public address system, and the Delhi Police are in a position to produce the record. The Tribunal has not seen one.

Nothing before 20.07.26

Neither witness spoke of any talks, or any invitation to seek permission, between the start of the protest and 19.07.26. The police document before the Tribunal is a prohibitory order dated 24.07.26, which is addressed to the public and not to the organisers. Barricades and the end of identity checks after 1:00 AM on 20.07.26 are not talks.

4.2.5.7 Conclusion

On the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds no sign that the police leadership attempted to negotiate with the leaders of the protest, or to de-escalate, before force was used on 20.07.26. This is contrary to the sequence in Standing Order No. 309 and to Principle 4 of the Basic Principles, and it leaves open the question whether a less restrictive course was available, which the Constitution requires the State to consider. The conclusion rests on two witnesses, on a published account of an affidavit that the Tribunal could not obtain in the original, and on the absence of any police record of talks or appeals. The Tribunal heard no police officers.

4.3 DID THE POLICE GIVE DUE WARNING TO THE PROTESTORS BEFORE USING FORCE?4.3 DID THE POLICE GIVE DUE WARNING TO THE PROTESTORS BEFORE USING FORCE?

The law does not allow the police to unilaterally disperse the crowd with force; negotiations and a warning must be issued. Whether the force used on 20.07.26 was proportionate or disproportionate does not depend only on whether the assembly was "unlawful" or not (as discussed in Section III), but also on whether the assembly was given appropriate warnings to disperse before the police resorted to tear gas and batons.

4.3.1. The applicable standard

According to Section 148 BNSS, an Executive Magistrate or an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector can order an assembly likely to cause disturbance to disperse. Force can be used only if, after being given proper warning, the crowd does not disperse or shows determination not to disperse. Even then, the force used must be the minimum, reasonably necessary, and persuasion, advice and warning must precede it as far as practicable.

Delhi Police's own rules say the same. As per Standing Order 72, the principle of minimum force must be followed at all times. Punjab Police Rule 14.56[84], applicable to Delhi, states that "all attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings, exhortation, etc., shall be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly," and that once force becomes necessary, "the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit" must be used. Standing Order 309[85] mandates that the force be deployed step-by-step: unarmed personnel at the first barricade, personnel with protective gear at the second, and full riot-control equipment only at the third. The order further states, in terms, that "warning on the Public Address [announcement] system prior to use of any kind of force must be ensured and also videographed."

This standard is in consonance with international rules as well. The UN Basic Principle on Use of Force also mandates that force must be used only when absolutely necessary, that a warning be given with proper time to be observed, and that injuries and damage be minimised. In other words, issuing a warning is not optional; this is a settled requirement, both in Indian law and at international level.

Courts have also taken this very seriously. In the *Ramlila Maidan*[86] case, the Supreme Court said that even if the crowd had pelted stones, a proper announcement ought to have been made

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[84] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

[85] Delhi Police. (n.d.). *Standing Order No. 309*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cDoPfhBsiXz5yAEpkv4rPN0F9NHnsppx/view

[86] (2012) 5 SCC 1

before firing tear gas; provocation does not waive the requirement of warning. The Punjab-Haryana High Court has also reiterated that force can be used only when crowds do not disperse even after dispersal orders. The Delhi High Court has allowed the use of batons only for the limited purpose of dispersing an unlawful assembly, and the Supreme Court has confirmed that batons can be lethal if they strike a vital part of the body. This is a reminder that the instruments involved here were not trivial, and that the procedural safeguards surrounding their use exist for these reasons.

Read together, these create a single standard: first warning, second, a chance to comply; only then, if necessary, a proportionate and documented response. The Tribunal has examined the events of 20.07.26 against this standard.

4.3.2 RAF Manual

The Manual prescribes the form: *"Aapka majma khilaf kanoon karar diya gaya hai. Apko hukum diya jata hai ki aap jald se jald yahan se tittar bittar ho jaye, warna aap ke virudh jabar kiya jayega."* It is to be spoken over the public address system, with a banner in the local language, made sure to be understood, and repeated twice or more (para 13.7). The action is to be videographed and diarised (para 13.11). No witness described such a warning or banner, and the record has not been produced.

4.3.3 The evidence before the Tribunal

Avni, from All India Students' Organization (AISA), stated that no announcement or warning was made before the imposition of Section 163 BNSS or before the use of force. Only one announcement was made, before 10 a.m., and that too concerned the imposition of Section 163, no order was issued regarding dispersal of the crowd. Ali, from the same organization, told the Tribunal that the police closed all the exit points of Jantar Mantar, and only then ordered the crowd to disperse. If the gates had already been closed, the crowd had no practical means of dispersing even had it wished to comply.

4.3.4 Administrative Response

The affidavit filed by the Delhi Police in the Supreme Court does not say that any announcement, declaration of unlawful assembly or warning was made before force was used. It does not give the number of announcements, their time, the person who made them, the language, or whether they were recorded. These are the steps that Standing Order No. 309

requires, and that Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules[87] makes the condition of force. The affidavit's account is that the crowd's conduct at the barricades led to force. It is not described as saying that a warning came between the two. The Tribunal cannot say from a media account that the affidavit is silent on warnings.

4.3.5 The Tribunal's Finding

Absence of proper warning

Section 148 BNSS, Standing Order 309[88] and Rule 14.56 require a proper, audible and recorded warning, and a command to disperse, before force is used. The Supreme Court affirmed in *Ramlila Maidan*[89] that people must be given a genuine opportunity to disperse. The Tribunal finds that this requirement was not followed in substance. The exits were closed before any order to disperse was issued, so the crowd could not have complied even if it had wished to.

Force beyond the minimum necessary

The Tribunal finds that the force used went beyond the minimum necessary. This finding stands apart from the finding on warning. A crowd that had been properly warned could still be met only with the force that the same provisions allow, and no more.

Men in civilian clothes carrying lathis

The order under Section 163, issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Parliament Street, New Delhi, prohibits carrying lathis and similar articles in the notified area. The testimonies and photographs show men in civilian clothes, without police identification, assaulting students. This is more than a further failure of warning, because it conflicts with the order that the police were enforcing that day. Who these men were, and under whose authority, if any, they acted, is a separate question, taken up in later sections of the report.

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[87] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

[88] Delhi Police. (n.d.). *Standing Order No. 309*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cDoPfhBsiXz5yAEpkv4rPN0F9NHnsppx/view

[89] (2012) 5 SCC 1

4.4 WHEN THE POLICE DECIDED TO USE FORCE, DID THEY FOLLOW A GRADED RESPONSE, USING LESS-LETHAL METHODS FIRST, AND WAS THE FORCE PROPORTIONAL?

4.4.1 Scope of Inquiry

This Section examines whether, on 20.07.26 and on the days that followed, the police and the paramilitary forces deployed with them moved through the stages that the law and their own instructions prescribe, and whether the force used was proportionate to the conduct of the persons against whom it was used. The stages are persuasion, warning, dispersal with the least force, and only then the more severe means.

4.4.2 Applicable Law and Standards

International standards

The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) provide that Governments and law enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules on the use of force (Principle 1), and that the use of non-lethal incapacitating weapons shall be carefully controlled (Principle 3). Officials shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to force, and may use force only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result (Principle 4).

Where force is unavoidable, they shall exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved, minimise damage and injury, and ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected person at the earliest possible moment (Principle 5). Arbitrary or abusive use of force shall be punished as a criminal offence (Principle 7), and exceptional circumstances such as a public emergency may not be invoked to justify a departure from the Principles (Principle 8).

The Resource Book on Human Rights and Law Enforcement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights advises officials to plan in advance for the differentiated use of force, to give priority to non-violent means, to consider in every situation whether force can be avoided altogether and, where it is necessary, whether de-escalation is possible, and to record every use of force. The Manual on Human Rights for Police Officers of the National Human Rights Commission similarly states that coercive measures must remain the last resort.

Statute

Section 148 of BNSS allows an Executive Magistrate, or an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, to command an unlawful assembly, or an assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, to disperse. If it does not disperse, or shows a determination not to, it may be dispersed by force. Section 149 allows the Executive Magistrate of the highest rank present to call on the armed forces to disperse an assembly where it cannot otherwise be dispersed and public security requires it, with the minimum force. Section 150 allows a commissioned or gazetted officer of the armed forces to act where no Executive Magistrate can be reached, and requires him to communicate with one as soon as possible. Section 151 protects a person acting in good faith under these provisions, and bars prosecution for such an act without the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. The provisions correspond to Sections 129 to 132 of the CrPC, 1973.

Delhi Police Instruction

Standing Order No. 72[90] of the Delhi Police, on the dispersal of unlawful assemblies, directs that the principle of minimum force be kept in view, adds that whenever force has to be used it should be used "with determination and firmness", and requires that the instructions in Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules[91], Sections 28(1)(p) and 29 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978[92] and the Delhi (Control of Procession, Assemblies and Playing of Music in Public Place) Regulations, 1980 be followed.[93]

Rule 14.56, which applies in Delhi, provides that force is to be regulated according to the circumstances of each case; that its object is to quell a disturbance of the peace or to disperse an assembly that threatens one and has refused to disperse; and that no ulterior object, such as a punitive or repressive effect, is to be taken into consideration. All attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings and exhortation are to be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly and ordered to disperse. Once an order to disperse has been defied, or the attitude of the crowd is obviously defiant, force is to be used without hesitation, but its degree is to be the minimum that the responsible officer, with due care and attention, decides is necessary for effective dispersal, and its degree and duration are to be limited as much as possible, with "the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit". Where the use of firearms is considered

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[90] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

[91] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

[92] Delhi Police Act, No. 34 (1978). https://licensing.delhipolice.gov.in/V2/GetActsnRulesPDFPdf?fileName=36629_The%20Delhi%20Police%20Act-1978.pdf

[93] Original not Found

necessary, a warning is to be given, the aim is to be kept low, and the order to cease fire is to be given as soon as the assembly shows a disposition to retire or disperse. The Rule also provides that the use of buckshot against crowds is prohibited.

The Delhi Police rely on the direction that force be used without hesitation once an order to disperse has been defied. The Tribunal reads that direction together with the requirements that precede and qualify it: prior warning, minimum degree, limited duration, the least deadly means, and the exclusion of any punitive object.

Standing Order No. 309 sets out the sequence to be followed in handling demonstrations. Personnel at the first barricade are to be without lathis, with only helmets and body protectors; at the second, without lathis but with cane shields; and only the third is to be fully equipped, including with sticks and tear gas. Water cannon, tear gas and lathi units are each to be under one officer for every unit. At least two videographers are to record both the demonstrators and the police action, and ambulances are to be positioned. The Order then requires, in sequence:

- briefing and re-briefing of staff, with “utmost restraint”;
- constant liaison with the leaders and organisers;
- repeated appeals on the public address system, videographed, to the leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful;
- a declaration, also videographed, that the assembly is unlawful if the demonstration turns violent;
- a warning on the public address system before any kind of force is used, which must be ensured and videographed;
- “controlled cane charge only for dispersal”, with “no action on [a] retreating crowd”;
- an announcement for the injured, and the use of stretchers to carry them to a vehicle, videographed;
- evidence regarding the use of stones and lathis to be videographed and taken into possession from the site; and
- an incident report, without delay, to senior officers, the Government of NCT of Delhi and the Ministry of Home Affairs, where a lathi charge or tear gas is used and people are injured.

Only women police are to deal with women's demonstrations.

RAF Manual

The Manual allows shock batons and lathis only "when tear gas does not have the desired effect" and only after declaration and warning (para 13.7). It says that the reserve team must evacuate the injured and give first aid (para 13.11). The evidence of force on seated and retreating persons, and of persons taken to hospital under shellfire, is not consistent with either direction.

Decisions of the courts

In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*,[94] the Supreme Court observed that where an assembly is peaceful, the use of police force is not warranted at all; that where a crowd or assembly becomes violent, reasonable force may be justified; and that it becomes a serious matter when the police use excessive force or do not stop after controlling the situation, which violates human rights and human dignity. In *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India*,[95] the Court held that the authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order but cannot extinguish the constitutional right to protest. In *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*,[96] the Court held that a procedure affecting liberty must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal*,[97] the Court directed that police personnel who carry out an arrest or handle an interrogation bear accurate, visible and clear identification with name tags and designations. That direction concerns arrest and interrogation. The decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court said to have restricted the use of lathis to the dispersal of an unlawful assembly, and to have noted that lathis may be lethal when used on vital parts, are to be identified by name, date and citation before they are cited.

4.4.3 Evidence Before the Tribunal

The Tribunal heard a large number of protesters, journalists and others. The evidence is set out below under the headings.

The sequence of force

The testimony places the first use of force at about noon at or near the protest site, and continuing through the afternoon and, on one account, into the night. Saanvi (name changed) stated that on reaching the site at about noon she was told that a lathi charge had begun inside

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[94] (2016) 15 SCC 525
[95] AIR 2018 SC 3476
[96] (1978) 1 SCC 248
[97] (1997) 1 SCC 416

the protest site. Aameen, who was in his tent on hunger strike, was told between about 12:00 and 12:30 PM by persons returning that the police were using lathis. Ramit Verma a youtuber stated that when he reached the site at about 11:00 AM the march had begun, and that the crowd sat down as the police charged now and then. Nisha (name changed) stated that at about 3:00 PM the police began throwing tear gas shells and charging with lathis and drove the protesters toward Rajiv Chowk. Meera (name changed) stated that at about 2:30 PM, near Gol Chakkar and the PNB building, the police fired many tear gas shells. Harsh Yadav a youtuber stated that at about 2:00 PM, at the first barricade a kilometre from the inner circle at Connaught Place, the police began firing tear gas along with a lathi charge. Vishal stated that at about 4:30 to 5:00 PM, near Gol Chakkar, he felt gas on his face, saw the police firing tear gas at the crowd, and then saw protesters throw stones from the park; pellets were used later Section 4.9. Vihaan (name changed) stated that the area was so restricted by barricades that it became suffocating, that the police used lathis near Sansad Marg, and that near the Gandhi charkha at Connaught Place tear gas and then pellets were used at about 4:30 PM. Kaira stated that between about 11:00 and 11:30 PM the police fired 7 to 8 shells in about ten minutes along with a lathi charge. Utkarsh Gaur a youtuber stated that on 20.07.26, at about 1:22 PM, 8 to 10 tear gas shells were fired near the protest stage.

Force against persons who were seated, retreating or leaving


Sunny Tomar stated that the march began peacefully from the back of Jantar Mantar and the police gave the marchers space to move forward, but when the protesters reached Kerala Bhawan, an Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police ordered the police to charge with lathis. A police officer struck him on the head and he fell. A girl who came forward to help him was struck so hard that her foot was fractured, or the lathi broke. When they tried to take her to hospital, the police did not open the gate and laughed.

Sajid Khan stated that at Janpath Circle a woman who was unwell lay down, and that other students were sitting silently without chanting when the police began a lathi charge. As they were taking her to hospital, tear gas was fired, and he and his friend were struck with a baton with nails. The police charged, stopped, and after a short while began again. Ramit Verma stated that he saw no provocation from the protesters, and that later, when there was no commotion, an RAF personnel told him *"Chalo chalo peeche hato"* (Move back) and then struck him on the head and shoulder, so that he bled. He asked a police officer why, if they wished to kill him, other officers should strike him again; when he said *"maar do, maar do"* (strike me), an officer struck him on the jaw.

Avni stated that at Janpath the police told the marchers to go ahead and began to beat them as soon as they did, and that when the marchers formed a human chain at the barricades in front

of Abhijeet Dipke's truck, the police beat them, punctured the tyres of the truck and fired tear gas. Kaira stated that the police continued to charge while protesters were trying to leave Sansad Marg, and did not stop when someone told them that the marchers were leaving. Nisha stated that the police beat protesters, including some who were wearing the Indian flag, and Bewesh stated that he was struck although he was wearing the national flag. Mandeep Punia stated that the police fired tear gas from the area near Connaught Place to remove protesters, who left and returned, and that he saw police personnel press the throat of a boy of 16 to 17 years.

The video evidence dated 20.07.26, reportedly recorded near the protest site in New Delhi, appears to show a tear gas shell being thrown towards a group of seated, non-aggressive protesters. The munition appears to produce a forceful impact accompanied by visible flames, raising concerns about the danger posed to protesters nearby. No visible aggression or immediate threat from the seated protesters is discernible in the footage. However, the exact type of munition and the cause of its apparent explosive reaction cannot be conclusively established from the recording alone.[98]



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the evidence found no apparent indicators of AI generation or manipulation. The geographical coordinates were verified as 28.6115° N, 77.2272° E. Overall, the video evidence raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent deployment of a tear gas shell directly towards seated protesters and its potentially hazardous impact in close proximity to civilians.[99]

[98] See exhibit 4 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.
[99] See exhibit 15 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Closed exits and the position of the injured

Saanvi stated that as the crowd ran from tear gas, she and others found that all routes out of the area were closed. Aameen stated that the tear gas and lathi charge produced a stampede-like situation, that the police had closed all the gates, the metro was closed and the internet was shut down, so that there was no way to leave; his head was injured when a grill fell, and tear gas fell near him as he was being taken to hospital. Kaira stated that all sides were blocked and that protesters were trapped near Bangla Sahib Gurudwara. Ali stated that on 20.07.26 an ambulance stood in front of the Parliament Street Police Station with protesters inside who asked to be taken to hospital, and the police said, *"Yahan aaye ho toh ab yahi saza hai"* (You came here, so this is the punishment now). He also stated that on the night of 19.07.26, police personnel stopped persons from taking food and essentials into the area, and that washrooms were closed.

Batons with nails

Sajid Khan and Bewesh each stated that they were struck with a baton with nails. Utkarsh Gaur a youtuber stated that he saw lathis about 10 to 12 feet long with a nail attached, and some with wire. Bewesh also stated that RAF personnel charged openly with lathis in order, in his understanding, to cause the greatest injury, and that at Janpath his leg was broken.

The direction of the force

Sunny Tomar, Sajid Khan and Bewesh attributed the order to charge with lathis at Kerala Bhawan to Sandeep Lamba, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police. Mr Khan stated that, during the first charge, the officer said, *"Lathi charge yeh nahin hai; lathi charge jab hoga tab haddiyan tootengi"* (This is not a lathi charge; when a lathi charge happens, bones will break). Bewesh added that the officer slapped a peaceful woman protester in front of him. Krishna Sood stated that the Deputy Commissioner of Police ordered the RAF to use pellets. This accords with the General Diary of the RAF, which records that the firing was "on the orders of zone-1, DCP, Jantar Mantar" (Section IX). The RAF Manual, however, leaves the choice of the type of force to the RAF contingent commander and keeps operational control of the RAF with the officers of the CRPF (paras 13.7 and 11.2). An order to use pellets from the DCP would therefore be a direction from outside the RAF's own chain of command, or the Diary records a request or consultation in different words

Testimony of a former officer

H.R. Singh, a former Additional Director General of the CRPF, stated that the police must follow a graded response, which begins with a warning and negotiation with the leaders, and as per his assessment based on media reports this was done neither by the police nor by the CRPF. He continued that the police had declared the peaceful protesters unlawful, that pellets can be used only in extreme cases and that, during his service, only lathis and tear gas were permitted even then. He also stated that it appears that the police and the RAF did not follow the standing orders, the standard operating procedure (hereinafter referred to as "SOP") and the graded response, which requires that any intervention satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality.

4.4.4 Administrative Response

The Delhi Police's affidavit to the Supreme Court does not set out the stages of the graded force that the police say they followed, the order in which they were used, the equipment used at each stage, the officer who authorised each stage, or the point at which force stopped. It does not give the number of tear gas shells, water cannons or lathi charges.

4.4.5 The Tribunal's Finding

The evidence establishes that force was used against protesters at many places on 20.07.26, from about noon and, on one account, into the night, and that it included lathis, tear gas and pellets. The points below consider whether that force followed the rules and was in proportion.

The graded sequence was not followed

The instructions that bind the Delhi Police prescribe a sequence: repeated announcements appealing to the demonstrators; a declaration that the assembly is unlawful; a recorded warning before any force; and then a controlled cane charge, with no action on a retreating crowd (Standing Orders Nos. 72 and 309; Rule 14.56). The evidence does not bear out that sequence. Tear gas and lathi charges are described together, from about noon, and, on several accounts, before any conduct by the crowd to which they could respond. Several witnesses described a charge, a pause and a further charge on persons who had stopped, sat down or were leaving. The accounts of Sunny Tomar and Avni, that the police made way for the marchers and then charged them, and of Ramit Verma, that he was struck after being told to move back, show that force was not always preceded by a direction with which the persons could comply.

Nor does the evidence show that the more severe means were used only after the lesser means had been tried and had failed. With the evidence in Section IX that pellets were fired on the same afternoon, tear gas, lathi charges and pellets were used alongside one another and not in stages. The Delhi Police have not produced the videographed announcements and warnings that Standing Order No. 309 requires, and have not stated how the personnel at each barricade were equipped, which the Standing Order prescribes and which they can state. Whether announcements and warnings were given is examined in Section VII. The Tribunal finds that the graded sequence was not followed.

Force continued where there was nowhere to go

Dispersal is the object of force under Section 148 BNSS and Rule 14.56, and Standing Order No. 309 forbids action on a retreating crowd. A person cannot disperse if there is nowhere to go. Witnesses at different places stated that gates, roads and the metro were closed, which indicates that those against whom force was used could not leave. Force used in these conditions did not serve the purpose of dispersal. Kaira stated that the police continued to charge while the marchers said they were leaving, which describes force continuing after the object of dispersal had been, or could have been, achieved. The Tribunal finds that force was used on persons who were leaving or could not leave, contrary to the direction in Standing Order No. 309.

The force was not in proportion

Principle 5 and Rule 14.56 require that force be proportionate, minimum in degree, limited in duration and not directed to a punitive end. The Delhi Police point to the size of the crowd, the breach of barricades and the injury of more than 240 of their personnel, and the Tribunal does not discount any of these. It notes the evidence of Vishal that protesters threw stones at Central Park after tear gas had been fired, and accepts that at some points protesters threw objects at the police. But force was also used on persons who were seated, who were helping an unwell person or who stood in a human chain. There is evidence of injuries to the head, eye, leg and jaw, and of remarks such as *"yahi saza hai"* (this is the punishment) and that bones would break. This is not evidence of force directed at those who were violent, and it bears on whether the force was directed to a purpose other than dispersal. A large number of injuries to police personnel does not justify force against persons who were not responsible for them. The Tribunal finds that the force went beyond what was proportionate.

Medical aid was not given at the earliest moment

Principle 5 and Standing Order No. 309 require medical aid to be given to the injured at the earliest possible moment. The evidence shows that it was not, in the instances of an ambulance said to have been held with protesters inside it, and of a gate said to have been kept shut for an injured person. The Tribunal finds that medical aid was not afforded as the rules require.

The lathi with nails

The Delhi Police have stated that the lathi with nails was a single incident, in the hands of a protester. That statement is not consistent with the testimony of three witnesses. The Tribunal finds that it is not borne out by the evidence.

Force was directed by senior officers

Standing Order No. 309 and Rule 14.56 place the decision on the degree of force with the responsible officer. There is testimony that a senior officer ordered the lathi charge at Kerala Bhawan, and a diary entry in Section 4.9 that the RAF fired on the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone 1. Both indicate that force was directed by senior officers. Section 151 BNSS protects a person acting in good faith under Sections 148 to 150, and the protection depends on acting within those provisions. The Tribunal finds that force was directed by senior officers, and makes its recommendations on accountability, and on the publication and review of the standing orders and SOPs, in Section 10 of the report.

Identification of personnel

Saanvi stated that the RAF and Delhi Police personnel she saw were not wearing name tags. The direction in *D.K. Basu* concerns arrest and interrogation, and the Tribunal makes no finding on name tags in this Section.

4.5 ARE ALLEGATIONS OF EXCESSIVE AND NON-LEGAL USE OF FORCE JUSTIFIED?

Herein, the report takes on various allegations raised on the use of force by the internal security forces.

4.6 EVIDENCE OF NAIL-STUDDED AND ELECTRIFIED BATONS, THEIR LEGALITY, AND USE OF EXPIRED TEAR GAS WITH RESULTANT HEALTH RISKS TO PROTESTERS

This Section examines three questions. First, whether batons fitted with nails were carried or used by the police at the protest of 20.07.26. Second, whether electric batons were used on protesters. Third, whether tear gas was used in a way, and with materials, that the law allows, including whether expired tear gas shells were fired.

The rules fall into a general framework that applies to every use of force, and into rules that apply to particular items. The general framework is set out first. The rules for batons, electric batons and tear gas follow.

4.6.1 The General Framework:

International standards

The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) require non-violent means first (Principle 4), restraint and proportion, minimum damage and injury, and medical aid to the injured at the earliest possible moment (Principle 5), the avoidance of force, or the minimum force, in dispersing assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent (Principle 13), and the responsibility of superior officers for unlawful force that they knew or should have known of (Principle 24). Principle 26 says that obedience to a superior's order is no defence where the order was manifestly unlawful.

The Constitution and the courts

A peaceful assembly is protected by Article 19(1)(b)[100], and any force used against it must meet the tests of reasonableness and proportionality. In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*,[101] the Supreme Court said that where an assembly is peaceful, the use of police force is not warranted at all, and that it is a serious matter when the police go beyond the limit by using excessive force or by not stopping even after they have controlled the situation. The Court awarded compensation although the protesters in that case had pelted stones. In *Himmat Lal*

[100] Constitution of India, art.19

[101] 2016 INSC 597

K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad[102], the Supreme Court described freedom of assembly as an essential element of any democratic system. In *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India*,[103] it held that the authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order but cannot extinguish the right to protest.

The statute

Section 148, BNSS, 2023 allows an Executive Magistrate or a police officer to command an unlawful assembly, or an assembly likely to disturb the public peace, to disperse, and to use force if it does not. Sections 149 to 151 deal with armed forces and protect persons who act in good faith. The High Courts have said that three conditions must be met before force is used: there is an unlawful assembly or one likely to disturb the peace, it has been ordered to disperse, and it has not dispersed.

Rules and Standing Orders

Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules,[104] which applies in Delhi, says that force is to quell a disturbance of the peace or disperse an assembly that threatens one and has refused to disperse, and that *"no ulterior objects, such as punitive or repressive effect, shall be taken into consideration".* The degree and duration of force are to be limited as much as possible, and the least deadly means that the circumstances permit is to be used. The same Rule says that once an order to disperse has been defied, force is to be used without hesitation, and the Tribunal records this for balance. Standing Order No. 72[105] requires that the principle of minimum force be kept in view, and that Rule 14.56 and sections 28(1)(p) and 29 of the Delhi Police Act be followed. The Ministry of Home Affairs' Code of Conduct for the Police in India (1985), at clause 4, says that the police should as far as practicable use persuasion, advice and warning, and that when force is inevitable only *"the irreducible minimum of force required in the circumstances"* is to be used.

Standing Order No. 309[106] requires a warning on the public address system before any force, videographed (item 14); controlled cane charge only for dispersal, with no action on a retreating crowd (item 17); an announcement for the injured to be taken to hospital for medical aid (item 19); and an incident report to be sent up the chain whenever lathi charge or tear gas is used and

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[102] (1973) 1 SCC 227
[103] AIR 2018 SC 3476
[104] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf
[105] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view
[106] Delhi Police. (n.d.). *Standing Order No. 309.* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cDoPfhBsiXz5yAEpkv4rPN0F9NHnsppx/view

people are injured (item 28). Circular No. 19/2012[107] repeats that force is to be preceded by proper warnings, and that Standing Order No. 72[108] must be strictly followed. Circular No. 35/2011[109] records that, under court guidelines, the onus of maintaining peace during a protest is on the organisers, and the Tribunal notes this as a point that the Delhi Police may rely on.

4.6.2 The Law on Batons

International standard on the use of Batons

The Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warns that over-arm baton strikes on bones and joints carry a heightened risk of fractures. It says that strikes to the head, neck, throat, spine, kidneys and abdomen are to be avoided. It also says that a baton is not to be used against a person who is neither engaged in nor threatening violence, and that such use is likely to amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or even torture.

Statute on Batons fitted with nails

The Tribunal has found no Indian law, instruction or standing order that authorises a baton fitted with nails. The standards that apply to the baton itself (least deadly means, no punitive object, and avoidance of serious injury) are those above. International guidance treats spiked and weighted batons as inherently abusive devices that should be prohibited.

Delhi Police Instructions

Standing Order No. 309 sets out the equipment for each barricade. Staff at the first barricade are to have no lathis and only helmets and body protectors. Staff at the second are to carry body protectors, cane shields and helmets, without lathis. Only the third barricade is to be fully equipped with sticks, body protectors, helmets, cane shields and tear gas. No spiked, nail-fitted or electric baton appears among the items the order lists. The order also requires that the lathis and other items used be videographed and taken into possession when a case is registered (item 24).

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[107] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

[108] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

[109] Office of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. (2011, June 22). *Title of the circular exactly as printed, in sentence case* (Circular No. 35/2011). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JSdTb8gjpPXrSfjhmqBPTUuiQJzVRBJr/view

Use of lathis against a peaceful march

The Delhi High Court has held that the police may use only reasonable force to disperse an unlawful assembly, and that a lathi charge on an unarmed and peaceful march was "punitive and repressive". Rule 14.56, quoted above, bars any punitive or repressive object and requires the least deadly means.

4.6.3 The Law on Electric Batons

International Standards

The OHCHR Resource Book on Human Rights and Law Enforcement says that direct-contact electro-shock devices, which include stun guns, stun batons and stun shields, work by using pain to achieve compliance. It says that this is incompatible with the principle of necessity, because compliance can be achieved by other means that are less easily abused and that do not, in many respects, inherently violate human dignity. It says that only projectile devices should be permitted, and only in conformity with human rights norms. It adds that use of any such device for the sole purpose of securing compliance with an order is inadmissible. The Resource Book also refers to the UN Committee against Torture, which has said that these devices could in some situations amount to torture, and has recommended that they be used only in extremely limited situations where there is a real and immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury. The Resource Book notes that the risks of an electric shock, including heart problems, are higher for persons with heart disease, for children and for pregnant women.

Delhi Police Instructions

No electric baton appears in the equipment listed in Standing Order No. 309. Several witnesses refer to the Rapid Action Force (RAF), which is not governed by the Delhi Police Standing Orders.

RAF Manual

The RAF's Manual authorises two shock batons per team, giving a localised shock "without any injury or burn", to be used only after declaration, warning and failed tear gas (para 13.7).

4.6.4 The Law on Tear Gas

International Standards

The Chemical Weapons Convention treats a riot control agent as a chemical that produces sensory irritation or disabling effects that disappear within a short time after exposure (Article II (7)). It bans the use of such agents as a method of warfare, and allows them for law enforcement, including domestic riot control. The permission rests on two assumptions: that the agent causes no long-term harm, and that it is used responsibly and in line with the Basic Principles. The OHCHR Resource Book says that officials should never use more than the minimum effective amount, and should assess the effect after each projectile, grenade or burst. It says that officials should never fire hand-held launchers directly towards a person, and should not use chemical irritants such as tear gas over wide areas against larger groups unless violence is so high that violent persons cannot be targeted directly. It adds that only experienced officers with special training should use such irritants when they are dispersed at a distance. Principle 5 of the Basic Principles requires medical aid to the injured at the earliest possible moment.

Expired Tear Gas

The Tribunal was not able to find any Indian rule/law on the shelf life of tear gas shells or on their disposal. The standards above bear on the question in a general way. The permission to use tear gas at home rests on the agent being used responsibly and not causing long-term harm, and a shell that has passed its expiry date raises the question whether either assumption can be relied on.

Delhi Police Instructions

Under Standing Order No. 309, tear gas is part of the equipment of the third barricade only, and it may be used only after a warning on the public address system. The order allows action only to disperse and not against a retreating crowd. It requires an announcement and stretchers for the injured, and an incident report to be sent up the chain.

RAF Manual

The Manual authorises riot gas guns (128 per battalion) and shells, including 1,056 long-range and 1,0556 short-range CN shells (paras 19.1, 19.3). Tear gas is to be used “adequately” (para 13.11). The shelf-life list in para 18.16 does not include tear smoke munitions, and says no item is unserviceable “merely because it is overage”.

4.6.5 Evidence Before the Tribunal

Batons fitted with nails

Ankita Bhardwaj, one of the authors of an investigation by the fact-checking organisation Alt News, presented the investigation to the Tribunal and spoke to the videos on which it relied.[110] The investigation was published on 21.07.26. It followed a statement by the Delhi Police, repeated in a fact-check by the Press Information Bureau, that videos showing batons with nails were not related to the previous day's protest.


The investigation describes two videos. The first was posted on Instagram on 20.07.26 by a user, @ansh.visuals_. It shows young protesters confronting police officials about batons with nails. One protester takes a baton in his hand and shows it to the camera. The protesters are heard asking how the officials had not seen it, when they had seen it from afar. The officials remain unmoved. The post was made unavailable in India at about 6:40 PM on 21.07.26, and Alt News used a downloaded copy. The person who posted it gave Alt News a screen recording of the video's metadata, which shows that it was filmed on 20.07.26 at 4:33 PM, and a longer version of the video. In the longer version, a baton with nails can be seen in the hand of a police official, who is named in the investigation as Vishal Tomar, when a protester in a black-and-white striped shirt notices it at about the 0:34 mark. The investigation matched the spot, using street-level imagery, to a place outside The Imperial hotel on Janpath Road.

A video of the above incident was also presented before the Tribunal, showing a young protester displaying a police-style baton (lathi) with an apparent sharp metal nail protruding from its surface. The baton was allegedly carried by police personnel deployed during the protests on 20.07.26.[111]

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[110] Zubair, M., Majumder, S., & Mahalanobish, A. (2026, July 21). Baton-with-nails videos indeed from July 20 protests. Delhi Police, PIB's 'fact check' incorrect. Alt News. https://www.altnews.in/baton-with-nails-videos-indeed-from-july-20-protests-delhi-police-pibs-fact-check-incorrect/

[111] See exhibit 13 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at reported coordinates 28.62° N, 77.22° E.[112]

[112] See exhibit 13 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Testimony of those struck


Utkarsh Gaur told the Tribunal that he saw the Delhi Police use lathis that were about 10 to 12 feet long with a nail attached, and that some had wire around them. Sajid Khan stated that the police used lathis with nails, which he put at 7 to 8 feet in length, and that he and a friend were hit with such lathis so hard that his friend's leg was fractured and he himself was injured.

Use of Batons on Vital Body Parts

Sunny Tomar stated that the police hit him with a lathi on the head, and that when he fell, female protesters came forward to cover him, but the police did not stop and hit one of them on the foot, which was fractured. Ramit Verma (Youtuber, popularly known as Peeing Human) stated that the police hit him on the head with a lathi so that blood oozed out, and that after a while they struck his jaw with a baton.

We saw his video and verified it. Verma is visibly bleeding from a head injury and alleges that a police officer struck him on the head while he was documenting the protests, followed by another baton strike to his jaw despite his existing injuries. Although the interview captures his visible injuries and account of the incident, the alleged assault itself is not shown in the recording.[113]

[113] See exhibit 9 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The incident was reportedly recorded near Connaught Place, New Delhi, at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E. [114]

[114] See exhibit 9 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Electric batons and barricades

Ali stated that he was at the front of the protest and that when the group reached the first barricade, and as soon as they put their hands on it to cross it, everyone who did so received an electric current, on 20.07.26. Meera stated that the RAF were using electric batons on protesters.

A video recording of an incident on 20.07.26, presented to the Tribunal by Varrun Sukhraj, shows a woman security personnel whose uniform appears to identify her as a member of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), applying a baton-like device to female protesters. The protesters are standing, and no visible aggression or immediate threat from them can be seen in the footage. A crackling sound, which may indicate an electrical discharge, is audible as the device is used. A female protester is also heard warning that using such a device in the rain could be dangerous. The exact nature of the device and whether it delivered an electric shock cannot be confirmed from the recording alone.[115]


[115] See exhibit 6 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video found no apparent signs of AI generation or digital manipulation, although this does not amount to conclusive forensic verification. The recording was filmed near the protest site, at reported coordinates 28.60° N, 77.20° E. [116]

[116] See exhibit 6 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Another video depicts a visibly distressed and apparently injured protester recounting his experience of alleged physical assault by security personnel during the demonstrations. The individual further alleges that he and several fellow protesters experienced electric shocks upon coming into contact with police barricades, causing them to fall to the ground. The testimony raises serious concerns regarding the possible electrification of crowd-control barricades and the potential exposure of civilians to electrical injury during a public demonstration.[117] The geo tagging information of the video is attached below:



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication.[118]

[117] See exhibit 23 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.
[118] See exhibit 23 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

A similar video presented depicts a journalist interviewing multiple young protesters who independently allege experiencing electric shocks upon coming into physical contact with police barricades during the demonstrations. The journalist subsequently approaches uniformed police personnel and directly questions them regarding these allegations. The personnel reportedly decline to provide a substantive response, instead repeatedly directing the journalist to move back.[119] The geo tagging assessment results of the video is attached below:



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication.[120]

[119] See exhibit 24 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.
[120] See exhibit 24 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.


Tear gas

Kaira stated that the Delhi Police fired 7 to 8 tear gas shells in 10 minutes at the crowd, and that in her view the aim was not to disperse the crowd but to make them unable to breathe. Meera described the same incident, with 7 to 8 shells, after which the protesters scattered along different routes, and the police then chased them, and there was no exit for them to leave the area. She stated that later that day, when a group were in a secluded place trying to catch their breath, 6 or 7 police officers ran towards them. Utkarsh Gaur stated that the police packed the protesters between the Connaught Place outer circle and Jantar Mantar and started firing tear gas, and that one shell hit a protester on the chest on 20.07.26. He also stated that on 25.07.26, at about 1:22 PM, shortly before the announcement of the resignation of the Union Education Minister, the police fired 8 to 10 shells near the protest stage.

Bewesh stated that he was going to hospital after the RAF charged at him with lathis in a way that broke his leg, that a female protester was helping him, and that a police officer fired a tear gas shell that exploded near him. Avni stated that the police and the RAF threw tear gas shells directly at the crowd. Aameen stated that he was in his tent, being on hunger strike, and that between 12:00 and 12:30 PM he saw people coming back, who told him that they were not going to the march because the police were firing tear gas. He said that as the crowd ran under continuous firing, it looked like a herd of elephants coming. Siddharth (name changed), a lawyer, stated that he was trying to protect two students who had fallen and were not being allowed to stand up because police were charging at them with lathis, and that a tear gas shell was thrown near him, and it made the air so hard to breathe that he picked up the shell with a handkerchief and threw it back.

We verified the video showing a person being directly hit by a tear gas shell as protesters sit on the street. The munition appears to produce a forceful impact accompanied by visible flames. No immediate aggression by the seated protesters is discernible in the footage.[121]

[121] See exhibit 4 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.




A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.6115° N, 77.2272° E.[122]

[122] See exhibit 4 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Expired tear gas

Siddharth stated that the rule is that every shell used is entered in a log and shells that have expired have to be removed, that this was not done, and that expired shells were used because they were not to be entered in the log (The Tribunal could not independently verify this claim as the rules governing the use of expired tear gas are not available).

A video of this incident was also presented before the Tribunal, showing a young protester displaying a used tear gas shell marked with an expiry date of December 2025 (12/25). If this marking indicates the manufacturer's expiry date, the shell would have been approximately seven months past its expiry at the time of the protests on 20.07.26. This raises concerns about the inspection and deployment of crowd-control ammunition.[123]



A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at reported coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E.[124]

[123] See exhibit 5 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.
[124] See exhibit 5 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Effects on health

Kaira, Siddharth and Meera described difficulty in breathing after the firing. The medical literature records the effects of the agents commonly used. A peer-reviewed study of 112 people exposed to tear agents during civil unrest in Santiago, Chile, in 2019 and 2020, found the most frequent effects to be eye pain or burning (62.5%), throat irritation (56.2%), respiratory distress (54.4%), skin pain or burning (52.6%) and impaired vision (51.7%).

4.6.4 Administrative Response: The Position of the Delhi Police

The Tribunal heard no police officer. The position of the Delhi Police is taken from a public statement, repeated in a fact-check by the Press Information Bureau, and from the counter-affidavit of Mr Sachin Sharma, DCP, in W.P.(C) 280/2026, as published by LiveLaw on 18 August 2026. The Tribunal could not obtain the original of the affidavit, and what follows is taken from the published account.

Batons fitted with nails

After the videos were posted on 20 and 21 July 2026, the Delhi Police said that they were not related to the protest of the previous day.[2] The affidavit, as published, says something different. It says that the videos show a single incident, that the object was in the hands of a protester and not of the police, and that it was not a lathi but a stick to which the national flag was attached. It also says that lathis are permissible equipment.[1] The two statements are not the same. The first denies any connection with the protest, and the second accepts that the incident took place at it. The affidavit's description relates to one video. It does not address the testimony of witnesses who described batons fitted with nails at other points.

Electric batons

The published account does not mention electric batons. The Tribunal cannot say from a media account that the affidavit is silent on them.

Tear gas, expired stock and health risks

The published account does not state the number of shells used, the age or expiry date of the stock, the records kept of its issue, or the medical effects on those exposed. It does say, as to the use of force generally, that the force was graded, that the barricades were breached, that about 240 police personnel and about 200 protesters were injured, and that the gathering was unlawful because no permission had been given. It does not, as published, give the cause of the protesters' injuries.

What the Delhi Police have not produced

The Tribunal has seen no list of the equipment issued to personnel at each barricade, which Standing Order No. 309 prescribes. It has seen no record of any lathi or baton taken into possession and videographed, which the same Standing Order requires for lathis used in a demonstration. It has seen no stock, issue or expiry record of the tear gas shells, and no record of the medical aid given to persons exposed. The affidavit, as published, does not address the equipment of the RAF, whose Manual authorises shock batons and tear smoke munitions and sets its own rules for them.

4.6.5 The Tribunal's Conclusion

Batons fitted with nails

Two videos, their metadata (4:33 PM on 20.07.26), the matching of the spot to a place outside The Imperial on Janpath Road, and the statements of a protester who was present and of the person who filmed the second video, show a police official holding a baton fitted with nails, and protesters confronting the officials about it. The Delhi Police statement that the videos were unrelated to the protest is not borne out. The investigation says that there is no evidence of use, and that is limited to these two videos, which show a confrontation and not a strike. Utkarsh Gaur and Sajid Khan stated that they saw or were struck with such lathis, and the absence of a medical record or of a recovered baton goes only to how many were used. No law, instruction or standing order authorises a nail-fitted baton, and Rule 14.56 requires the least deadly means. The Tribunal finds that a baton fitted with nails was held by a police official at the site on 20.07.26, that on the testimony of the witnesses such lathis were used to strike protesters, and that their presence was inconsistent with Rule 14.56 and the principle of minimum force.

Strikes to the head and jaw

Sunny Tomar and Ramit Verma stated that they were struck on the head and the jaw. The OHCHR Guidance says that such strikes are to be avoided. Standing Order No. 309 allows a controlled cane charge only for dispersal, and not against a retreating crowd. The Tribunal finds that these strikes were contrary to the Guidance and, if the crowd was retreating, to the Standing Order. They are examined further in the report.

3. Electric batons. Meera and Ali referred to electric shocks. The video presented by Varrun before the Tribunal shows a girl getting an electric shock after being hit by an electric baton on a rainy day. If such devices were used on persons who were not resisting, the Resource Book says that they are incompatible with the principle of necessity and that their use to obtain compliance is inadmissible. Muskan, Bewesh and Avni speak of the RAF, a force that does not fall under the Delhi Police Standing Orders. The Constitution, the BNSS and the international

standards apply to every force. On this evidence, the Tribunal finds that electric batons were used.

Tear gas

The witnesses agree on this point. Seven witnesses described tear gas being fired at the crowd on 20.07.26, in volumes of 7 to 8 shells in 10 minutes according to two of them, in a confined area between the Connaught Place outer circle and Jantar Mantar. They described a shell that struck a person on the chest, a shell that exploded near a person who was walking to hospital, and a shell thrown near a lawyer who was helping fallen students. Two witnesses stated that the crowd was chased and that they had no exit. Against the standards in Part C, three things stand out.

A shell striking a person on the chest means that it was fired directly towards a person, which the Resource Book says is never to be done.

Repeated firing in a confined space at a large group is what the Resource Book allows only where violence is so high that violent persons cannot be targeted directly. The evidence that the Tribunal heard, taken with Section VII, is that the crowd was peaceful and was not resisting.

Standing Order No. 309 allows action only to disperse and not against a retreating crowd.

The Tribunal finds that tear gas was fired at the crowd repeatedly, in the numbers that the witnesses stated, including in a confined area, at persons moving away, and in at least three instances in the direction of a person, and that this was not in keeping with the legal standards.

Expired tear gas

The testimony of Siddharth and the photograph posted by Ashutosh Ranka on X (formerly Twitter) on 21.07.26 show that expired tear gas was used during the protest. The rules governing stock registers, issue records, batch numbers and expiry dates are not available in the public domain, and the Delhi Police have produced no stock, issue or disposal records. The Tribunal finds, on the testimony and the photograph, that expired tear gas shells were used.

Injuries and health risks

A large number of protesters sustained injuries from nail-fitted lathis, tear gas including expired shells, electric batons and lathi blows aimed at vital parts. The witnesses' accounts of difficulty in breathing are consistent with the effects that the medical study records. Persons who were not in a position to leave, because of blocked exits or because they were confined in a small area, were at greater risk. The Tribunal finds that the equipment and manner of its use exposed protesters to a serious risk of injury.

Limits of the evidence

The Tribunal heard no police officer, and could not obtain the original of the Delhi Police affidavit, so the account of the Delhi Police is taken from a published report of it. These conclusions are recorded on the evidence presented to the Tribunal.

4.7 ARE THERE EVIDENCE OF BATON CHARGE AND TEAR GAS AGAINST NON-RESISTING PROTESTERS, AND OF BLOCKED EXITS CREATING STAMPEDE-LIKE CONDITIONS

This Section examines three connected questions about 20.07.26 and the days that followed. First, whether lathis and tear gas were used against persons who were not resisting. Second, whether the routes out of the area were closed, so that persons could not leave. Third, whether the use of force in those conditions produced a stampede-like situation in which people were injured.

4.7.1 Applicable Law and Standards

International standards on force and assemblies

The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) provide that, in dispersing assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, restrict it to the minimum extent necessary (Principle 13). Where force is unavoidable, officials shall act in proportion, minimise injury, and ensure that medical aid is rendered to the injured at the earliest possible moment (Principle 5). Article 21 of the ICCPR protects the right of peaceful assembly[125], and the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 37 (2020), has addressed the dispersal of assemblies and the use of less-lethal means, including chemical irritants.[126]

The Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020) states that chemical irritants should not be used in confined spaces or where those affected have no means of escape, and that they should be used only after warning and with a route by which people can leave.

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[125] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

[126] Human Rights Committee. (2020). *General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21)* (CCPR/C/GC/37). United Nations. https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=WEtyW87uznJql0nPB0R%2BjvIANofAyBdf7Aw9oQ77nX58%2Fy%2BuM8cxMUWb93tupOebEKl%2FMANbswS4GcF1CgqyOg%3D%3D

The right to assemble peacefully

Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to assemble peacefully and without arms, subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order under Article 19(3). In *Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad,*[127] the Supreme Court described freedom of assembly as an essential element of any democratic system. In *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India*,[128] it held that the authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order but cannot extinguish the right to protest. In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,*[129] the Court observed that where an assembly is peaceful, the use of police force is not warranted at all, that where a crowd becomes violent reasonable force may be justified, and that excessive force, or force that does not stop after the situation is controlled, violates human rights and dignity.

The Delhi Police instructions

Standing Order No. 309 of the Delhi Police requires that a "controlled cane charge" be used "only for dispersal", with "no action on (a) retreating crowd", that ambulances be positioned, that the injured be announced and carried to a vehicle, and that an incident report be sent without delay to senior officers and the Ministry of Home Affairs where a lathi charge or tear gas is used and people are injured. Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules,[130] which applies in Delhi, provides that the object of force is to quell a disturbance or to disperse an assembly that threatens one and has refused to disperse, that no punitive or repressive object is to be taken into account, and that the degree and duration of force are to be limited as much as possible.

4.7.2 Evidence Before the Tribunal

The Tribunal heard ten witnesses who were present at or near Jantar Mantar, Connaught Place, Janpath, Kerala House and the adjoining roads. They included protesters, a physician and other eyewitnesses. Eight gave oral testimony in the presence of the members of the Tribunal, and two (Anaya and Disha) gave written testimony. The identities of witnesses have been kept confidential wherever requested.

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[127] (1973) 1 SCC 227
[128] AIR 2018 SC 3476
[129] (2016) 15 SCC 525
[130] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

Force used on crowds described as not resisting

Saanvi (name changed) stated that she reached the site at about noon and was told that the police had begun a lathi charge. Later, she saw a crowd moving forward in an orderly manner without chanting. She was on the footpath when tear gas shells fell and drove the crowd in different directions.

Disha (name changed) stated that the first procession began marching toward Parliament at about noon, and that the police abruptly fired tear gas on the protestors while some of them were handing roses to the police.

Aameen, who was in his tent on hunger strike, stated that between about 12:00 and 12:30 PM he was told by people returning that the police were using lathis. He saw the police coming from the Kerala House side. Protesters sat on the road to stop them, and the police used tear gas to disperse the seated protesters.

Avni (name changed), who was onboard the truck with Abhijeet Dipke and other protestors, stated that the police and the RAF threw tear gas shells directly at the crowd. Near the LIC building on Janpath, the police said words to the effect of "go ahead, go ahead", and as soon as people moved forward, they were beaten. Near the barricades in front of the truck, protestors formed a human chain; she stated that the police beat them, punctured the tyre of the truck so that it could not move, and fired tear gas.

Kaira (name changed) stated that after Abhijeet Dipke announced the march to Parliament, the police began charging with lathis, and that 7 to 8 shells were fired in 10 minutes along with lathi charge. At Patel Chowk, lathi charge and tear gas intensified, and the protesters were trapped from all sides. She stated that the police continued to do so while protesters were fleeing Sansad Marg, and did not stop when someone told them that the protesters were leaving.

Bewesh stated that he was among the first to enter Kerala House on 20.07.26, after Sonam Wangchuk was removed from the site. He stated that Sandeep Lamba instructed police officers there to use lathis, and that RAF personnel then struck protesters openly even on vulnerable parts of the body.


Meera (name changed) stated that when she reached Jantar Mantar at 7:00 AM there were no Delhi Police officers, only a few RAF personnel, and the mood of the protesters was vibrant. At about 2:30 PM, near Gol Chakkar and the PNB building at Connaught Place, many tear gas shells were fired. The group decided to sit without saying anything. She stated that RAF shields struck her face two to three times, that a push from behind made the crowd fall forward, and that 6 to 7 police officers ran toward them to use lathis when they reached a secluded place. She also described a similar incident in which the police fired 7 to 8 shells.

Siddharth (name changed) stated that he was trying to protect two fallen students who were not being given a chance to stand up while the police charged at them. A tear gas shell fell near him, and it became so suffocating that he picked it up with a handkerchief and threw it back.

Utkarsh Gaur stated that the police packed the protesters between Connaught Place's outer circle and Jantar Mantar and began firing tear gas, and that on 20.07.26 one shell hit a protester on the chest. He also stated that on 25.07.26, at about 1:22 PM, 8 to 10 shells were fired near the protest stage, just before the announcement that the Union Education Minister, Mr Dharmendra Pradhan, had resigned.

Another victim whose identity is concealed stated was tear gas, baton charging, and verbal abuses. She said she got tired and wanted to sit; she was having problems breathing, so they decided to leave the place. The next day she joined the protest again.

Geolocation assessment of Muskan's video is attached herein:



We verified the video with geo tagging and/or the use of AI in the video and found that there were no use of AI or any other attempts of impersonating of the victim.[131]

[131] See exhibit 15 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Closed exits, loss of network and stampede-like conditions

Saanvi stated that she found all routes out of the area closed, and that there was no network or internet. Aameen described the situation as stampede-like: because of the tear gas and the lathi charge there was no way out, the police had closed all the gates, the metro was closed and the internet was shut down. He said the fleeing crowd under continuous tear gas fire sounded like elephants running. Kaira stated that all sides were blocked and that protesters were trapped near Bangla Sahib Gurudwara. Meera stated that the internet was shut down and the roads were blocked, and that the police narrowed the area step by step, with one officer telling people to go to one spot and another to a different spot; after a second round of tear gas firing there was no exit, and she found it hard to breathe. Avni described the scene near the barricades as chaotic. Disha stated that in the stampede-like situation she fell and was crushed by the crowd, and hurt herself further trying to jump over barricades.

Injuries

Bewesh stated that he was wearing the national flag, hoping that the police would not strike him, and that he was struck regardless, and that RAF personnel struck him in a way that broke his leg. While he was being helped to hospital, a police officer fired a tear gas shell that exploded near him. Aameen stated that a grill behind him fell on him and injured his head, and that tear gas fell near him again as people took him to hospital. They reached nearby Dargah, where they were able to get a taxi with difficulty. Meera stated that she saw a girl whose shirt was covered in blood, and that a girl in front of her got an electric shock. Disha stated that she had difficulty walking for at least a month and that, two months later, her knee injury had still not fully recovered.

A medical physician, whose identity is concealed, stated in her written testimony that she was on duty at Jantar Mantar on 20.07.26 because at least 6 to 7 persons who were on hunger strike, to her knowledge, needed medical attention. She began receiving calls at about 10 to 11 AM from friends outside Jantar Mantar who told her of the police lathi charge, one of whom was caught in a stampede. Between 11 AM and 4:30 PM she saw around 40 to 60 patients. Most had bruises and swellings on the limbs and buttocks, which they attributed to the lathi charge, and crush injuries to the hands and feet from the stampedes. She described the following more serious cases.

- A person named Ahmad (name changed) who had been on hunger strike for about 20 days or more, was brought to her unconscious and not breathing, though a pulse was present. His blood pressure was about 220/150 mm Hg, which is dangerously high. He responded to a painful stimulus, she placed him in the recovery position, and in a few

minutes, he regained consciousness, with his blood pressure at about 150/90 mm Hg. He told her that he had been hit with a lathi on the chest until he lost consciousness.

- A boy of about 18 years had a fractured leg, which she immobilised with cardboard and bandages, and a cut on the eyelid that, in her words, missed his eye by millimetres.
- A man of about 30 years had fallen from a height while climbing a wall to get away from the police and appeared to have a dislocated shoulder.
- Several patients had abrasions and cuts with bleeding that, in her view, could not be explained by blunt force alone. She was told later that some lathis had spikes.
- She learnt later, through activists and friends at Lady Hardinge Medical College, that some persons had pellet injuries.

Equipment and tear gas shells

Bewesh stated that the police used lathis with nails studded in them and that he was struck with one. Utkarsh Gaur stated that he saw lathis about 10 to 12 feet long with a nail attached and some with wire around them. Kaira stated that her throat had not recovered because the tear gas was expired, and that the shells were thrown not to disperse the crowd but to make people suffocate. Siddharth stated that expired shells were fired, and that, according to him, every shell used has to be entered in a log and expired shells have to be removed, but the expired shells were used because their use was not meant to be recorded.

Identification of personnel

Saanvi stated that the RAF and Delhi Police personnel she saw were not wearing name tags.

The video evidence presented before the tribunal reportedly depicts a group of uniformed personnel, apparently belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), equipped with protective gear, body-worn cameras and other operational equipment, without discernible name badges or individual identification markings. The individual recording the video questions the personnel about the absence of identification, stating that protesters participating in a peaceful demonstration should be able to establish the identity and official status of the security personnel deployed. None of the personnel reportedly provides a verbal explanation. Instead, one individual appears to gesture towards the person recording, indicating that further questioning should cease. The geo tagging assessment results of the video is attached below.[132]

[132] See exhibit 16 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E.[133]

A different account

Siddharth stated that the police tried to provoke students of Jawaharlal Nehru University by charging with lathis, abusing them and calling them “anti-national”, and tried to portray the protesters as violent. He described an incident in which a police officer went into the crowd. According to him, some persons in the crowd who were not protesters pushed and tried to provoke the peaceful protesters and hit the officer, after which the Delhi Police claimed that the protesters were violent.

[133] See exhibit 16 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annex I.

Administrative Response

The affidavit of Delhi Police filed in the Supreme Court states that the protest ceased to be peaceful when sections of the crowd breached multiple layers of barricades and attempted to move towards Parliament, that the crowd then went out of control, and that a struggle followed in which police and protesters were injured. It denies excessive force on the ground that the protesters were many and spread over about three kilometres, and that some of them attacked police officers without provocation.

The affidavit's account is of a crowd that was moving and resisting. The witnesses before the Tribunal described crowds, or persons in them, that were sitting, retreating or running away when they were struck or when gas was fired. The two accounts may both be accurate, because they may describe different places and different times over a crowd of this size. The published account of the affidavit does not distinguish between places and times. It does not say whether force was used on persons who were leaving, and it does not mention closed exits, closed gates, the metro or blocked roads. Standing Order No. 309 says that there is to be no action on a retreating crowd.

4.7.3 The Tribunal's Conclusion

Force was used on persons who were not resisting

The Tribunal heard witnesses who were at different places and at different times, from the protest site to Janpath and Sansad Marg. They described tear gas and lathis used on a crowd walking in an orderly way, on protesters who had sat down, on a human chain, and on students who had fallen, and force that continued as people were leaving. The accounts agree on the sequence even where they differ in detail and in time. Their recollection of the time varies between about 10 AM and 2:30 PM, which the Tribunal does not regard as affecting the common pattern, since the events described took place at different spots over several hours.

Standing Order No. 309 allows a controlled cane charge only for dispersal and forbids action on a retreating crowd, and Principle 13 of the Basic Principles requires force to be avoided, or kept to the minimum, in dispersing an assembly that is unlawful but not violent. The Tribunal finds that lathis and tear gas were used at several places in and around Jantar Mantar, including Kerala House, Janpath, Patel Chowk, Sansad Marg and the Connaught Place outer circle, on 20.07.26 and on later dates, and that they were used on persons who were seated, who had fallen, who were walking in an orderly manner, who formed a human chain, or who were leaving. This does not accord with the Standing Order or with Principle 13.

Tear gas was used where people could not leave

Under the instructions and standards in Part D, tear gas is a means of dispersal and is to be used where people can leave. The testimony is that it was fired at seated protesters and at a crowd on a footpath, in the neighbourhood of closed routes, and, in the case of two persons, at or near persons being taken to hospital. The Tribunal finds that tear gas fired in these conditions did not serve the purpose of dispersal. Its finding on whether the shells were expired is in the Section on tear gas and batons.

Routes were closed

Five witnesses described closed gates or roads, and the closure of the metro, at different places. Nobody placed before the Tribunal a document showing who ordered the closure of each route. The testimony describes it as done by the police, and the Delhi Police, which controlled the deployment, are in a position to explain it. What the testimony establishes is that persons who were being driven by tear gas and lathis could not leave. The Tribunal finds that gates and roads were closed at several places, and that persons could not leave while tear gas was being fired. It makes no finding on who ordered the closure of each route.

The result was stampede-like conditions and injuries

The evidence of Aameen, Disha and Anaya links the injuries to people fleeing in panic with no way out. Anaya described crush injuries to hands and feet and a fall from a wall in trying to escape, and Aameen was injured when a grill fell on him. The Tribunal accepts that link on this evidence. The Tribunal finds that persons were injured in the course of the lathi charge, the tear gas and the stampede-like conditions, including fractured legs, head injuries, a dislocated shoulder, a knee injury that had not healed after two months, and crush injuries. It cannot state the number of persons injured in this manner on the evidence. Anaya saw 40 to 60 patients between 11 AM and 4:30 PM, and the Delhi Police stated that about 200 protesters were injured.

Medical aid was not ensured

Principle 5 of the Basic Principles and Standing Order No. 309 require that the injured be given medical aid at the earliest possible moment. Aameen was taken to hospital while tear gas fell near him, Bewesh was met by a shell on his way to hospital, and a volunteer physician treated dozens of patients at the site. The Tribunal finds that medical aid was not ensured at the earliest possible moment, as the rules require, in the instances described by Aameen and Bewesh.

Records not produced

The Delhi Police have not placed before the Tribunal an explanation of the closure of routes, the stock and log of tear gas shells used, or any record of the medical aid given. The Tribunal makes its recommendations on the publication of these records and on accountability in Section 10 of the report.

4.8 IS THERE EVIDENCE OF MISBEHAVIOUR AND SEXUAL ABUSE BY POLICE PERSONNEL AGAINST WOMEN PROTESTERS?

The Tribunal received several testimonies from women protesters and other eyewitnesses, in which they alleged that Delhi Police personnel and Rapid Action Force (RAF) engaged in misconduct on 20.07.26. Many testimonies were received remotely and some in person, including some independent content creators (YouTubers) who were present there and documented the events as they unfolded. Testimonies were recorded in the presence of Tribunal members, and the identities of witnesses are kept confidential where requested. Below are accounts that were presented before the Tribunal.

4.8.1 Applicable Standards

Before moving to the evidence, the Tribunal notes the safeguards on the basis of which the conduct was examined. As per settled procedure, a woman can be arrested, as far as practicable, only by a woman police officer. Delhi Police's own Standing Order 309[134] says, "Special attention be paid while dealing with women's demonstrations only women police to tackle them."[10] Apart from these, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 criminalises assault or criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman (Section 74), and words, gestures or intrusion intended to insult the modesty of a woman (Section 79). The former is cognizable and non-bailable, with a minimum punishment of one year. These are the standards against which the testimonies must be examined.

RAF Manual

The Manual attaches mahila elements to the reserve team, to act against women when they are the crowd and otherwise to give first aid and help women and children (paras 13.8, 13.9).

4.8.2 Evidence Before the Tribunal

On the morning of 20.07.26, according to accounts, the environment at Jantar Mantar was peaceful. Meera, who reached the protest site at around 7 a.m., testified that only RAF

[134] Delhi Police. (n.d.). *Standing Order No. 309*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cDoPfhBsiXz5yAEpkv4rPN0F9NHnsppx/view


personnel were present and everything was peaceful. In the afternoon, this changed. At around 2:30 p.m. near the area of Gol Chakkar and PNB Building at Connaught Place (CP), tear gas shells were fired and the crowd scattered in different directions. Meera testified that the internet was suspended, roads were blocked, and police were giving contradictory directions: one officer was asking people to go to one side, and another was sending people to a different side. In this way, they restricted the space. At the same time, she saw a woman whose T-shirt was covered with blood. Meera stated that her friends decided to sit there without raising any slogans, but that the police still looked hostile.

When male protesters tried to seek cover behind female protestors thinking that police would not use force on them, RAF deployed its own women personnel. Meera told the Tribunal that she was pushed forward by the crowd and fell. The RAF hit her face with a shield two to three times while asking her to return home. She also told the Tribunal that a girl received an electric shock in front of her, and that one of the CJP members was dragged by the legs with enough force to pull his shirt up his body. This account aligns with the testimonies given by Bewesh Adhikari and Ramit Verma.

After all this, Meera and her group left that area. Then a man came, claiming to be a member of "Jantar Mantar Management." He asked for their identities and asked them not to go further. They complied and reached a secluded area, with Jantar Mantar on one side and road on the other. They were just raising slogans, then police came running towards them and charged with batons. During this, one of her shoes was left behind, and 6-7 officers approached; she begged them not to beat her while other people were getting beaten. They were abusing female protesters calling them prostitutes. While she was walking, an RAF officer came and shoved a baton into her buttocks. She got furious and asked him why he had done this; he just laughed. Meera testified that male officers gave them sexually explicit threats, saying *"I will beat these prostitutes by dragging…[in an abusive tone] …go to your homes or I will take you to the Police Station and beat you by stripping naked".*

Other witnesses corroborate elements of this account from different vantage points. Bewesh Adhikari testified that he saw the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Sandeep Lamba, slapping a woman without any provocation, we investigated the authenticity of the video and found that it was not AI generated, the evidences of the investigation report is attached in the Annexure and the geo tagging results below:[135]

[135] See exhibit 20 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.




A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at reported coordinates 28.62° N, 77.22° E.[136]

After this incident, Mr Lamba was removed from Jantar Mantar and was sent back to his station of posting. Ramit Verma, a YouTuber who was present at the site, testified that Delhi Police personnel were abusing women protesters, and he saw a woman protester directly asking an officer how he could abuse her mother. Another witness told the Tribunal that she and her friend were touched inappropriately, in such a manner that her friend's shirt was torn apart. Both left for Kerala Bhawan, where they formed a human chain so that no one would be beaten. Utkarsh Gaur, another YouTuber, testified that he witnessed a pregnant woman being beaten by Delhi Police very brutally.

In another video presented before the Tribunal showing police personnel allegedly engaging in sexualised misconduct against female protesters, including directing a baton towards a protester's buttocks and striking another on the buttocks. Supplementary video testimony

[136] See exhibit 20 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

recounts sexually degrading verbal abuse, threats of stripping women naked at the police station, and repeated slapping of female protesters.[137]



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E. The victims in the video also testified before the tribunal online[138].

The testimony given by Ishita Singh (name changed) showed another side of the protest, which unfolded on 20.07.26. She testified that during the protest, she was beaten in a baton charge. After a while, a YouTuber approached her for comments, and she gave some critical statements against the Prime Minister, in which she used abusive language. She then left for home. The next day, her clip went viral on social media and news channels. Her personal details and home address were made public. After all this, she started receiving abusive calls in which people were asking "who had given her the right to abuse the Prime Minister". The security guard of

[137] See exhibit 11 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.
[138] See exhibit 11 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

her building told her that unknown people were coming looking for her. One neighbour of hers also told her the same. FIRs were lodged against her, and she has been receiving rape threats ever since. Under pressure from outside and inside her home, she recorded an apology video. Even after apologising, things did not settle; she received threats, including threats of acid attacks. Journalists were trying to contact her, but she was refusing repeatedly. She agreed to meet one journalist who suggested that she record another apology video, saying her address was already public. After this video she was viral again. Her Instagram account was also suspended.

Digital Harassment Following the Protest: The Legal Gap

Ishita Sharma's testimony describes a pattern, distinct from physical conduct described above but connected to it: circulating the personal details of a private citizen without consent, followed by threats, and pressure to apologize publicly. This pattern is commonly known as "doxxing." Section 72 of the IT Act, 2000" punishes a person for disclosing information that he receives using the powers given by the IT Act. In other words, if a person acting in an "official or statutory" capacity receives information regarding any person and then discloses it, s/he may be punished with imprisonment for up to two years. The evidence presented to the Tribunal does not establish that the personal details of Ishita Singh were circulated using official access. This falls into a gap which the law does not clearly address, as Section 72 covers only those acting in an official capacity.

In cases where private citizens, especially women, are targeted after the protest ends, the available legal remedies are scattered. Section 74 and 79 of BNS address physical and verbal conduct against women's modesty—but were not made for online harassment. Section 356 of BNS, 2023 (defamation) addresses reputational harm, but not the privacy violation behind it. The provisions for morphed or sexually fabricated images (Section 67 and 67A, IT Act) and on deepfakes (for which there is no dedicated offence, because Section 66C, IT Act is for credential theft and not for fabricated likeness) were not directly engaged on the facts of this testimony, but they show that women protesters are exposed to the digital harm. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as "DPDP Act"), allows a right to erase in limited circumstances, but this right does not extend to the removal of outdated or irrelevant information from the internet.

Administrative Response

The police's affidavit does not mention any allegation of misbehaviour, harassment or sexual abuse of women protesters, or the arrest or handling of women by male personnel. The only statements that bear on the conduct of police personnel are general ones. The affidavit is described as saying that officers were only trying to contain crowds that attacked them without provocation, that all measures were taken in accordance with the permissible modes of controlling violence, and that the petitions rely on selective photographs and unverified reports.

Standing Order No. 309 provides that only women police are to deal with women's demonstrations (item 22). The affidavit does not say whether women police were present, how many, or what their role was.

4.8.3 The Tribunal's Conclusion

The testimonies of different witnesses show the same pattern. Women RAF personnel were deployed against women protesters, women protesters were subjected to sexually explicit threats, and there was direct physical contact with the crowd that went beyond what was necessary to disperse it.

Meera stated that women RAF personnel were deployed against women protesters. This accords with Standing Order No. 309, item 22, which requires that only women police deal with women's demonstrations. But following the instruction does not make whatever the personnel did lawful or proportionate. The Order decides who may be deployed, and not what they may do.

The harm suffered by women protesters after 20.07.26 was not limited to the protest itself [it includes digital harassment]. The legal framework set out above does not adequately address it.

4.8.4 Escalating instances of sexual assault on women 10.10.26 *(based on secondary sources)*.

The allegations of sexual misconduct during the 10 October protest must be examined alongside reports of violence against women during subsequent detentions. According to Scroll's investigation published on 16 October, Neha Bora, president of the All India Students' Association (AISA), alleged that a policeman touched her chest while attempting to stop her from crossing a barricade as protesters moved towards Dilli Haat after being prevented from assembling at Jantar Mantar. The report also documented allegations made by women detained on 11 October, when members of the Students' Federation of India gathered at Connaught Place to protest the previous day's police action. Juliya, one of the detainees, alleged that female officers dragged her by her hair and held her by the throat, while a male officer groped her breasts as she was forced into a police bus. These accounts raise serious concerns about the

treatment of women during crowd control and detention, particularly where allegations involve inappropriate touching and the use of physical force[139].

Further allegations were reported by Scroll on 12 October in its article, *"'Private parts kicked, phones taken away': Detained Delhi protestors allege assault in police vans"*. Women detained following the protests alleged that they were physically assaulted by female police officers inside police vehicles while being transported away from central Delhi. The report described allegations of women being struck on their breasts and private parts, as well as being choked and beaten. Detainees also alleged that their phones were taken away and that access to medical assistance was delayed for an injured protester. According to their accounts, some detainees were transported to a community centre in Pandwalan Khurd, approximately 40 kilometres from central Delhi. These allegations extend the concerns beyond the initial use of force at protest sites to the treatment of women after detention, when their ability to seek assistance or document their experiences may be restricted. The allegations require investigation and should not be treated as established findings of criminal liability.

Taken together, these reports raise questions about the safeguards available to women during detention, the conduct of personnel responsible for their custody, and the mechanisms through which allegations of sexual and physical abuse can be independently investigated. They also highlight the importance of ensuring access to medical assistance, legal counsel and communication with family members. Where allegations concern sexual violence by state personnel, accountability requires more than an internal review: complaints must be investigated impartially, evidence preserved, and the safety and dignity of complainants protected throughout the process. The incidents reported on 10 and 11 October should be documented separately from allegations arising during earlier protests, while being examined within the broader context of police conduct during the crackdown.

4.9 EVIDENCE OF A TRUCK FULL OF STONES NEAR THE PROTEST SITE AND OTHER SMASHED/BROKEN VEHICLES

4.9.1 The actual incident

At 8 am on 20.07.26, as the Cockroach Janta Party assembled at Jantar Mantar, its workers pointed to a truck loaded with stones on the road linking Sansad Marg to the protest site. Abhijeet Dipke put out a video asking how it had crossed a police cordon. The stones, the CJP alleged, could be used to frame protesters or trigger violence. The police did not respond.

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[139] Rathore, V., & Minj, N. (2026, October 16). 'Groped and pushed': Women allege sexual harassment while being detained during Delhi protests. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/1096435/groped-and-pushed-women-allege-sexual-harassment-while-being-detained-during-delhi-protests

Several versions of the truck story emerged with contradictory claims even from the police station that seized the truck and on social media. Avdhesh Kumar, whose investigative report uncovered the full story appeared before the Tribunal.[140] The results of his findings and cross questioning by the jury is given below.

Avdhesh traced the vehicle with its registration number. It was not a stray truck: the police had seized it four days earlier, after a pre-dawn crash on 16.07.26 that injured seven people and led to an FIR. It was in the custody of the Parliament Street station's malkhana – a department inside an Indian police station responsible for the storage of weapons, cash, seized properties, and crime scene evidence.

Over the following week, the dumper moved at least four times – to the protest site, to Bhalswa to be emptied, to the pavement outside the Indian Youth Congress office on Raisina Road, and then out of sight. Officers at the same station offer incompatible explanations.

The FIR records the time of the crash as 4.15 am on 16.07.26. Truck HR63 E 6865, driven rashly and negligently, hit a Maruti Eeco, HR43 D 9778, at the Firoz Shah Road–Kasturba Gandhi Marg crossing in Lutyens' Delhi. Seven people in the van were injured. Both vehicles were taken to the Parliament Street police station.

The truck was last registered to Keshav Kumar Sahni, who claimed it had been at the station since the crash. "This is a dumper truck that was carrying bricks and stones for construction work," he said. "However, we sold this dumper about two months ago. I have the agreement."

Charan Singh, a relative of the van's current owner, deposited the damaged vehicle at the station. "When the accident happened, seven people were sitting in the vehicle. Everyone was injured," he said. "It was a truck loaded with bricks and stones that hit our vehicle."

Avdhesh said three versions emerged from the police themselves: An officer at Parliament Street, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "This truck was parked right outside Parliament Street, directly opposite where the van is standing now. But as soon as the video of the truck went viral on the morning of 20.07.26, we took the truck to the Bhalswa area, emptied it, and brought it back and parked it here again."

Mohit Bhati, the investigating officer, said the truck was initially shifted because protests were on and the station was short of space. Asked how it reached the Youth Congress office, he said: "We had seized the vehicle, and since then it has been in the possession of the malkhana department. I cannot tell you anything beyond this."

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[140] Kumar, A. (2026, July 28). A truck full of stones appeared near the CJP protest. We found out how. Newslaundry. https://www.newslaundry.com/2026/07/28/from-accident-to-malkhana-to-protest-site-tracing-the-mysterious-stone-laden-truck

Sansad Marg SHO Neeraj Kumar contradicted both. The truck was emptied on 19.07.26, he said – a day before the protest – and the videos in circulation are old footage. Asked how a seized vehicle ended up outside a party office, he said it made no difference where the police chose to park it.

YouTuber Ratan Ranjan had flagged it four days earlier, posting from outside the office of Indian Youth Congress on the evening of 21.07.26 that this was the Jantar Mantar dumper and the Delhi Police should investigate what it was doing there.

On 25.07.2026, Indian Youth Congress workers released a video showing the same truck outside their office at 5, Raisina Road. It was towed at about noon that day, after repeated complaints and an argument with the police.

After Avdhesh's report was published, the Delhi Police issued a clarification. In a post on X, that "the truck had been moved to a secure location as part of law and order arrangements for the 'Chalo Sansad' march, it was emptied and shifted to a safer place in the early hours of 20.07.2026".

Further in the Tribunal proceedings student leader Anish Gawande again testified that he saw the truck being parked at the protest site on the morning of 20.07.26. When Anish asked the police about the truck, the police officer at the site responded that a routine construction work was going on nearby and the truck is being parked here because of the congestion of the space at the construction site.

Ali, one of the volunteers for the protest, testified that he first saw the truck on the night of 19.07.26, and on 20.07.26 when the march began, he witnessed placing of accidental/broken/smashed vehicles placed enroute Sansad Marg, he said no one from the protest destroyed those vehicles and that they were placed at the site to create a narrative of destruction of property against the protesters.

Ali's statements also reverberate with Avdhesh's report. He mentions that when he enquired about the destroyed vehicles placed at the Sansad Marg, the police staff at Parliament Street said that the van had been smashed by demonstrators, along with other police vehicles. However, their own FIR says otherwise—it is the same Eeco from the 16.07.26 crash. Charan Singh (owner of the destroyed vehicle) said it has also been moved. "Where I parked my vehicle, there were other broken-down vehicles standing too," he said. "Where this vehicle is standing now, he did not park it there."

4.9.2 Tribunal's conclusion

On the basis of testimonies presented before the Tribunal and Avdhesh's report, the Tribunal resolves that the statement that truck was emptied on 19.07.26 is inconsistent with what followed. If it was emptied a day before, it should not have been standing full of stones at Jantar Mantar on 20.07.26. As per the report the truck was there near the protest site, and as per the Police's clarification, it was shifted in the early hours of 20.07.26. The truck therefore was parked near the protest site on the night of 19.07.26. The Tribunal was not able to verify if the truck was still parked at the same spot after the morning of 20.07.26. The Police's statement that the truck was moved from there in the early hours of 20.07.26 therefore could not be refuted. However, based on several testimonies and reports before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the destroyed vehicles were placed at the spot by unknown persons and the reason most likely appears to be to set up a narrative against the protesters. Had the Tribunal met the incumbent senior police officers, or had the officers mentioned the truck in their Supreme Court affidavit, the exact story of the destroyed vehicles could have been verified. But the officials did not respond. The Tribunal therefore moves ahead with its opinion.

4.10 PRESENCE AND ROLE OF MEN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES WHO ALSO PERPETRATED VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PROTESTERS AND THEIR POSSIBLE IDENTITIES; WERE THEY UNLAWFULLY DEPLOYED BY THE POLICE?

The evidence presented before the Tribunal, which included video material, shows that on 20.07.26 men in civilian clothes, some of them carrying batons, were beating protesters.

4.10.1 Applicable Law and Standards

The law does not prohibit plain-clothes policing in itself. It requires that a person exercising coercive force over another must be identifiable.

According to Section 36 of BNSS, every police officer making an arrest must bear an accurate, visible, and clear identification of his name, so as to facilitate easy identification. The requirement is consistent with the directions of the Supreme Court in *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,*[141] that person making an arrest or conducting interrogation must bear accurate, visible, and clear identification showing their name and designation. Both the provision and the direction are framed for arrest and interrogation, and not to the dispersal of the crowd. However, they state a principle: a person against whom the State exercises force has a right to know who is the one using force against him.

[141] AIR 1997 SC 610

Section 148 BNSS provides for the dispersal of an unlawful assembly.[142] Under it, a person can be required to assist police officers in dispersing the crowd. If this section is applied to the unidentified men beating the students, it is possible that those men were asked to assist the officers, but the Delhi Police do not claim this; they say that these men were police personnel.


Section 37 BNS shows why identification has legal consequences for the citizen. There is no right of private defence against an act done by a public servant, in good faith and in his official capacity, which does not cause a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. But the Explanation attached to this section states a person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person acting is a public servant. Where the action is done on the direction of a public servant, the right is not lost unless the person knows or has reason to believe that the actor is so directed, or unless the actor states the authority under which he acts or produces it in writing on demand. The Tribunal does not say that any protesters acted in private defence. The point is that the protection law provides to public servants depends on their being identifiable as such. A man in civilian clothes with a baton in his hand, who does not reveal his identity and beats people, leaves no chance to know who he really is.

4.10.2 Identity of Men and the removal of badges

Three possibilities arise from the evidence presented. First, the unidentified men were police personnel. This is consistent with the statements of the police themselves. It is also consistent with the testimony of Mandeep Punia, who saw a man in civilian clothes and, in the evening, the same man in police uniform, and with the testimony of Saanvi, who saw a person in civilian clothes instructing women police personnel to take their positions.

Second, some of the unidentified men were not police officers. We verified one such video the geo tagging information is attached below.[143]

[142] See annexure II
[143] See exhibit 7 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at reported coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E.[144]

The evidence supports the first and second point. The witnesses did not tell the name, rank, or unit of these men, nor did the police tell their identities. This is why the question of their identity remains unanswered, and the reason that they were not identifiable on 20.07.26.

On the question of removal of badges and no identity marker on the security personnel deployed, Chander Uday Singh, senior advocate at the Supreme Court argued before the Tribunal that "along with security forces there were clearly non-state actors who were armed with *lathis* [batons], including plastic *lathis* given to them by the police. The police also were mostly in their uniforms but there were also some police personnel in civilian clothes, but there was no way to make out which ones were the actual police officials and which were not because they had taken their badges off. The fact that the police official themselves had taken their badges off conveys something about their intentions. These conveys that the intentions were

[144] See exhibit 7 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

not merely to contain, not merely to enforce the dispersal of crowds, but to wreak vengeance on the crowd. So, because the purpose is to wreak vengeance, you take of the badges and there's a purpose to it, nobody takes off the badges because they want to comply with the law or the Constitution. So, if your objective is to teach them a lesson then automatically graded response goes down the drain, proportionality goes down the drain, proportionate reaction goes down the drain all that happens is a violent attack by the police and security forces". Chander further added that *"it will be for the Tribunal on the basis of the actual testimony of people who were eyewitnesses and who might have been victims, etc to determine that. I don't want to enter that fray. But the probability that there was a predetermination here because of not wearing badges, et cetera, et cetera, to me seems very high. And the law does operate on the basis of reasonable probability or presumptions that would arise and which would be rebuttable but would in the first instance operate as a presumption because if something totally untoward like that had been done, the presumption would appear to arise that this was predetermined."*

This Section deals with three questions: who these were; what their role was in the use of force; and, if they were police personnel, whether they were lawfully deployed. A person who cannot be identified cannot be held responsible for his actions, and a protester who cannot learn whether the person beating him is a public servant cannot know what the law demands of him and allows him to do.


4.10.3 Other Evidence Before the Tribunal

Mandeep Punia, a journalist, testified that he saw men in civilian clothes beating protesters with batons without any provocation. He described a lane near Sansad Marg through which students were trying to come out. Men in civilian clothes hit a student there, and a stampede-like situation was created. Students who fell were not given the chance to stand up and were beaten continuously. Journalists were abused, and one of his friends was beaten. One police officer said to him, *"Jitna marzi shoot [video-graph] kar le; mai to aise hi lath chalaunga"* (Shoot [video graph] as much as you like; I will keep wielding the baton like this). When asked why force was being used, another officer replied, *"Protest site ko kisi bhi tarah khaali karwane ka upar se order hai"* (an order from above to clear the protest site by hook or by crook). Mr. Punia testified that, by the evening, one of the men who had earlier been in civilian clothes was in police uniform.

Saanvi, a lawyer by profession, testified that on 20.07.26 she reached the protest site at around 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. The first statement she heard was, "Any statement against Modi, you will be detained." The way to reach Jantar Mantar was very narrow due to barricading, and by evening, the environment was threatening, as the police had gathered near the barricades. She and her friends tried to enter the area, and they were told that the police had already begun a

baton charge. She saw a man with only one shoe, and near him a man in civilian clothes with a police baton in his hand, who gave instructions to women police officers to take their position.


Video evidence was presented before the Tribunal by showing several Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel allegedly beating a young protester at an isolated location. The injured protester appears severely incapacitated and unable to move without assistance. The recording also shows RAF personnel carrying several weapons, including a device resembling a pellet-firing gun.[145]



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.21° E.[146]

[145] See exhibit 14 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.
[146] See exhibit 14 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.


The one video shows two men in civilian clothes carrying police-style batons and striking protesters on separate occasions. In the first incident, a man wearing a helmet and concealing his face with a handkerchief strikes a young protester, apparently after being asked to identify himself. In the second, another man strikes a passing protester. Neither man displays visible police insignia, a name badge or official credentials. No immediate aggression by the affected protesters is discernible. The men's identities and official status, as well as the circumstances preceding the incidents, remain unverified.[147]



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E.[148]

[147] See exhibit 7 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.
[148] See exhibit 7 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

The second video recording reportedly depicts a young protester recounting his encounter with unidentified individuals carrying police-style batons and allegedly exercising enforcement authority without displaying any visible official identification. The individual alleges that these persons were indiscriminately assaulting protesters and civilians with batons. He further recounts being personally struck in his private parts, raising serious concerns regarding the nature and severity of the physical force allegedly employed. The geo tagging assessment results of the video is attached below.[149]



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.63° N, 77.22° E.

These testimonies show that unidentified men in civilian clothes were present at different locations. They also indicate that these people were part of police operations and not protesters: one was seen later in a police uniform, and another was seen giving directions to women officers. No witness testified anything regarding the rank or unit of these men or whether they belong to the security force or not.

[149] See exhibit 17 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

Administrative Response

The videos available show police officials in plain clothes carrying lathis. The Delhi Police's affidavit calls them "spotters", and says that they were drawn from the Special Branch, the Special Cell, the Crime Branch and the local police. It says that, because of the urgency of the situation, they were strategically merged into the crowd. It says that this is neither illegal nor unusual, and that the same tactic is used at gatherings such as Independence Day and Republic Day. It says that the videos show a crowd control measure out of context.

Three points follow from that description. First, the affidavit, as described, accepts that men in plain clothes seen in the videos with lathis were police personnel, and names the four units from which they were drawn. This bears directly on the question of who the men were. Second, the affidavit's explanation is that they were spotters. The published account does not say what the spotters did when they were in the crowd, whether they struck any person, on whose order they acted, or whether they carried identification. A spotter's work is to watch and to point out persons. A person carrying a lathi and using it is doing something else. Third, the comparison with Independence Day and Republic Day is a comparison with events at which the crowd is attending a ceremony. It is not a comparison with a protest where force was being used.

The affidavit does not mention name plates or the Delhi Police rule that requires all ranks to wear them (Standing Order No. 51).

4.10.3 The Tribunal's Conclusion

1. The presence of police in civilian clothes at a protest is not unlawful, and the Tribunal accepts that "spotters" are a part of policing at a protest.
2. The men in civilian clothes could not be identified, because they wore nothing that could reveal their identity. Where the identity of those who used force is unknown, holding them responsible for their excesses becomes difficult. The Tribunal makes recommendations on this in Section 10.
3. It was submitted to the Tribunal that the removal of badges (name tags), and the presence of personnel in civilian clothes, served a purpose: a predetermined decision to use unlawful force against the protesters. The Tribunal notes that the absence of identification made it impossible to tell police from others, which is consistent with that submission. The evidence before it does not allow it to find the purpose.

4.10.4 Increased involvement of Right-Wing Groups and Unidentified Persons Attacking Protesters on 10.10.26 (this additional section is based on secondary resources).

On 10.10.26, individuals identified in media reports as members or supporters of right-wing organisations were reported to have threatened, chased and physically assaulted protesters participating in, or attempting to reach the CJP-led demonstration against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Although the protest was scheduled to take place at Jantar Mantar, police restrictions and mass detentions prevented demonstrators from assembling there, and confrontations subsequently occurred at Connaught Place and other locations in central Delhi. Reports and video footage published by several media organisations documented groups of men in civilian clothes confronting and assaulting protesters, including women, while police personnel were present nearby.[150]

According to *Hindustan Times*, at approximately 2.30 pm near Palika Bazaar, a group of more than 30 men claiming affiliation with the Bajrang Dal raised slogans and threatened journalists covering the demonstration. The newspaper also reported that groups of men associated with right-wing organisations assaulted protesters and journalists at Connaught Place and near the MCD Civic Centre. These incidents suggest that intimidation was not confined to protesters alone, but extended to journalists attempting to document the events.[151]

Video footage of the attacks further illustrates the nature of the violence. *India Today* reported that a video circulating on social media showed a man pushing and kicking a young protester near an iron fence, while two other men aggressively pushed another individual against the fence and repeatedly punched them, the reports therefore raises questions on sexual assault on women. Following the circulation of the footage, Delhi Police arrested four men in connection with the assault. In a subsequent report, *Hindustan Times* stated that the apprehended men claimed to be members of the Hindu Raksha Dal, according to the police. These arrests constitute an important development in establishing individual accountability, although they

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[150] Vijaya Chronicle Staff. (2026, October 11). Anti-CEC protest: Right-wing group members assault protesters at Connaught Place. Vijaya Chronicle. https://www.vijayachronicle.com/story/anti-cec-protest-right-wing-group-members-assault-protesters-at-connaught-place; Hindustan Times Correspondent. (2026, October 11). Delhi protest: Right-wing groups allegedly assault protesters, journalists amid heavy security deployment. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/delhi-protest-right-wing-groups-allegedly-assault-protesters-journalists-amid-heavy-security-deployment-101791652812221.html; Noor, A., Raghav, V., & Agarwal, S. (2026, October 15). How Delhi Police let Hindutva mob run amock. The Quint. https://www.thequint.com/news/politics/right-wing-mob-attack-protesters-violence-cockroach-janta-party-gyanesh-kumar-delhi-police

[151] Sinha, J. (2026, October 11). Right-wing groups assault protesters, journalists amid heavy security deployment in Delhi protest. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/delhi-protest-right-wing-groups-allegedly-assault-protesters-journalists-amid-heavy-security-deployment-101791652812221.html

do not, by themselves, establish responsibility for all the reported attacks that took place that day.[152]

The presence of unidentified men in civilian clothes at multiple locations also raises questions about their identities, affiliations and purpose. On 12 October, *The Indian Express* reported on a petition before the Delhi High Court seeking an independent and time-bound investigation into the assaults of 10 October. The petition alleged that groups of men in civilian clothes had been stationed at several points around Connaught Place and adjoining roads, where they confronted and assaulted people arriving for the protest. It further alleged that women bystanders and journalists, rather than law-enforcement personnel, were seen intervening to protect those being attacked. These allegations require independent verification, but they underscore the need to establish who these individuals were and what measures the police took to prevent or stop the violence.[153]

The contrast between the extensive police deployment and the reported assaults by groups of men is particularly troubling. While police detained protesters under prohibitory restrictions, media reports described groups of alleged right-wing activists gathering, threatening demonstrators and physically attacking them in public spaces. *The Quint* questioned why individuals were able to assemble and attack protesters despite restrictions on public gatherings, while demonstrators themselves faced detention. The available reports do not establish that police personnel coordinated with the attackers; nevertheless, the incidents warrant scrutiny of whether officers intervened promptly, whether the attackers were allowed to operate without effective restraint, and whether all complaints were investigated.[154]

These incidents should therefore be examined as a matter of public accountability, rather than treated solely as isolated altercations. The authorities must establish the identities of all those involved, verify any organisational affiliations, investigate allegations of intimidation and assault, and clarify the actions taken by police personnel who were present. When demonstrators are subjected to restrictions by the state while other groups are reportedly able

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[152] Ojha, A. (2026, October 11). *Viral video shows group of men thrashing protesters during CJP stir; 4 arrested*. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/cities/delhi/story/delhi-connaught-place-protest-assault-video-four-arrested-cjp-rss-bjp-jantar-mantar-3014646-2026-10-11; Sinha, J. (2026, October 11). 4 men held after right-wing groups threaten, assault CJP protesters in Delhi: Cops. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/4-men-held-after-right-wing-groups-threaten-assault-cjp-protesters-in-delhi-cops-101791697313523.html

[153] Ghosh, S. (2026, October 12). Jantar Mantar closed, no alternate site, says plea; Delhi High Court refuses urgent hearing. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/delhi-high-court-hear-plea-closure-jantar-mantar-protest-site-cjp-10917594/

[154] Noor, A., Raghav, V., & Agarwal, S. (2026, October 15). *How Delhi Police let Hindutva mob run amock*. The Quint. https://www.thequint.com/news/politics/right-wing-mob-attack-protesters-violence-cockroach-janta-party-gyanesh-kumar-delhi-police; Times News Network. (2026, October 11). *Videos show CJP protesters being beaten up by 'activists'*. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/protesters-beaten-up-by-groups-of-men/amp_articleshow/134860564.cms

to intimidate or assault them, the disparity in the enforcement of public-order measures demands a clear and evidence-based explanation.

4.11 ARE THERE EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF PELLET GUNS AND THEIR LEGALITY

This section examines two questions: whether pellets were used against protesters on 20.07.26 and, if they were used, whether their use was lawful. The first question is on fact, on which the Tribunal heard the testimonies of people who testified that they were injured by pellets, and of one filmmaker who verified the videos. The second question relates to law and standards, and the Tribunal examines it in the light of international guidance, the Arms Act, 1959, and the SOPs and standing orders related to crowd control.

4.11.1 Applicable Law and Standards

International Standards

The Resource Book on Human Rights and Law Enforcement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights states that kinetic projectiles which have been tested and confirmed to be less lethal, sufficiently accurate and precise may be permitted, as long as the instructions for their use are in accordance with human rights and are realistic. Such projectiles "should generally only be fired against the lower abdomen or legs of a violent individual and only with a view to addressing an imminent threat of injury." The Resource Book states that ammunition which fires a large number of small pellets over a wide area is by nature inaccurate and indiscriminate. It notes that the safety distance recommended for many such munitions is 40 metres, at which their accuracy makes it hard to avoid vulnerable parts of the body, and that this inherent inaccuracy creates a very high risk of injuring uninvolved bystanders. It sets out four principles for law enforcement officials: never to use kinetic impact projectiles at close range; never to target sensitive parts of the body, in particular the head, neck, chest or groin; never to use equipment that fires multiple projectiles, because of the risk to bystanders; and never to use such projectiles indiscriminately against a crowd, but only against specific persons.

Statute

There is no separate law regulating the use of pellet guns. They are regulated under the Arms Act, 1959 and the Arms Rules, 2016. The word "pellet" is not used in either of them. Rule 2(2) of Arms Rules defines an "air weapon" as a device that discharges a projectile from a barrel under the pressure of compressed air or other gas, but does not employ an explosive charge to do so. A 12-bore pump-action gun firing cartridges does not use explosive charge, and therefore does not come within the definition. It is a firearm, and the law on firearms applies to it. The

Act does not state when police may fire at a crowd. That is governed by the provisions on crowd dispersal and by the standing instructions on the subject.

Delhi Police Instructions

The use of pellets is regulated through the SOPs, which are generally not available as public documents. The SOP to Deal with Public Agitations with Non-Lethal Measures of 2011, prepared by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (hereinafter referred to as "BPRD"), came into the public domain when Venkatesh Nayak obtained a copy through an RTI application in 2012. The SOP provides a graded approach: unlawful assemblies are first to be dispersed by persuasion, negotiation and warning; if these fail, minimum force may be used, beginning with non-lethal measures such as the baton. Force should be proportional, must be used only when absolutely necessary, and must be stopped when the violence stops. If the use of force cannot be avoided, officers should, as far as practicable, aim below the waist. It is to be noted that the 2011 SOP does not mention pellet guns.

Standing Order No. 72[155] of the Delhi Police, issued in January 1989 deals with unlawful assemblies, crowd dispersal, discipline and the use of minimum force. It empowers an Executive Magistrate or a designated police officer to order the dispersal of the crowd, and when necessary, the use of force. However, the officers are required to act with "utmost restraint and patience" so that the situation does not escalate and the loss of life and property is minimised. This order also does not mention pellets.

Standing Order L&O/10/2022 of the Delhi Police, issued by the Commissioner of Police on May 25th, 2022, provides operational guidelines for regulating rallies, demonstrations and processions in the capital. It provides for three-layered barricading: first, police without batons, equipped with helmets and body protectors, second, with cane shields, and third with full riot-control equipment, which includes batons and tear gas. Under this order, force can be used only on the direction of senior officers and only in such a way that it causes the least possible injury; before force is used, repeated announcements must be made on the public address system, the operation must be videographed, and medical aid must be given to injured police officers and protesters. This order also provides for water cannons, Vajra vehicles and tear gas where required. This order too does not include pellet guns among the crowd-control equipment.

RAF Manual

Plastic pellets (4,800) and .303 ballistic cartridges (4,800) are authorised for an RAF battalion (para 19.3), so the question is the conditions of use. Rubber bullets are allowed only against

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[155] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

arsonists and clashing groups, at specific targets, when other methods are ineffective (para 13.7).

4.11.2 Evidence Before the Tribunal

Varrun Sukhraj, filmmaker and activist, presented videos of the police action at Jantar Mantar and its surrounding areas. The videos show that the nearest place where pellet guns were used was almost 2 km away from the Parliament. The map below provides more explanation.



Vishal testified that on 20.07.26 he reached the protest site at around 12 noon and parked his motorcycle at Connaught Place. Mobile networks were suspended and, according to him, the environment was quiet until 4 p.m. Between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., a commotion started near Central Park of Connaught Place. The Police started using tear gas, first in the air, and then directly at the crowd. According to him, the protesters pelted stones in return. He saw a man whose eye was bleeding, and then he saw a police officer aim a pellet gun at him. He ran and felt as if something had hit his back. All this happened in the inner circle of Connaught Place and not near Parliament. The next day, he went to Safdarjung Hospital for a medical check-up. The X-ray and the medico-legal certificate (MLC) showed around 25 unidentified objects in his body. Later, the Press Information Bureau fact-check unit stated that pellets were not used; however, Vishal maintained that he was a victim of pellet injuries.

Samar (name changed), political science student at Delhi University, testified that he reached the protest site on the afternoon of 20.07.26. Around 2 p.m., a baton charge began. When he was walking, the police were giving way to the people, but there were intermittent baton

charges, which, according to him, were meant to provoke the protesters. Tear gas was already being used before he reached the site. Then a police officer aimed a pellet gun at him and fired, and the pellets hit him, including in the eye. He was taken to Lady Hardinge Hospital, where the doctors told him they could not perform the surgery as it was too extensive. He was asked to sign a consent form and was referred to Safdarjung Hospital, and from there to AIIMS, where he was operated on, two days later. At the time of testifying, he had two pellets in his eye, as a result of which he cannot see, and he stated that around 200 pellets were in his body. Some pellets had come out on their own from his neck and hand. Two of his nerves are damaged, because of which he is unable to raise his arm and his ring finger has stopped working. The doctors told him that they would remove a pellet only if it causes him trouble, and one more surgery is still due. He also spoke of continuing headaches[156]

Vihaan, visual arts student, testified that he joined the protest on the night of 19.07.26 and was making sketches and posters. The next day, the police had narrowed down the way. He and his friend left Jantar Mantar and were going toward Sansad Marg, then a commotion started, and a baton charge began. On the way to Connaught Place, near Gandhi's Charkha, the police were using tear gas, and at this moment he was hit by something. When he checked, he found it was pellets, around 16 to 17 of them, at around 4:30 p.m., and he was bleeding. People near him poured water on him. No rickshaw or auto was available, and he reached Lady Hardinge Hospital on foot, where he was not treated. He then went to Lok Nayak Hospital, where surgery was scheduled but, after an internal decision, the doctors refused to operate on him. His professor then took him to Holy Family Hospital, where five to six pellets were removed from his body. Some pellets are still inside his body, in the shoulder area, and removing them could cause permanent problems. His MLC records foreign material and pellets.

Nisha testified that she reached the protest site on 20.07.26 at around 9:30 a.m. She said that the atmosphere was safe: students were making sure that women did not suffer any inconvenience, and those who were stuck in the crowd were taken out by forming a human chain. At around 3 p.m., the Delhi Police began using tear gas, which made it difficult to stay there, and the protesters began moving back. At around 3:30 p.m., a baton charge began, and she was taken to Rajiv Chowk, while tear gas was continuously fired at Jantar Mantar. She was hit by pellets near Rajiv Chowk. The pellets hit her ear, and her ear was left hanging. She felt dizzy, and people took her to an ambulance, from where she was taken to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. The doctors did not inform her what had happened, and she was discharged within 15 minutes of a two-hour surgery. She told the Tribunal that she saw a police officer lying on the stretcher with no visible injuries.

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
[156] See exhibit 21 in the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.

Tanushree Pandey, an independent journalist who helped Notoon Toppo obtain her medical records, told the Tribunal that the MLC mentioned "gunshot" but that the doctor later said there was a problem with the entry, and that it seemed like to be a "bullet" (goli).

The tribunal was also presented with the visual evidence of a pellet victim named Irshad Sheikh, a young protester hospitalised after sustaining multiple projectile injuries to his face and upper body during the protests. The visible distribution of injuries appears consistent with the impact of multiple small projectiles, potentially discharged from shotgun ammunition containing metal pellets, including birdshot.

The precise ammunition type and firing distance cannot be conclusively established from the injury pattern alone. Independent medical reporting concerning the injured protester documents multiple metallic foreign bodies recovered during surgery, including injuries affecting vulnerable areas of the face and neck. The video report further depicts a substantial deployment of anti-riot units equipped with protective gear and crowd-control equipment in the vicinity of the demonstrations, raising questions regarding the scale and nature of the security response to the reportedly peaceful protests. The severity and distribution of the reported injuries demonstrate the potentially devastating consequences of dispersive projectile ammunition, including penetrating wounds, damage to vital anatomical structures and the risk of permanent disability.[157]


[157] See exhibit 22 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.



We verified the video with geo tagging and/or the use of AI in the video and found that there was no use of AI or any other attempts of impersonating the victim.[158]

In another video presented before the tribunal shows a personnel belonging to the Rapid Action Force (RAF) discharging a weapon described in the submitted note as pellet-firing towards protesters. The firearm and ammunition have not been independently identified from the source note. No prior warning or dispersal announcement is discernible within the recorded sequence. The geo tagging assessment of the video is attached below.[159]

[158] See exhibit 22 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.
[159] See exhibit 1 from the Visual Evidence Dossier attached in annexure I.



A preliminary authenticity assessment of the video reported no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation, though this does not constitute conclusive forensic authentication. The location was identified at coordinates 28.617274° N, 77.207708° E.

Position of the Delhi Police and the Security Forces

As per the media reports the Delhi Police have reportedly denied that pellet guns were used. The affidavit filed by them in the Supreme Court also does not mention pellet guns, 12-bore guns, ballistic cartridges or pellet injuries, and does not mention the Rapid Action Force. It says that lathis are permissible equipment and that all measures taken were in accordance with the permissible modes of controlling violence. It does not say what equipment other than lathis was used, or by which force. However, the visuals from the protest site show a Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel carrying a 12-bore pump-action gun, a firearm that discharges cartridges packed with a large number of small metal or lead pellets and is commonly called a pellet gun. The Tribunal was shown photographs and hospital records of those who testified about pellet injuries.

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) initiated an inquiry into whether RAF personnel used pellet guns. Officials said that the RAF has the 12-bore pump-action gun as a part of its riot-control equipment, and that, according to its SOP, this gun is to be used when the lives of the personnel are in danger. The SOP requires that the gun should be fired using a deflector so that the pellets do not cause serious injuries, and that it be aimed below the torso.

The RAF registered a General Diary entry at 1:24 a.m. on 22.07.26 in relation to the protest of 20.07.26. The entry mentions that to control the crowd during CJP protest, "on the orders of zone-1, DCP, Jantar Mantar", the Deputy Commandant of RAF fired "55 rounds of non-electrical shell, 15 rounds of electrical shell, five tear smoke granite, two rounds using ballistic cartridges with plastic pellets from an anti-riot gun." The image of the general diary is attached below:

GENERAL DIARY

District : NEW DELHI (DELHI) **P.S./Section:** PARLIAMENT STREET **GD No. :** 0008A

Date: 22/07/2026 **Time:** 01:24:22

Entry Made For :
Rank / Name / PIS No. of Police Officer :
SUB-INSPECTOR / OM PARKASH/ 28900610

GD Type(s) : Information

GD Subject: Information

GD Brief :
इस समय दर्ज है कि Dated 20/07/26 DC Satish Kumar Sangwan Deputy Commander B-108 RAF साहब ने DO Room में आकर बतलाया था कि Zone-1 Jantar Mantar DCP North Raja Bhatiya के साथ Duty थी जिनके आदेशानुसार CJP Protest में भीड़ पर काबू के दौरान Non Electrical Shell -55 , Electrical-15, Tear smoke Granite -5 , ARG -2 BC, 2 PP use किया गया । रपट इतलान cctns दर्ज की गई है ।

NOTE: COMPUTER COPY

Signature 22/07/2026
SUB-INSPECTOR / OM PARKASH/28900610

PARLIAMENT POLICE STATION NEW DELHI

In response to a Right to Information (RTI) application filed by Saket Gokhale, a spokesperson of the All India Trinamool Congress, it was stated that at least ten people were injured because of pellets.

The matter is pending before the Supreme Court in *Yashovardhan Azad v. Union of India*, which seeks a ban on metallic pellets. The Court issued notice and directed the Centre to preserve the RAF ammunition log for the Jantar Mantar safe. During the hearing, the Court observed that the SOP of the BPRD is only a proposal, and that the operational SOP allows the use of pellets in exceptional circumstances, and that a blanket ban cannot be granted unless the graded use of force is challenged as violating Article 21 of the Constitution.

4.11.3 The Tribunal's Conclusion

Pellets were fired at protesters

The evidence on the use of pellets is consistent. Four witnesses, at the locations they identified (the inner circle of Connaught Place, the road at Connaught Place near the charkha, and Rajiv Chowk), testified that they were hit by pellets at around 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. The medical records presented by two of them mention foreign objects, and the surgical history of the other two is consistent with pellet injuries. The response to the RTI application records at least ten persons injured by pellets, which is more than the four who testified. The Tribunal's examination of the videos shows personnel apparently discharging a shotgun-type device at locations about 2 km from Parliament, which is consistent with the locations given by the witnesses. The Tribunal finds that, on the afternoon of 20.07.26, pellets were fired at protesters in Central Delhi at more than one location.

The RAF fired them, on an order attributed to the DCP, Zone-1

The Delhi Police deny using pellets. The General Diary of the RAF records that its Deputy Commandant fired two rounds of ballistic cartridges with plastic pellets from an anti-riot gun, to "control the crowd", and that this was done "on the orders of zone-1, DCP, Jantar Mantar". Visuals show an RAF personnel carrying a 12-bore gun. According to the Indian Express, the CRPF inquiry found that RAF personnel fired at least seven rounds of ammunition containing metal pellets. If the denial of the Delhi Police relates only to their own personnel, it does not answer who ordered the firing, because the General Diary attributes the order to the DCP, Zone-1. The Tribunal finds that RAF personnel fired pellets at the protesters, and that the General Diary records the order as coming from the DCP, Zone-1.

Three matters remain unresolved

First, how many rounds were fired: the diary records two rounds with pellets, while the CRPF inquiry is stated to have found at least seven. Second, the kind of pellet: the diary records plastic pellets, while the CRPF inquiry and some of the medical records refer to metal. Third, which

round hit which witness. The ammunition log that could answer these questions has been ordered by the Supreme Court to be preserved and is not available to the Tribunal. The Tribunal makes no finding on these three matters.

The use of pellets was not shown to meet the standards that allow it

No law or standard placed before the Tribunal authorises the Delhi Police to fire pellets at a crowd. The BPRD SOP of 2011, Standing Order No. 72[160] and Standing Order L&O/10/2022, as they have been described to the Tribunal, do not mention pellets, and the Delhi Police standing order, which allows force only on the direction of a senior officer, does not include pellets among its equipment. The only standard that allows pellet use is the RAF's own SOP, under which they may be used only when there is a grave danger to life, with a deflector, and aimed at the lower half of the body. The guidelines of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights say that multi-projectile ammunition should not be used and that no projectile should be aimed at the head, neck or chest.

Against those standards, the General Diary records that the purpose of the firing was "to control the crowd", and not that RAF personnel were in danger. The injuries described before the Tribunal were to the eyes, ears, neck, shoulder, back and body. Vishal, Vihaan and Nisha stated that they were hit while running, walking or moving backward, and none of the four witnesses described any danger from which the police were protecting themselves. The Tribunal notes the testimony of Vishal that protesters pelted stones at Central Park after tear gas was used, and the statement of the Delhi Police that many of their personnel were injured, and accepts that at some points protesters threw objects at the police. But that does not show the grave danger to life, at the places and times where the witnesses were hit, that the RAF's SOP requires. The Tribunal finds that the evidence does not show that the conditions for the use of pellets were met.

A submission on the nature of the device

Senior advocate Chander Uday Singh submitted to the Tribunal that "pellet gun" is a misnomer, and that these are shotguns designed to scatter pellets that cannot be aimed with precision and that, as in Jammu and Kashmir, can cause loss of eyesight, permanent scarring and other lasting injuries. He submitted that the response to a protest has to be graded, gradual and proportionate, and that, from the reports and video clips that he had seen, and speaking without having been present, there was no case of any violence by the protesters. The Tribunal notes the submission

[160] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

on the nature of the device, which accords with the OHCHR guidance above. It does not adopt the submission that there was no violence by protesters, for the reasons given in point 4.

5. LAWFULNESS OF MASS DETENTIONS AND WHETHER THESE WERE TARGETED

5.1 Legality of detentions

The exercise of detention and arrest powers by the police must be tested against the standards set by international law, constitutional restrictions, and statutory law.

a. International law

Resolution 1997/50 of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights defines arbitrary detention as including "both the requirement that a particular form of deprivation of liberty is taken in accordance with the applicable law and procedure and that it is proportional to the aim sought, reasonable and necessary". Any evaluation thereunder is to consider the elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. Thus, two issues arise for consideration when examining mass detentions under international law, namely the purpose for and the process which such detentions were effected.

The purpose of the detentions can be inferred from the circumstances during which they took place. Evidently, detentions were done to prevent ordinary citizens from visiting Jantar Mantar and participating in the ongoing protests. It is crucial to highlight here that the right to freedom of expression and association, including peaceful protest, is a core part of international human rights law. The ICCPR and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (**UDHR**), which India played a significant role in contributing to and ratifying, enshrine people's right to liberty and freedom of association and peaceful assembly. In this context therefore, detentions effected to curtail the above rights fall foul of India's international obligations.

Various procedural safeguards are enunciated in international law against arbitrary detentions. The ICCPR and UDHR explicitly provide for all persons' right against arbitrary detention and right to due process when deprived of their liberty. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment ('**Body of Principles**') specifically requires any detention to be carried out in strict accordance with law and subject to the scrutiny of judicial authorities. In addition, the Body of Principles enumerates the following safeguards:

- Anyone who is arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest (Principle 10) and such information shall be recorded along with time of arrest and taking

of arrested person to any place of custody, identity of the arresting officials, and information regarding the place of custody (Principle 12).

- Arrested persons must be duly informed of their rights at the time of arrest (Principle 13) and are entitled to notify appropriate persons of their choice of their arrest and of their transfer from one place to another during custody (Principle 16). They are also entitled to legal counsel and adequate time and facilities to consult with them (Principles 17 and 18).
- Detained persons have the right to be visited by and to correspond with, in particular, members of their family and should be given adequate opportunity to communicate with the outside world (Principle 19).

The above principles against arbitrary detention have been codified within Indian law as well.

b. Indian Law

Prior to the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ('BNSS') in 2023, the procedure for arrests was governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "CrPC"). Section 41 of the CrPC allowed for any arrest by a police officer without a warrant, i.e. without application of mind by a competent judicial authority, if a person is "concerned" in any cognisable offences, which were classified as such in the Schedule to the IPC. Such an arrest could take place even on a "reasonable suspicion" of involvement in a cognisable offence. Other grounds included possession of any stolen property, obstruction of a police officer from carrying out their duty, and proclamation as an offender by the State Government.

The 177th Law Commission Report dealing with the Law of Arrest released in 2001 characterised cognisable offences as those premised "not upon the quantum of punishment prescribed or the gravity of the crime but upon the need to arrest the person immediately for one or the other relevant purposes viz., to prevent the person from committing further offences, the need to reassure the public that they can feel reassured about the effectiveness of the law and order machinery, the need of investigation and may be, in some instances, the need to protect the offender from the wrath of public and so on."

Indeed, the same report recognises that the power of arrest is "wrongly and illegally exercised in a large number of cases all over the country". It was stated that practically, no consequences ensue from wrongful arrests, which ultimately empowers police officers to abuse their powers. Regardless, several judgements of the Supreme Court have enumerated certain principles that are supposed to restrain the abuse of arresting powers. In *Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar*

Pradesh[161] the Supreme Court held that the following criteria should be used to determine whether detention upon arrest should continue:

- the person's unwillingness to identify himself so that a summons may be served upon him;
- the need to prevent the continuation or repetition of that offence;
- the need to protect the arrested person himself or other persons or property;
- the need to secure or preserve evidence of or relating to that offence or to obtain such evidence from the suspect by questioning him; and
- the likelihood of the person failing to appear at court to answer any charge made against him.

The most notable decision of the SC in this regard comes from *DK Basu v. State of West Bengal*.[162] Eleven guidelines were issued as enumerated below:

- The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
- That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may be either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.
- A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation center or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
- The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.

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[161] AIR 1994 SC 1349.
[162] AIR 1997 SC 610.

- The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.
- An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
- The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any, present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection Memo" must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
- The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union Territory, Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
- Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Area Magistrate for his record.
- The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
- A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous police board.

These principles were codified as additions by way of Sections 41A, 41B, 41C, AND 41D by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, in part due to the recommendations of the Law Commission's 177th Report. The amended Section 41 allowed for arrest only when a cognisable offence has been committed in the presence of a police officer, or where reasonable suspicion exists due to a complaint or some other information that a cognisable offence has been committed. Where such an offence is punishable by less than seven years, the arrest can take place only if the police officer, for reasons to be reduced in writing, believes that such arrest is necessary to prevent the commission of any further offence, properly investigate the offence, prevent evidence-tampering or witness-tampering, or to ensure their presence before the Court. Where such reasons do not exist, the police officer must issue a notice directing such person to appear before him under Section 41A. Section 41B carries the

stipulations under (a),(b), and (c) of the ***DK Basu***[163] judgement highlighted above. Section 41C provides for a control room as in point (k) above and Section 41D allows an arrested person to meet an advocate as under point (j) above. These provisions now find place as Sections 35, 36, 37, and 38 of the BNSS respectively.

c. Whether lawful procedure was followed during mass detentions

As is clear from the above provisions, any arrest or detention can take place *only* when there is a commission of a cognisable offence in the presence of a police officer or reasonable suspicion exists as to the commission of a cognisable offence by a person. During the days of the protest however, any person remotely suspected of intending to visit Jantar Mantar was detained. These detentions took place without reference to the commission of any offence. Admittedly, police officers at various checkpoints across South, Central and New Delhi districts profiled people prior to detaining them. Not only was there no proximity to any offence, many of those detained had no intention of actually visiting Jantar Mantar. As testimonies evince, several detainees were also stopped due to their visibly Muslim identity.

It is also questionable why or on what legal basis detainees were transported from one checkpost or police station to another, for instance with detainees stopped by Nizamuddin police personnel who were later taken to Badarpur. There is no legal provision that allows for the transportation of detainees. Even after their release, several detainees were called and asked to return to the police station without being informed as to any reason or grounds.

There were three grounds cited by the Delhi Police for detaining persons: the operation of an order under Section 163(2) of the BNSS; violation of section 65 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978; and arrest to prevent the commission of cognisable offences under Section 170 of the BNSS.

One order under Section 163 of the BNSS (among presumably many others for different districts) was passed on 19.07.26 by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, South-East District under Section 163(2) of the BNSS banning the assembly of more than two persons in any public location *for the purpose of protest, dharna, demonstration, rally, procession, or agitation* in relation to the Sansad March called for by the CJP. While such an order may have applied to those assembling to protest, no such detention would be warranted under Section 223 of the BNS (providing for violation of a duly promulgated order) unless it could be demonstrated that such persons had gathered for the purpose of a protest. In other words, there was nothing empowering police officers to arbitrarily stop and detain persons based merely on the suspicion that a gathering had taken place for the purpose of a protest.

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[163] AIR 1997 SC 610.

People were also detained under Section 65(2) of the Delhi Police Act, which allows for the removal of any person who resists, refuses, or fails to comply with any reasonable direction given in the discharge of duties under the Act. However, the testimonies of lawyers show that no reasonable direction was actually given by police officers which was resisted. Detention powers were therefore arbitrarily exercised to prevent people from joining the protest at Jantar Mantar.

The final ground under which persons were detained was Section 170 of the BNSS, which allows arrest without a warrant when a police officer *knows of a design to commit any cognisable offence and the person so designing cannot otherwise be prevented.* Not only were no such designs to commit cognisable offences present but, as highlighted above, the kalandras carried blatantly false allegations of rioting and violence based on uncorroborated complaints.

In most of these detentions, no lawful procedure was followed. Detainees were not informed of the grounds or reasons of arrests and were surreptitiously transferred from one police station to another without being given any opportunity to inform relatives, even in the case of minors. No arrest memorandums were prepared in the vast majority of detentions. Lawyers coordinating to arrange the release of persons were given no information as to the status of detentions and no information was displayed in any control centre or police station; in some cases, officers explicitly lied about detainees being present. Detainees were not allowed to meet advocates or family members, with one detainee at the Mandir Marg Police Station being denied his stroke medication without any lawful reason. Detainees were searched and their belongings were seized, despite Section 49 of the BNSS permitting such seizure only when a person is arrested without being able to furnish bail; no distinction was made in this regard.

d. Beyond legality – detentions and the fundamental right to peaceful protests

Despite the weak legality of such detentions, the police are generally provided with vast powers to curtail protests, generally under the garb of law and order or public order. Article 19 of the Constitution provides all citizens with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression and to assembly peacefully and without arms. Yet, the restrictions thereon under clauses (2) and (3) (restricting sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1) respectively) have been interpreted in a manner that effectively frustrates their exercise. For instance, Section 189 of the BNS[164] prohibits the assembly of five or more persons if the common object is to "overawe by criminal force" the Government or Legislature or any other public servant, to resist the execution of any law, to commit any offence, to deprive any person of the enjoyment of right of way, and so on. These restrictions can be interpreted in a wide manner by the authorities,

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[164] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

especially when the object of a peaceful protest is to demonstrate resistance to the government of the day. While detentions in the manner that took place in July 2026 were undoubtedly illegal, they may have been legal if they had taken place inside of the protest site, notwithstanding that such protests were the exercise of citizens' fundamental rights. The experience from the CJP protests shows how the law enables the power of the state, irrespective of legality, to curb the fundamental democratic right to protest.

5.2 Testimonies before the tribunal

Six lawyers testified on the nature of the detentions before the Tribunal, which grew significantly from 20.07.26 as a response to the CJP's Sansad Chalo March. This repression was manifested in the unrestrained halting and detaining on a mass level of anyone presumed to be a part of the protest. While this was initially in the limited radius of the protest site (including Sansad Marg, Tolstoy Road, and Janpath Road), the days following the March saw detentions all around Delhi NCR, including North-West Delhi, South Delhi, and even Gurgaon. Testimonies showed that ordinary protestors, including students, were treated by the police as criminals, who exceeded reasonable restraint. All attempts were made to keep detainees for as long as possible within the 24-hour statutory limit before releasing them.

5.2.1 Detentions at the Mandir Marg Police Station on 20.07.2026

Lawyers testified that on the night of the 20th, a group of 11 individuals who were walking back from the protest site at around 7 pm, were stopped and detained by police who proceeded to take them to the Mandir Marg Police Station. The detainees were all male and were mostly between the ages of 18 and 24. Among them was a 58-year old stroke patient, a Muslim, who was denied his medication despite the police being handed a copy of his prescription. Detainees were made to sign arrest memos at night, without being informed of the contents of what they were signing.

No information was provided on the process under which they were detained. Detainees were not informed of the grounds of detention by the police, even when they were asked by lawyers. When lawyers arrived at around 4 am in the morning, they were informed that the detainees would be presented before a Magistrate and released in a few hours. When more lawyers arrived at 9 am, they were told that the detainees would be presented before the Special Executive Magistrate (SEM) (an Assistant Commissioner of Police), who would hold court at 11 am. However, the SEM held court only at 2.30 pm. Lawyers were not allowed to meet detainees on request. At around 11 am, an MLC of the detainees was conducted and they were made to sign search slips. Their belongings were seized from them the preceding night, including their phones and bags. Even though it was unclear whether they were formally

arrested or detained, the biometric measurements of the detainees, namely fingerprint and iris scans, were taken.

The proceedings before the SEM began only around 2.30, under Section 126 of the BNSS, which allows an Executive Magistrate to require a person to execute a bail bond when they are believed *"likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity"*. A *kalandra* (the documentary equivalent of the FIR) was prepared which recorded their detention under Section 170 of the BNSS, which allows detention without warrant when a police officer *knows of a design* to commit any cognisable offence.

The *kalandra* itself blatantly recorded false information regarding the detention, stating that the detainees raised slogans inside the police station, were visibly angry, and would have committed a "heinous crime" if they were not arrested. It also noted information about some "complainants" who faced some problems and came to the police station; however, no information was disclosed as to what threat to peace the detainees posed or what crime they were going to commit, and no information about the complainants was found in the *kalandra*. While the *kalandra* recorded that the grounds of arrest were communicated, this was not confirmed by the detainees themselves.

The proceedings before the SEM were delayed numerous times, initially due to the delay in the SEM's arrival, and later due to the claim that the detainees did not present valid identification before the SEM – ironically, this claim was belied by the fact that the identification was seized by the police, and at least an hour was taken to deal with the confusion and execute the required bond for release.

5.2.2 Detentions at the Sabz Burj Circle, Nizamuddin

Lawyers testified before the Tribunal on detentions they were monitoring at a police checkpost at Sabz Burj Circle, Nizamuddin, on the 22.07.26 and 23.07.26. It is pertinent to note that Nizamuddin is more than 5 kms away from the protest site; however, the surrounding area is predominantly Muslim and is also part of the route taken by students of Jamia Millia Islamia and the residents of Okhla (Muslim locality) to reach the protest site. Thus, lawyers suspected that the checkpost was placed strategically to target Muslims.

Police personnel were stopping autorickshaws with those that they "presumed to be protesters". This was confirmed when a police officer said to a lawyer that they were stopping those "who looked dangerous" to them. Those stopped were mostly young students but also Muslims. Persons who were stopped were made to wait at the checkpost for varying periods of time, after which they were loaded onto a bus and sent to Badarpur Police Station, 12 kms away from Nizamuddin, although this did not happen with every person stopped. Those stopped were required to give their name, phone number, and address to the police. Once at Badarpur PS,

they were made to wait for inordinate periods of time before they were released. No formal document was issued to them at the time of detention and release.

Lawyers were not allowed to communicate with the detainees. There were numerous instances where the detainees were visibly minors. At times, the lawyers present were also threatened with detention.

The reason cited for detention was a prohibitory order against unlawful assembly issued under Section 163 of the BNSS. The order itself, however, barred only those assembling for the purposes of a protest or demonstration (**Annexure III**). It is apparent then that the police relied entirely on their own assumptions in detaining individuals. Some of those detained were not even heading towards the protest site, but their pleas were refused by the police.

That the police were ideologically interested in the detentions cannot be precluded. In conversations with them, lawyers testified that the Inspector and Sub-Inspector of the Nizamuddin PS openly stated that such protests happened due to the "lack of hormonal regulation" by students, and that the "country itself was running only because of the current government, prior to which we were in slavery". Some personnel also made targeted taunts at detainees, with one lawyer recalling that a minor detainee who was a Muslim was told that he "did not look like a minor because of his beard", although "it made sense because people from his community grew them very young".

Testimonies showed that detainees were subject to unlawful surveillance. They were asked for passwords to their social media accounts, bank details, and had their mobile phones seized and checked by officers – despite not being under any formal or legal arrest.

5.2.3 Lawyers' visits to Lodhi Colony and Nizamuddin police stations

Lawyers testified on the physical assault of lawyers at two police stations, Nizamuddin and Lodhi Colony police stations. At Nizamuddin, lawyers who gathered to check on detainees were treated with explicit hostility. While constables were willing to let lawyers meet detainees, the SHO and Inspector refused to let them do so; the latter openly called for the use of force in front of lawyers to prevent them from meeting detainees. At certain points, police officers began taking videos and photos of the lawyers present. In an escalation, two lawyers were detained individually; while one lawyer was kept only for a short period of time, the other was detained and physically assaulted by the SHO. A Medico-Legal Case (MLC) conducted recorded bruises from the assault on the lawyer's body. A writ petition filed by him against the unlawful detention is currently pending in the Delhi High Court.

A similar assault on lawyers took place at Lodhi Colony PS, where lawyers were denied access to detainees. The situation was resolved only when a large number of lawyers from the Saket Bar Association assembled to intervene.

5.3 The Tribunal's Conclusion

Based on lawyers' testimonies, the Tribunal makes the following findings:

A. The Delhi Police made a mass, organised, and concerted effort to detain people to prevent people from gathering in Jantar Mantar and restrict their fundamental right to peaceful protest under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.
B. Detentions were done arbitrarily, without lawful cause or regard for statutory safeguards of arrest.
C. An intentional and organised effort was made to conceal the location of detainees and unlawfully transport them across the state.
D. Detentions were disproportionately targeted against students and Muslims.
E. Detainees were subject to unlawful invasions of privacy and criminalised in a manner disproportionate to the objective of detention.

1. Anti-SIR Protests: scaling-up of mass detentions

While testimonies before the Tribunal were limited to the July protests, news reports on the ongoing protests against the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and irregularities in the Election Commission's functioning demonstrate a significant intensification of the measures taken in July, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The following conclusions emerge on the ongoing state of detentions from online reports:

A. The scale of detentions is much larger, with the stopping of buses and trains entering Delhi from outside the state with the sole purpose of detaining persons who are suspected to attend the protests. Detentions took place across trains, buses, and vehicles journeying across various states including Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh.[165]
B. Detentions are indiscriminate, without cause or regard to statutory safeguards of arrest.[166]
C. Detention buses have now been modified to include cage-like enclosures, within which multiple protesters are kept for more than hours on end with little to no mobility.[167]
D. Journalists have been specifically targeted while covering the protests despite presenting their press cards and other identification.[168]
E. Advocates seeking to represent detained clients are denied access and are themselves detained, despite an order of the Supreme Court on 11th October expressly to the contrary.[169] Mass detentions

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[165] Alisha Dutta, *'Picked up from trains': CJP, SFI claim thousands detained to keep them away from Jantar Mantar 2.0*, THE PRINT, https://theprint.in/india/picked-up-from-trains-cjp-sfi-others-claim-1000s-detained-to-prevent-jantar-mantar-2-0-attendance/3066543/.
[166] United Nations, *India: Concerns over mass detentions before and during protests*, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/10/india-concerns-over-mass-detentions-and-during-protests.
[167] Nidhi Suresh, *A prison-like bus, an unknown location: A day in detention with Neha Bora*, NEWSLAUNDRY, https://www.newslaundry.com/2026/10/12/a-prison-like-bus-an-unknown-location-what-detention-means-for-protesters-like-neha-bora.
M Rajshekhar, *What happens after Delhi Police detains you? I saw it first hand*, NEWSLAUNDRY, https://www.newslaundry.com/2026/10/14/what-happens-after-delhi-police-detains-you-i-saw-it-first-hand.
[168] *Delhi's Detention Day: Protesters picked up, journalists detained*, NEWSLAUNDRY, https://www.newslaundry.com/2026/10/10/delhis-detention-day-stop-everything-and-watch-this-now-protesters-picked-up-journalists-detained.
[169] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers. Order of the Supreme Court dated 11.10.2026 in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Govind Mohan (Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 63801/2026).

and manhandling of lawyers peacefully protesting took place right outside the premises of the Supreme Court of India on multiple days.[170]

F. Detainees are routinely held for close to 24 hours or beyond 24 hours before release.[171]

G. Detainees are routinely denied access to drinking water, food, first aid, and legal representation. Detainees' phones and personal identification are withheld in several instances even after their release.[172]

H. Detainees are subject to unrestrained violence during detentions including choking and beating in a widespread and unrestrained manner.[173] Detainees are forced into humiliation rituals, including but not limited to kneeling before police officers in rows and verbal abuse.[174]

I. Duty magistrates unlawfully refuse to entertain urgent applications for release of detainees.[175]

J. Several female detainees have reported being subject to sexual assault by male police officers during detentions. No First Information Reports have been registered (**FIRs**) against such sexual assault despite several attempts.[176]

K. A concerted and organised effort is made to conceal the location of detentions, with police officers refusing to provide any information even in the case of women and children.[177]

L. Women have been physically manhandled by male police officers and subject to sexual assault during attempts at detention. Women have been detained and kept in detention even beyond sunset.[178] Women and minors are released from detention at late hours beyond sunset at remote locations without being provided any assistance to return home.[179]

M. Minor children have been held in detention without any attempt at intimating the parents or guardian of such minors. Minor children are not produced before Juvenile Justice Boards within 24 hours of detention and are released only after intervention by lawyers.[180]

N. Trans women are detained with men and are refused released along with women.[181]

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[170] Debayan Roy, *Delhi Protests: SCBA, others move Supreme Court over detention, assault on lawyers,* BAR AND BENCH, https://www.barandbench.com/news/delhi-protests-scba-others-move-supreme-court-over-detention-assault-on-lawyers.
[171] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers.
[172] Shrimansi Kaushik, *Delhi police accused of beating, assaulting detainees, denying them basic rights*, THE HINDU, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/delhi-police-accused-of-beating-assaulting-detainees-denying-them-basic-rights/article71576271.ece.
[173] https://x.com/mehartweets/status/2110068752050217163?s=20.
[174] https://x.com/NREGA_Sangharsh/status/2109375427877970245?s=20.
[175] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers.
[176] *Jantar Mantar protest: Three journalists allege sexual assault by Delhi Police officer,* SCROLL.IN, https://scroll.in/latest/1096174/journalist-alleges-sexual-assault-by-delhi-police-officer-while-covering-jantar-mantar-protest.
[177] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers.
[178] *Women Activists Manhandled, Detained After Sunset, Carried Away in Bus Without Women Cops, Say SFI*, THE WIRE, https://thewire.in/government/women-activists-manhandled-detained-after-sunset-carried-away-in-bus-without-women-cops-say-sfi.
[179] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers.
[180] Based on first-hand reports from Karwaan lawyers.
[181] https://x.com/Lawyer_Saheba/status/2111175065861808465?s=20.

6. LAWFULNESS OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

This Section deals with the suspension of internet and mobile network services in the area of Jantar Mantar on and after 20.07.26, and the use of signal jammers alleged by the witnesses. Part B records the testimony received by the Tribunal. Part C sets out the law and standards that apply, under the Constitution, the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and its Rules, and international human rights law.

An "internet shutdown" means an order that stops or slows telecommunication services, such as mobile data, voice calls or messaging, for a particular area and period. A "jammer" is a device that transmits radio signals to block all receivers within its range.

The Ministry of Home Affairs issued a notice dated 20.07.26 suspending internet services. The notice states that it was issued under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, "in the interest of public safety, averting public emergency and in the interest of public order". It applied from 08:00 to 12:00 hours within a radius of 1.5 km of Jantar Mantar, New Delhi.

6.1 Applicable Law and Standards

The testimony raises three questions. What standard must any restriction on speech, assembly and access to information meet? What law permits the suspension of telecommunication services, and on what conditions? And what law, if any, permits the police to use jammers? This Part takes these in turn and ends with international standards.

6.1.1. International standards

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[182] provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers". Article 19 of the

[182] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A (Dec. 10, 1948). https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

ICCPR[183] provides that everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of choice (Art. 19(1) and (2)). The exercise of this right may be subject to restrictions, but only those that are "provided by law and are necessary" for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals (Art. 19(3)).

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

In its report on internet shutdowns, the Office of the High Commissioner stated that "when shutdowns are based on legal orders, they generally rely on vaguely formulated laws that offer a large scope of discretion to authorities".[13] The report also stated that any restriction on freedom of expression and other Covenant rights must pursue a legitimate goal in line with Article 19(3) of ICCPR, and be necessary and proportionate to achieve it; must be the least intrusive option available; must not impair the essence of the right; and must not be discriminatory. It added that the onus of showing that these conditions are met is on the State seeking to restrict the rights.

6.1.2. The constitutional standard

Assembly and expression

Article 19(1)(b) provides that "all citizens shall have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms". Article 19(3) permits the State to impose by law "in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions" on this right. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, subject to the grounds in Article 19(2).[184]

In *Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad*[185], the Supreme Court held that freedom of assembly is "an essential element of any democratic system", and that public streets are the natural places for the expression of opinion and the spread of ideas. In *Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of M.P.*, the Court held that the burden is not on citizens to prove that the exercise

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[183] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

[184] Constitution of India, art.19

[185] (1973) 1 SCC 227

of their right is not barred. It is for the State to show that its action falls within a permitted restriction, and the presumption rests in favour of the citizen.

Restrictions on telecommunication

In *PUCL v. Union of India*[186], the Supreme Court held that even an express statutory power to intercept communications could be exercised against citizens only with procedural safeguards, and the Court read such safeguards into the law.

The internet and Anuradha Bhasin

In *Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India*[187], decided on 10 January 2020, the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom to carry on trade or business through the internet, are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g).[188] The Court directed that every order suspending telecom services must be published and must state reasons in writing. The restriction must be proportionate and must adopt the least restrictive measure available. It cannot continue indefinitely, and it is subject to judicial review and to scrutiny by a review committee. The Court held that an indefinite suspension of internet services is illegal. It also stated that the power under Section 144 of the CrPC "cannot be used to suppress legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights".

6.1.3. The law on suspension of telecommunication services

The statute

Parliament has replaced the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 with the Telecommunications Act, 2023. Under section 20(2)(b) of the 2023 Act, telecommunication services may be suspended only on the occurrence of a public emergency or in the interest of public safety, on the grounds specified in that provision, and for reasons recorded in writing.

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[186] (1997) 1 SCC 301

[187] (2020) 3 SCC 637

[188] Constitution of India, art. 19

The Suspension Rules, 2024

The Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, notified on 22 November 2024, give effect to this power. In summary:

- The order may be issued only by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary. An officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary may act in unavoidable circumstances, subject to confirmation by the competent authority within twenty-four hours.
- The order must give reasons, define the geographical area and the specific services suspended, and be published.
- The order cannot remain in operation for more than fifteen days.

A suspension order is a written direction to a licensed telecom service provider to withhold a specified service, in a specified area, for a specified period. It may be confined to mobile data and leave voice and SMS running.

The competent authority for Delhi

Under Article 239AA of the Constitution[189], the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory has no power to make laws on the matters in Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List, which include public order and police. The Delhi Police and public order in Delhi are therefore under the Union Government, which is the background to the notice of 20.07.26[190] having been issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

6.1.4. The law on jammers

The Telecommunications Act, 2023

Section 48 [191] provides that no person shall possess or use any equipment that blocks telecommunication, unless permitted by the Central Government or by an authority that the Central Government has authorised for a specific purpose. Using or possessing such equipment without authorisation is an offence under Section 42(3)(a), punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up to fifty lakh rupees, or both.

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[189] Constitution of India

[190] Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, July 17). *Order* (No. 22016/12/2019-CIS-IV) [Order suspending mobile internet services within a 1.5 km radius of Jantar Mantar, New Delhi]. https://origin1504-mha.nic.in/files/circulars_documents/Suspension_order_18072026.pdf

[191] Telecommunications Act, Act No. 44 (2023). (India). https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2023/250880.pdf

Three points follow from the text of the Act. First, the word "person" in Section 2(j) includes any company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and the Act contains no exemption for the police. Second, Section 48 removes the criminal consequence of possessing and using such equipment for a person who has permission. It does not give that person a power to interfere with other people's communications. Third, the permission is tied to a "specific purpose".

The Jammer Guidelines, 2023

The administrative framework for jammers is the Guidelines issued by the Office of the Secretary (Security), Cabinet Secretariat (No. 11/11/2022-SS).[192] They define a jammer as "essentially a radio frequency transmitter which is designed to block all radio receivers that fall within its jamming range and covered by frequency bands present in the jamming equipment". They are concerned mainly with the security of VVIPs and VIPs against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices, and with certain jammers used for examinations. The provisions relevant here are these.

Para 3(c)

Central Ministries and Departments, State Governments and Union Territory Administrations, the Defence forces and the Central Armed Police Forces may use jammers only from the authorised public sector suppliers (at present Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited), and only for the specific purpose for which the Office of the Secretary (Security) has given permission.

Para 3(g)

Information on the installation and deployment of all kinds of radio-frequency jamming solutions is to be maintained by the nodal Ministry or authority and shared with the Office of the Secretary (Security), the SPG, the Intelligence Bureau and other security agencies concerned.

Para 4(l)

When a Special Protection Group (SPG) protectee is moving in the vicinity, all jammers procured by Government agencies are to be deployed in consultation with the SPG.

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[192] Cabinet Secretariat. (2023). *Jammer guidelines 2023* (No. 11/11/2022-SS). https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/circular/policyonjammer/english/1_Upload_3730.pdf

As placed before the Tribunal, the Guidelines do not expressly provide for jamming during protests, assemblies or crowd control. They do not state safeguards such as the duration of use, the radius, public notice, or protection of emergency communications.

6.1.5 Delhi Police Act, 1978 and the BNSS

Sections 28, 30(3), 31 and 33 of the Delhi Police Act[193] give the Commissioner of Police and police officers powers for the preservation of public order. Section 28(1)(p) allows regulations on the conduct of persons constituting assemblies and processions. Section 30(3) allows the Commissioner to prohibit an assembly or procession for the preservation of public order. Section 33 allows the Commissioner, to prevent or suppress a riot or grave disturbance of the peace, to close or take possession of a building or place. None of these provisions expressly authorises the jamming of telecommunications. Section 163 of the BNSS, 2023 allows preventive orders in urgent situations, and it likewise does not provide authority to jam telecommunications.

Possession and use are separate questions

Possession or procurement of a jammer and authority to operate it are two different matters. Where a jammer is authorised for a particular purpose, such as the protection of a protectee against radio-controlled explosive devices, its use for another purpose is a matter for the actual permission, the threat assessment and the consultation that the Guidelines require.

6.2 Evidence before the Tribunal

6.2.1 Loss of network and its effect on the protesters

Saanvi testified that, when the police started charging with lathis, she tried searching for an escape route. All exit routes were closed, and she found that there was no network or internet available.

Utkarsh Gaur told the Tribunal that internet services and mobile networks were shut down on 20.07.26 and that on the following day only internet services were suspended.

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[193] Delhi Police Act, Act No. 34 (1978). (India). https://licensing.delhipolice.gov.in/V2/GetActsnRulesPDFPdf?fileName=36629_The%20Delhi%20Police%20Act-1978.pdf

6.2.2. Reach of the shutdown

Harsh Yadav, a youtuber, testified that he went to Connaught Place at about 2:00 pm to upload a video on Instagram, and that internet and network services were suspended in an area of 4 to 5 km around Jantar Mantar. He stated that he got an internet connection at a café in Connaught Place, and that it was through this connection that he learnt how the police were using force on the protesters. Harsh further testified that videos he uploaded on 20.07.26 were removed by the government in India, but remained available in America.

6.2.3. Use of jammers

Vishal, a pellet victim, reiterated that he was at Connaught Place and that jammers were used by the Delhi Police.

6.3 Administrative Response

The police's affidavit does not mention the suspension of internet or mobile services, the use of signal jammers, or the removal of videos. It does not say whether the police asked for any suspension, or whether it had any bearing on their conduct.

7. SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES DEPLOYED AND THEIR LAWFULNESS

This section examines the surveillance techniques used by the Delhi Police at and around Jantar Mantar between 20.07.26 and 26.07.26, and whether their use was lawful. It concentrates on facial recognition technology (FRT), which was used to identify persons in the crowd and to compare them against police databases, and on the retention and use of the data and the lists generated from it.

7.1 Applicable Law and Standards

The Questions the Law Addresses:

The technologies described above involve three distinct acts: capturing a person's image in a public place, matching that image against a database of known faces, and keeping the image and the result of the match. The law applicable to each of them answers three questions. First, under what authority may the State carry out the act. Second, what limits apply to it, including limits arising from the rights to privacy, to free expression and to peaceful assembly. Third, what rules govern the collection, storage, sharing and deletion of the data. This part sets out the law on each question, beginning with the international and comparative standards, Constitution, then the statutes and police instructions.

7.1.1 International and Comparative Standards

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17[194] provides: "1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In its report A/HRC/48/31 (2021), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged States to suspend the use of remote biometric recognition in public spaces until they can show compliance with privacy and data protection standards and noted its effect on the right of peaceful assembly.

[194] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

The European Union

Article 5(1)(h) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the AI Act)[195] restricts the use of real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement. It is allowed only for listed purposes and, in general, with prior authorisation.

7.1.2 Constitutional provision and case law

The right to privacy

Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[196] In *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*,[197] a nine-judge Bench held that privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, and that it includes informational privacy, that is, control over information about oneself. The Court also held that the State may restrict this right only if three conditions are met together: there is a law that authorises the restriction (legality); the restriction serves a legitimate aim of the State; and the restriction is proportionate to that aim. The Court added that procedural safeguards against abuse are an essential part of a valid restriction.

Fair procedure

In *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*,[198] the Supreme Court held that the "procedure established by law" in Article 21[199] must itself be fair, just and reasonable, and must satisfy Article 14 (equality before the law).[200] A procedure that is arbitrary does not meet the requirement.

Police surveillance

In *Malak Singh v. State of Punjab*,[201] the Supreme Court accepted that the police may maintain surveillance registers of persons with a history of crime, and observed that such surveillance must stay within the limits of the Police Rules and must not amount to harassment. The Court indicated that surveillance of persons without such a history stands on a different footing. In

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[195] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), 2024 O.J. (L 2024/1689). https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/5/

[196] Constitution of India, art. 21

[197] (2017) 10 SCC 1

[198] (1978) 1 SCC 248

[199] Constitution of India, art. 21

[200] Constitution of India, art.14

[201] AIR 1981 SC 760

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.[202], the minority opinion of Subba Rao, J. stated that the knowledge of being watched affects a person's freedom of movement and conduct.

Speech and peaceful assembly

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. The State may impose restrictions only on the grounds listed in Article 19(2) (for speech) and Article 19(3) (for assembly), and the restrictions must be reasonable.[203] In *Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India*,[204] the Pegasus matter, the Supreme Court noted that surveillance may have a chilling effect on freedom of the press and on the exercise of other rights.

7.1.3 Statutes and Police Instructions

No dedicated law on facial recognition

No Indian statute specifically authorises or regulates the use of facial recognition technology by the police. The Committee of Experts chaired by Justice B.N. Srikrishna (2018) and the NITI Aayog papers on responsible AI (2022) recommended a legal framework and safeguards for such systems.[205]

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

This Act[206] lays down rules for how personal data in digital form may be collected, used and stored. A photograph or video image of a person's face is personal data. The body that decides why and how such data is used is called the "Data Fiduciary", and the person to whom the data relates is called the "Data Principal". The Act places duties on the Data Fiduciary, such as giving notice and taking consent (Chapter II), and gives rights to the Data Principal (Chapter III). Section 17 of the Act contains exemptions for the State. Two of them bear on the use of facial recognition by the police.

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[202] AIR 1963 SC 1295
[203] Constitution of India, art.19
[204] AIR 2021 SC 5396
[205] NITI Aayog. (2022). *Responsible AI for all: Adopting the framework—A use case approach on facial recognition technology* [Draft discussion paper]. https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2022-11/Ai_for_All_2022_02112022_0.pdf
[206] Digital Personal Data Protection Act, Act No. 22 (2023). (India). https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf

Prevention and investigation of offences (section 17(1)(c))

Section 17(1) provides that the duties of the Data Fiduciary in Chapter II and the rights of the Data Principal in Chapter III do not have to be followed where *"personal data is processed in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence or contravention of any law for the time being in force in India."* The section itself keeps two duties in place even for such processing. Under section 8(1), the Data Fiduciary remains responsible for following the Act and its rules, including for work done on its behalf by another party. Under section 8(5), it must take reasonable security safeguards to protect the personal data it holds, so that the data does not leak or fall into wrong hands.

Notified State bodies (section 17(2)(a))

Section 17(2)(a) allows the Central Government to name, by notification, a body of the State whose use of personal data falls entirely outside the Act. The Act says this may be done *"in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order or preventing incitement to any cognizable offence relating to any of these".* The exemption works only through a notification naming the body. Whether Delhi Police, or any other body involved at Jantar Mantar, had been so notified is not confirmed.

The Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022

This Act[207] deals with the collection, storage and use of records of "measurements" of persons for the purposes of criminal investigation. The word "measurements" is defined widely. Section 2(1)(b) states that it "includes finger-impressions, palm-print impressions, foot-print impressions, photographs, iris and retina scan, physical, biological samples and their analysis, behavioural attributes including signatures, handwriting or any other examination referred to in section 53 or section 53A of the CrPC, 1973." A photograph of a person is therefore a "measurement" under the Act.

The National Crime Records Bureau

Section 4(1) provides that the National Crime Records Bureau shall, in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of any offence: (a) collect the record of

[207] Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, Act No. 11 (2022). (India). https://origin1504-mha.nic.in/files/documents/TheCriminalProcedure%28Identification%29Act2022_13092024.pdf

measurements from State Governments, Union territory Administrations and other law enforcement agencies; (b) store, preserve and destroy the record at the national level; (c) process the record with relevant crime and criminal records; and (d) share and disseminate the record with any law enforcement agency, in the manner prescribed. The records may be retained for 75 years.

Rule 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Rules, 2022

Rule 5 of the Rules made under the Act deals with how the records are handled. The records are to be stored in a secure and encrypted format, and the detailed procedures for uploading, encryption and destruction are left to SOPs. To match a person's record, an authorised user sends a request to the Bureau, which matches the record and sends back a report. A request to destroy a record goes through a Nodal Officer, who may recommend it to the Bureau once satisfied that the record is not linked with any other criminal case. Unauthorised access to, or sharing of, the data is punishable under the IPC, 1860 and the IT Act, 2000, as the Rule states. The Act repealed the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920.

Delhi Police Standing Order

The Delhi Police instructions that have been placed before the Tribunal are two Standing Orders issued by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, in June 2022. Copies were obtained from the Delhi Police under the RTI Act.

Standing Order No. Tech. & PI/04/2022 (9 June 2022), on the Integrated Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4i) System

The C4i[208] is the Delhi Police control room that receives camera feeds. On 6 August 2025, in reply to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1996, which asked what approvals and safeguards apply to facial recognition surveillance by the Delhi Police, the Minister of State stated that the Safe City project includes a Facial Recognition System on identified cameras, and that, to regulate the functioning of the C4I, the Delhi Police "has issued Standing Order No. Tech. & PI/04/2022 dated 09.06.2022". The Standing Order states that CCTV feeds from markets, public places and border check points are integrated with the C4i, and that "the video feed provided to the C4i will ensure real time city-wide surveillance and help in the prevention and

[208] Delhi Police. (2022, June 9). *Standing Order No. Tech. & PI/04/2022: C4i system* [Standing order]. Internet Freedom Foundation. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oeOJGeZjyWE1OvStTfiyJuVHjb-BypLR/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in

detection of crime" (para 1.4). The pages of the order before the Tribunal (paras 1 to 5) do not use the words "facial recognition."

Standing Order No. Tech. & PI/06/2022 (2 June 2022), on CCTV Systems in Markets, Border Check Posts and Crime Prone Areas[209]

Para 3.1.5(viii) directs that cameras at entries, exits and outside banks be "positioned and placed in such a manner that the images so generated allow facial recognition". Paras 3.2.5(i)(g) and (h) provide that the SHO maintains the recorded media, retrieves it from archives as per procedure, and shares it with authorised persons on the instructions of senior officers.

Each Standing Order states that it "is exclusively for internal smooth functioning of the Police Department."

Other provisions

The Delhi Police Act, 1978 (sections 28(1)(p) and 29) deals with the regulation of public gatherings and the control of conduct at them, and section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 requires daily entries in the General Diary.[210]

7.2 Testimony

Shrishti Jaiswal, journalist on the ground, testified that cameras had been fixed on poles around the protest site and that drones were in use. She stated that each Station House Officer had about 25 freelance photographers working with the police. She stated that while she was recording for documentation, she saw her own face on the screen of the Ikshana van, with identifying details attached. When she confronted the officer, he told that the system is automatic, and records anything it finds interesting. She stated that the DPDP Act, 2023 gave the State wide exemptions for such processing. She also stated that facial recognition had earlier been used against persons protesting the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.

Journalist Kaushik Raj testified that the use of facial recognition by the police was not backed by any specific law. He stated that the police had spoken of an 80% match threshold. He stated

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[209]Delhi Police. (2022, June 2). *Standing Order No. Tech. & PI/06/2022: CCTV systems in markets, border check posts and crime prone areas* [Standing order], p. 2. https://delhipolice.gov.in/StandingOrderFiles/38844_Tech%20and%20PI%206%202022.pdf (removed from the Delhi Police website; originally accessed on 15.10.2026.

[210] Delhi Police Act, Act No. 34 (1978). (India). https://licensing.delhipolice.gov.in/V2/GetActsnRulesPDFPdf?fileName=36629_The%20Delhi%20Police%20Act-1978.pdf

that the police say FRT was used to identify anti-social elements in the protest. They were capturing everyone indiscriminately, how long will they keep the data, and how will they use it, there is no law governing it.

Sajid Khan testified that he saw Sandeep Lamba wearing Meta AI Ray-Ban glasses at the protest site.

Avni told the Tribunal that there were barricades, surveillance vehicles and cameras at the protest site, and that she and others felt unsafe.

Ali deposed that drones were used for surveillance.

7.2.1 Administrative Response

The affidavit filed by the Delhi police says that facial recognition software was deployed at the protest site as a proportionate policing measure. It says that the software does not automatically capture the profile of every person present, that it is not used for indiscriminate surveillance or for collecting personal information on peaceful protesters, and that it captures only persons with a past criminal record for serious offences, and not those with petty offences such as traffics challans. It says that no action is taken on the software alone, and that a field verification is made to confirm that the person was present at the site.

The affidavit is also described as saying that about 2,873 persons have criminal charges against them, including offences of murder, attempt to murder, dacoity, rape and offences under the POCSO Act, and that they will be investigated by Special Investigation Team set up by the Commissioner.

The affidavit does not say what law or order authorises the software, what database it compares face against, who decides who is on the database, how long images are kept, or whether the images of persons who are not on database are deleted. It does not explain how the figure of 2,873 was reached, or whether it relates to persons identified by the software at the site. It does not mention cameras on vehicles, drones or smart glasses.

8. WERE THE ACTIONS OF POLICE TO REGULATE AND IMPOSE REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON PROTEST OR TO PREVENT THEM?

This Section asks one question. Did the police and administrative measures of 19 and 20 July 2026 regulate the protest, which the Constitution allows, or did they prevent it, which it does not? The Section first states the law that separates the two. It then sets out the evidence before the Tribunal and ends with the Tribunal's conclusions. The Tribunal heard no police officers. The position of the Delhi Police is taken from its two public documents of 19 July 2026 and from a published report of its affidavit before the Supreme Court, whose original the Tribunal could not obtain.

8.1 The Legal Position

8.1.1 Restrictions are the exception

The rights of speech and of peaceable assembly in Article 19(1) are not absolute. Articles 19(2) and 19(3) let the State restrict them, but only if three things are true. The restriction must be made by a law.[211] It must serve one of the purposes the Constitution lists. And it must be reasonable. A police practice or executive order that has no law behind it cannot restrict these rights.

8.1.2 The purposes are few

For assembly, Article 19(3) allows “reasonable restrictions” only “in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order”.[212] The Constituent Assembly added the word “reasonable” so that courts could strike down a restriction that was arbitrary. An assembly cannot be restricted because it is inconvenient, unpopular or critical of the Government.

8.1.3 “Public order” has a narrow meaning

In *Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar*, the Supreme Court described three circles. Law and order is the widest, public order lies inside it, and the security of the State is the innermost. A breach of law and order is not for that reason a disturbance of public order. In *Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr*,[213] the Court said that public order means the absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence or crime of violence. A gathering is therefore not a threat to

[211] Constitution of India, art. 19
[212] Constitution of India, art. 19
[213] AIR 1978 SC 47

public order because it is large, noisy or inconvenient. The question is whether there is a real and close threat to public peace.

8.1.4 The restriction must be reasonable and proportionate.

State of Madras v. V.G. Row said that reasonableness depends on the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, the harm it addresses, the proportion between the two, and the conditions at the time. The Court now applies a test of proportionality, in *Modern Dental College*, *K.S. Puttaswamy*[214] and, for Article 19 rights, *Anuradha Bhasin*[215]. It asks whether the aim is legitimate, whether the measure is a suitable way of reaching it, whether a less restrictive way was available, and whether the effect on the right is in balance with the benefit to the public. *Anuradha Bhasin*[216] adds that a restriction must be supported by reasons and be open to review. That an authority had power to make an order does not show that it was right to make it.

8.1.5 The State must justify the restriction

The citizen does not have to prove that the exercise of a right is outside the permitted limits. It is for the State to show that its action is within them. The Human Rights Committee takes the same view of Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[217] which allows only restrictions that are in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society.

8.1.6 Regulation is different from prevention

The State may lay down reasonable conditions of place, time and manner. *Himmat Lal K. Shah*[218] accepted that the police may regulate meetings on public streets but held that regulation must not become an arbitrary denial of the right. *Amit Sahni*[219] held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely. *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan*[220] held that the right to protest at Jantar Mantar may be regulated but not extinguished. *Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re*[221] held

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[214] (2017) 10 SCC 1
[215] (2020) 3 SCC 637
[216] (2020) 3 SCC 637
[217] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf
[218] (1973) 1 SCC 227
[219] *Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police*, (2020) 10 SCC 439
[220] AIR 2018 SC 3476

that a preventive order of the kind now in section 163, BNSS 2023 is for urgent cases of apprehended danger, and that preventive action is no excuse for disproportionate force. A measure regulates if it leaves the assembly possible on stated conditions. It prevents it if it makes the assembly impossible.

8.1.7. The procedure must be fair, and force on a peaceful assembly is not warranted

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[222] requires a procedure that affects liberty to be right, just and fair. In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*[223] the Court said: "In those cases where assembly is peaceful, use of police force is not warranted at all. However, in those situations where a crowd or assembly becomes violent it may necessitate and justify using reasonable police force." It added that excessive force, or force that continues after the situation is controlled, violates human dignity and the rule of law.

8.1.8. When an assembly is "unlawful"

A peaceable assembly without arms is protected. It loses that protection only if it is an "unlawful assembly" under section 189(1) BNS, 2023,[224] which is a narrow statutory definition. It needs five or more persons who share one of five common objects: to overawe the Government, Parliament or a public servant by criminal force or a show of it; to resist the execution of any law or legal process; to commit mischief, criminal trespass or another offence; to take possession of property or enforce a right by criminal force or a show of it; or to compel a person, by criminal force or a show of it, to do what he is not bound to do or to omit what he may do. Three of the five need criminal force or a show of it. The other two, resisting a law or legal process and committing an offence, do not. Marching, slogans, banners, numbers, inconvenience and criticism of the Government are not on the list, and neither is the lack of permission.

8.1.9. Each member's share in the object

Under section 189(2), a person is a member only if, knowing the facts that make the assembly unlawful, he intentionally joins it or continues in it. Being present is not enough. The common object has to be shown for the assembly, and knowledge and intention for each person. An assembly may change its character. The Explanation to section 189(1)[225] and *Moti Das v. State*

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[222] (1978) 1 SCC 248
[223] 2016 INSC 597
[224] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[225] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

of Bihar say that a lawful assembly may become unlawful when its members act violently. The international standard points the other way: violence by some does not make the whole assembly non-peaceful, and the State must separate those who are violent from those who are not.

8.1.10. Disobeying an order

The State may say that those who assembled against a prohibitory order under section 163 BNSS[226] shared an object of committing an offence, which is disobedience of an order of a public servant (section 223 BNS), or of resisting a law. For that argument to hold, the order must have been in force and lawful under Article 19(3), and those present must have known of it and shared the object. These are questions of fact and law, and a finding that permission was absent does not answer them.

8.1.11. Offences and the power to disperse

Knowing membership of an unlawful assembly is punishable with up to six months' imprisonment, a fine, or both. Staying on after a command to disperse "in the manner prescribed by law", or being a member while armed with a deadly weapon, carries up to two years (section 189)[227]. Members are liable for offences done by any member in pursuit of the common object (section 190), and rioting needs force or violence used in pursuing it (section 191), so a peaceful assembly cannot commit it. An Executive Magistrate or the officer in charge of a police station may command such an assembly to disperse, and, if it does not, have it dispersed by force. The armed forces may be called in only in the cases and manner the Code provides (sections 148 to 151 BNSS, formerly sections 129 to 132 of the CrPC). A command that does not meet the legal requirements cannot find the offence of staying on.

8.1.12. What follows

The Constitution protects an assembly that is peaceable and without arms, and the State must show that any restriction on it is lawful, necessary and proportionate. The BNS treats an assembly as unlawful only if its members share one of the listed objects. A police declaration that an assembly is unlawful, or the existence of a prohibitory order, does not in itself prove that it is, or justify dispersing it by force.

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[226] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Act No. 46 (2023). (India). https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2023/Bharatiya_Nagarik_Suraksha_Sanhita,_2023.pdf

[227] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).

8.2 The Evidence

8.2.1. The order of 24 June 2026

The Delhi Police rely on an order under section 163 BNSS made by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Parliament Street, who holds Magistrate powers by a notification of 2010. It is valid until 22 August 2026 and was made without hearing those it affects. It exempts an area at Jantar Mantar Road and states that disobedience is punishable under section 223 BNS. It was posted on the X account of the DCP, New Delhi, at 8:49 PM on 19 July 2026, about fifteen hours before the march.

8.2.2. The Public Advisory of 19 July 2026

The Advisory, issued by the DCP, New Delhi, says that no permission had been sought or granted for the march, that an order is in force "in the New Delhi District", and that assemblies of five or more persons are prohibited except at Jantar Mantar with prior permission. It gives as context that Parliament's session begins on 20 July and that strict security arrangements are in place. The order covers a sub-division, and the Tribunal has seen no district-wide order. Both documents are addressed to the public and not to the organisers. The Tribunal has seen no correspondence between the police and the organisers on permission, and neither Gawande nor Das spoke of any talks or any invitation to seek permission between the start of the protest and 19 July.

8.2.3. Measures before and at the march

The witnesses described barricades, and identity checks that ended after 1:00 AM on 20 July. Five witnesses described gates or roads closed at different places, and the metro closed. Two of the leaders, Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, were at Mr J.P. Nadda's house on the morning of 20 July, and Das stated that their phones were taken for a time. By the time they left, the internet had been suspended and calls were jammed. [The evidence on suspension and jamming is in Section 6.2] No document before the Tribunal shows who ordered the closure of routes, and the Delhi Police have not explained it.

8.2.4 What happened to the march

Gawande stated that no warning was given and no talks were held before the police charged with lathis and fired tear gas as the march moved off. Sunny Tomar and Avni stated that the

police made way for the marchers and then charged them. Ramit Verma stated that he was struck after being told to move back. Witnesses described tear gas and lathis used on a crowd walking in an orderly way, on persons who had sat down, on a human chain, on students who had fallen, and on persons who were leaving. Kaira stated that the police continued to charge while the marchers said they were leaving. The same pattern was described at Kerala House, Janpath, Patel Chowk, Sansad Marg and the Connaught Place outer circle, and on later dates. Vishal stated that protesters threw stones at Central Park after tear gas was used.

8.2.4 The account of the Delhi Police

As published, the affidavit says that about 30,000 persons were spread over three kilometres, that about 5,000 police personnel were deployed, that barricades were breached, that the assembly was unlawful because no permission was given, that force was graded, and that about 240 police personnel and about 200 protesters were injured. It also says that 2,873 persons face criminal charges.

8.2.5. What the Tribunal does not have

It has no document showing what danger to public order the police anticipated, why a ban of this width was needed, or whether a narrower condition was considered. It has no order for the closure of routes and none of the recorded announcements or warnings that Standing Order No. 309 requires.

8.3 The Tribunal's Conclusions

8.3.1 The order has a basis in law, but the State has not shown that it was reasonable

A section 163 order is made under a statute, and the Tribunal accepts that it meets the first requirement of Article 19(3). The order was made without hearing those affected, covers a sub-division while the Advisory describes a district, was published about fifteen hours before the march, and bans every assembly of five or more persons and not particular conduct. Public order, as the courts use the term, needs a real and close threat to public peace. The only context the Advisory gives is that Parliament was in session and that security arrangements were in place. The Tribunal has not seen the material on which the police feared a disturbance, or any consideration of a narrower condition, and the burden of showing this is on the State. The Tribunal finds that the State has not shown that the restriction was reasonable and proportionate.

8.3.2 A restriction on approaching Parliament would be lawful, but it is not what was done

The Tribunal accepts that the State may lawfully keep a march from entering the Parliament complex or blocking its approaches. That is a restriction on where a march may go. It does not justify a ban on assembly across a district, the closure of routes far from Parliament, or force on persons at a distance from it. The Tribunal finds that the legitimate aim of protecting the approach to Parliament does not account for the measures described in the evidence.

8.3.3. The measures prevented the march, and did not regulate it

A regulation would have fixed a route, a place, a number or a time, and would have been discussed with the organisers. The evidence shows no such step. It shows a general ban, layered barricades, closed gates, roads and metro, the loss of phone and internet communication, and force on a march that had begun to move. Taken together, these left the assembly no lawful way of taking place outside the Jantar Mantar site, which *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan*[228] says may be regulated and not extinguished. The Tribunal finds that the effect of the measures was to prevent the march and not to regulate its place, time or manner. It makes no finding on what the officers intended.

8.3.4. The label "unlawful assembly" was not shown to be earned

The Delhi Police rely on the absence of permission and on the prohibitory order. Absence of permission is not a common object under section 189(1). The most that the State can say is that those present shared an object of disobeying the order, and that depends on the order being lawful and on their knowing it. The order was published hours before the march, and the persons whom the witnesses describe as seated, walking in order or leaving cannot be shown, on that evidence, to have shared that object. Three of the five objects need criminal force or a show of it, and the Tribunal has seen no evidence of that by the assembly as a whole. It accepts that at some points protesters threw objects at the police and that police personnel were injured, and that this may support action against those persons. It does not make the whole assembly unlawful, and the State had to separate those who were violent from those who were not. The Tribunal has seen no sign that this was done. The Tribunal finds that the evidence is of an assembly that was unarmed, that did not resist, and that remained peaceable within Article 19(1)(b)[229], and that the Delhi Police have not shown that it was an unlawful assembly.

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[228] AIR 2018 SC 3476
[229] Constitution of India, art.19

8.3.5. Disobedience of such an order calls for a modest response

Even if the order was lawful and known, the offence is disobedience under section 223 BNS, and not rioting, which needs force or violence in pursuit of a common object. For this Section, the point is that the Constitution does not allow the State to answer a breach of a prohibitory order by an assembly that is peaceful with the force the witnesses describe. *Anita Thakur*[230] says that force is not warranted at all on an assembly that is peaceful. The Tribunal finds that the lack of permission did not justify the use of force on the march.

8.3.6. The size of the crowd does not change this

A crowd of about 30,000 over three kilometres was hard to police, and the Tribunal does not discount it, or the injuries to police personnel. The size of the crowd is a reason for narrower conditions agreed beforehand with its leaders, and not a reason for none.

8.3.7. Limits of the evidence

The Tribunal heard no police officer. It has only a published account of the affidavit, and has not seen the original of the order, the Advisory or the notification of 2010. The police may have had information that is not before it. These conclusions are recorded on the evidence presented to the Tribunal.

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[230] 2016 INSC 597

9. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S REPORT

With respect to what transpired during and immediately following the protest on 20.07.26, the actions of the internal security forces and by extension the state, to exercise force against the peaceful protestors in the national capital New Delhi, this report of the Tribunal's findings raises more questions than answers on the functioning of the internal security forces and the law they operate within. Legal provisions read together create a single standard for democratic state responses to democratic peaceful protests: first mediation and persuasion, second warning if there is a legitimate fear of the assembly turning unlawful and causing public harm, third, a chance to comply; only then, if necessary, a proportionate, graded and documented response. The People's Tribunal examined the events of 20.07.26 against this standard and this report delineates and contests the legal provisions within which the internal security forces operate.

The peaceful protest, the response of the internal security forces and administration at large and this very report begins with one contesting question of what is a lawful or unlawful assembly? The earlier provision that determines what is a lawful or unlawful assembly was from section 141 of the IPC. The code was drafted by Macaulay in the 1840s and came into force in the 1880s. Section 189 of the BNS[231] applicable in India today is a verbatim reproduction of 141 IPC.

However, just the establishment of the fact that an assembly is unlawful does not warrant internal security agencies to the use force. The report delineates that the use of force if and when required under the applicable law should be "graded", but what is a graded response? There is no provision to check the actions of security forces if and when they do not comply with the law. The Ministry of Home Affairs' guidelines for the Indian Police Code of Conduct states "*Force can be used only if, after being given proper warning, the crowd does not disperse or shows determination not to disperse. Even then, the force used must be the minimum, reasonably necessary, and persuasion, advice and warning must precede it as far as practicable"* [232]

Punjab Police Rule 14.56,[233] applicable to Delhi, states that *"all attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings, exhortation, etc., shall be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly," and that once force becomes necessary, "the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit" must be used.*[234]

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[231] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Act No. 45 (2023). (India).
[232] Ministry of Home Affairs Guidelines to the Indian Police Code of Conduct for the Police in India (1985), available at: https://police.py.gov.in/MHA%20-%20Model%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-%20Indian%20Police.pdf
[233] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf
[234] Punjab Police Rules Volume 2, available at: https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

This report contests the use of vague terminologies used in laying down the provisions, what is "graded" in a graded response? Where do the internal security forces stop using force? "*The crowd does not disperse or shows determination not to disperse…":* why will the crowd assembled for a particular purpose "disperse" without appropriate democratic steps taken by the authorities to meet their demands and what are those demands that are above people in a democratic set-up?

What are the "least deadly weapons", is it a weapon that leaves the victim severely wounded, including permanently losing eyesight? And what are those circumstances with respect to the assembly of citizens where the "least deadly weapons" are to be used?

How will you classify a baton with nails? Or electric batons? Where does a plastic baton fall; it does not qualify to be a deadly weapon but can still be used to beat a person to death, to lead to the death of a person already suffocating or injured with tear gas or stampede? Therefore, who defines graded response and what are the limits, if any? Pellet guns may be deemed to be less lethal and regular bullets. But in their very nature, they randomly target both persons in the crowd and parts of the body. This means that if firing is resorted to as a last resort, pellet guns can never fulfil the accepted police norm of carefully targeting only ring-leaders of the mob, and only parts of the body that injure but do not kill.

It may be argued that these provisions are necessary when the assembly becomes violent and threatens the internal peace and security of the country. But as per the findings of this report, the views of the experts and observers and those of the people on the ground as participant or non-participant witnesses there are no evidences that the protestors on 20.07.26 (and incidentally in the second phase of the protests from 10.10.26) engaged in any sort of violence that endangered the peace and security of other citizens. The grounds [if applicable] to label the protest of 20.07.26 (and 10.10.26) as violent are baseless. And the said grounds cannot be used to declare the assembly unlawful.

The Tribunal also contests the use of the term "dispersal" and what actually happened on the ground. The law and protocols warrant the internal security forces to use the minimum necessary force if required to "disperse" the crowd. Oxford Dictionary defines the word disperse as: "*to move apart and go away in different directions"*[235]. However, the report argues with evidence that the protestors were intentionally confined between the barricades, not to disperse but unleash brutal force, sexually harass, detain as many people as possible and record their data using mass surveillance without consent. If the purpose was to "disperse" the crowd, which implies that the people move away, why were the appropriate exist routes not given to

[235] Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Disperse. In Oxford advanced learner's dictionary. Retrieved October 23, 2026, from oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com

the protestors to “move away” and when they did move away or disperse by crossing the barricades, why were protestors chased and beaten by the internal security forces?

The report with emphasis calls for a complete international and local ban on deploying pellet guns against civilian assemblies, in line with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The report reiterates senior lawyer Chander Uday Singh’s views that it is a misnomer and euphemism to call the weapon “pellet gun”; pellet guns are in no way short of a lethal gun, with the added disadvantage that it is designed to indiscriminately target individuals and any part of their bodies including their eyes. In a crowd, indiscriminate targeting becomes more threatening.

On the allegations of use of nail-studded batons, electric batons, expired tear gas shells, sexual assault on women protestors by the police personnels, the report finds evidence of all of these. This constitutes serious violations of the legal limits under which the internal security forces are authorised to act. These gravely violate the principles of proportionate response, appropriate use of force, minimum necessary use of force and of graded response. And the testimonies of sexual assault are extremely grave; the report calls for strict action against the personnel responsible for the sexual assault and harassment of women who were protesting, were part of media (including independent social media persons) or just happened to be victims of sexual assault and harassment.

The report raises questions to the internal security forces on why medical aid was not provided to the injured, even though the injured or the protesters at large faced no threat to the internal peace and security anywhere in the country?

The question of mass detention is another feature of the state response that causes grave concern. More so because there is reason for us to believe that these detentions were more targeted against young people of a religious minority community. What are and should be the legal limits for the police detaining people, and how should these be enforced? What are the legal provisions available to check the police’s actions when they act on unproved presumptions. What does the police mean by the phrases “presumed to be dangerous” and “looked dangerous”? Does a particular attire or living in a certain locality or being in a certain age makes one “dangerous”? And is mere “looking dangerous” enough ground for the police authorities to detain people en masse without accountability? And how to hold the police and other internal security forces accountable if and when it attacks the legal aid personnels and prevent the proper implementation of legal provision or does the police function without the Constitutional and legal limits?

Lastly, on the concerns of mass surveillance as this was the most heavily surveyed protest in the history of the country, the report asks what will be done with the data collected by the

internal security forces without the consent of its citizens, where and with whom is the data stored and who is responsible if and when the data collected be misused against the citizens?

In all, the report calls for serious steps to be taken for police reforms, availability and applicability of legal provisions to hold personnels of the internal security forces accountable for their actions. To withdraw all legal actions [if still pending] against the protestors and the media persons. And increased measures to check and balance the functioning of the internal security forces.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENSURING DEMOCRATIC POLICING OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL PROTESTS

The mode and methods of policing are at the heart of the unconstitutional actions found by this Tribunal in this report. Thereby, the recommendations presented below focus on policing, particularly to pinpoint the fundamental areas which require systemic change towards ensuring democratic policing of peaceful protests. While the Tribunal's report is focused on Delhi as the site of the protests and the Delhi Police as the police organisation primarily deployed, our recommendations are framed to capture policing of protest concerns, and change needed, more broadly.

10.1 Fundamental reorientation of policing

The National Police Commission (NPC), in its second report, placed the protection of constitutional rights at the centre of what it viewed as the objectives of law enforcement by police. The Commission stated that,

> *"Law enforcement cannot, however, be held up as an objective by itself. It may be viewed as a fundamental duty and responsibility with the ultimate object of preserving peace and order, protecting the life and property of the people, and what is more, protecting the constitutional rights conferred on them".*[236]

In this way, the NPC laid out its vision that the ultimate aims of policing are to protect public peace, the life and property of the people of India, and their constitutional rights. This was a vision in line with the constitutional vision that birthed the Indian republic. In contrast, in the same report, when describing "dharnas, protest demonstrations, public meetings" and other forms of public assembly as "recurrent features of political activity", the NPC was constrained to state that "putting down political dissent has become a tacitly accepted objective of the police system".[237] Post the NPC, the Supreme Court has held that protests or demonstrations expressing dissent are crucial in a democracy[238], but this has not dented the policing approach on the ground.

In fact, the policing of peaceful protests in India is one of the sharpest illustrations of the dominance of a punitive, 'law and order' approach which serves to curb, criminalise, and demonise public protests. The development of policing in independent India has led to police controlled by the executive, immune to accountability, and as in the case of the July 2026

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[236] Second Report of the National Police Commission, Government of India, paragraph 14.30, page 13, August 1979

[237] Second Report of the National Police Commission, Government of India, paragraph 15.6, page 21, August 1979

[238] *Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors (2012) 5 SCC 1*

protests, the prime state institution violating constitutional rights. This approach not only prevents the upholding of constitutional guarantees on the ground; it also dehumanises and degrades policing itself. It alienates scores of ordinary people from the police and reinforces the militaristic and hierarchical nature of policing that is antithetical to a democracy. While this approach to policing protests has by and large prevailed pre- and post-independence, the added layer of a Hindu nationalist regime ruling at the centre since 2014 has sharpened the vilification of protests. The issue of political leadership is a reminder of the inextricable link of the policing of protest to the reality of the politicisation of policing in India. This is yet another systemic issue at the heart of the nature of policing which requires urgent overhauling.

While this may not be an achievable or realistic recommendation to work towards at present, there is no doubt that a fundamental, wholesale transformation in the very ethos and orientation of policing is most necessary, as the first major step towards any semblance of democratic reform. Policing must be reshaped to prioritise the upholding of constitutional rights and democratic norms, encompassing redrawing the whole gamut of policing rules, regulations, policies, operational ethos, tactics, actions, internal police sub-culture; as well as the structure and makeup of police organisations, and larger laws and accountability processes relating to policing. This kind of transformation of policing and its accountability can only take place under a ruling government that genuinely seeks it, and is willing to commit to a transparent, participatory process to shape and achieve it, taking into account that policing is a state subject. While this is not possible at the present time, we would be remiss in advocating for focused police reform without alluding to the scale of rebuilding and change needed to better policing as a whole.

10.2 Recommendations towards democratic policing of protest/assembly

Returning to our focus which is the policing of protest/assembly, we make the following recommendations in light of our findings relating to police actions at the July 2026 protests.

10.2.1 Replace police power to permit assembly

In Delhi and across India, Police Acts, regulations, and/or Standing Orders require that protests at designated sites can be held only after receiving police permission and a ‘no objection certificate’ from them. Section 28(1)(p) of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 empowers the police to “regulate the conduct of or behaviour or action of persons constituting assemblies” as well as specify the routes and times in which the assembly can take place. The police are essentially the gatekeepers of whether a protest or assembly can be held.

In a joint report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur (SR) on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, the SRs reinforced that as freedom of public assembly is a right, “its exercise should not be subject to prior authorisation by the authorities”. They advocated that States can establish *“a system of prior notification, where the objective is to allow State authorities an opportunity to facilitate the exercise of the right, to take measures to protect public safety and/or public order and to protect the rights*

and freedoms of others. Any notification procedure should not function as a de facto request for authorization or as a basis for content-based regulation".[239]

We reiterate that the right to peaceful assembly is a constitutional right, and the right to hold an assembly should not be denied as long as it is a peaceful assembly. We recommend that the present process of seeking police permission is extinguished and replaced by a system of prior notification, through overhaul of the relevant legal provisions, regulations, and/or Standing Orders.

10.2.2 Police use of force

We focus several recommendations around issues of police use of force, in terms of decision-making, policy, and ground operations.

10.2.3 Impose stricter conditions to justify dispersal of an assembly

As stated in the report, under the BNSS 2023, the police or an Executive Magistrate can direct the members of a public assembly to "disperse" if they find the assembly is "likely to cause a disturbance to public peace".[240] The law goes on to empower the use of force if the assembly does not disperse upon being ordered so, allowing the police to "confine" or "arrest" any person refusing to leave the protest site.[241] It must be stressed that dispersing an assembly is effectively cutting off the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression and freedom of assembly. The decision to disperse an assembly should be resorted to only when absolutely unavoidable and on the basis of stricter grounds than the present legal formulation of "likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace". It is a glaring gap that the law does not prescribe stricter grounds under which a public assembly can be dispersed, such as where violence is visibly serious and widespread and constitutes an imminent threat to bodily safety or property.

Notably, the legal ingredients that constitute when an assembly can be deemed "unlawful" also do not contain strict grounds of imminent threat to life or property, but focus on security-centric concerns.[242] We note that in international law, a peaceful assembly that incites discrimination, hostility or violence would be in contravention of Article 20[243] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and thereby may justify dispersal. Other situations in which dispersal may be considered is where an assembly blocks access to essential services such as a hospital, which needs to be clearly distinguished from where an assembly is causing only slight

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[239] Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, Paragraph 21, page 6, February 2016: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc3166-joint-report-special-rapporteur-rights-freedom-peaceful
[240] Section 148(1), BNSS 2023
[241] Section 148(2), BNSS 2023
[242] Section 189(1), BNS, 2023
[243] See text of the ICCPR here: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

inconvenience or temporary disruption. Considering the implications of the police or executive branch's decision to disperse an assembly, we recommend that the relevant legal provisions and police or administrative orders are thoroughly reviewed and redrafted to impose stricter conditions to justify the dispersal of an assembly.

10.2.4 Place prohibitions on the use of firearms to disperse peaceful protest/assembly

The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and several others, have established a universally accepted norm that use of force and particularly firearms by police must be considered a "last resort".[244] With regard to use of force and public assemblies, Police Manuals and regulations largely incorporate the last resort standard. As the report describes, Police Manuals and regulations call for a graded use of force in the dispersal of assembly, and include provisions to give warnings to the assembly, and state that firearms are only to be used as a last resort. Further, most Manuals and regulations mandate that the use of force or firearms must cease as soon as dispersal happens. At the same time, there are no prohibitions placed on the use of force or firearms.

The UN Basic Principles limit, and place prohibitions, on the use of force, according to the circumstances, pertaining to public assembly. Principle 13 of the UN Basic Principles prescribes that the use of force is to be avoided entirely or only to the "minimum extent necessary" in the dispersal of "assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent". Principle 14 specifies conditions on the use of firearms to disperse violent assemblies, stating that firearms are not be used even in dispersal of violent assemblies except under specific conditions laid out in Principle 9, which are:

> *9. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life*".[245]

Principle 9 makes clear that in the context of a violent assembly, firearms may be used only against an imminent threat either to protect life or to prevent life-threatening injuries.

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[244] See text of the Basic Principles here: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement

[245] Principle 9, Basic Principles: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement

International standards also maintain that firearms should never be used simply to disperse an assembly and indiscriminate firing into a crowd is not permitted.[246]

Police Manuals and regulations prescribe the protocols for use of force and firearms on "unlawful" assemblies, with no recognition or distinctions made between non-violent and violent assemblies. We recommend that the use of any kind of firearm is prohibited from use, in any manner, on non-violent assemblies, even when an assembly is deemed "unlawful", and particularly so when women and children are present at the site. We also recommend that Police Manuals and regulations are amended to clearly indicate that firearms are prohibited to be used only to disperse an assembly. In the case of violent assemblies, we recommend that the language of Principle 9 is added to Police Manuals and regulations to tighten the conditions under which firearms can be resorted to.

10.2.5 Minimise the breadth of weapons permissible to be used on public assemblies and develop weapon-specific protocols that list potential injuries/harm

We restate the use of various weapons, some impermissible, used by the police as documented in this report, including nail-studded and electrified batons, indiscriminate use of lathis, and pellet guns, on unarmed protestors.

We note that the Bureau of Police Research and Development, under the aegis of the Ministry of Home Affairs, published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to deal with public agitations through non-lethal measures in 2011, which prescribe the following non-lethal weapons for use in crowd control by the police, including water cannons, teargas shells, stinger and dye-marker grenades, tasers and lasers, net guns and stink bombs.[247] While the 2011 SOPs are the only attempt to specify weapons for use in public assembly situations with some description of the effect of such weapons, they are framed to focus on the efficacy of the weapons for the police or security force against crowds/assemblies. Across Police Manuals and regulations, there is an absence of gauging the use of weapons against the extent of harm or injuries they may cause.

We recommend that each state police conducts comprehensive research, with the assistance of independent experts, on lethal and non-lethal weapons for use on public assemblies, towards reaching the minimum listing of permissible weapons that can be used. The elimination of potential weapons must be based on the type and severity of harm and/or injuries that can be caused by each. Weapons long in use by Indian police, such as tear gas and water cannons, can be, by design, indiscriminate in their effect, which also should be considered through proper research.

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[246] Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, Paragraph 60, page 14, February 2016: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc3166-joint-report-special-rapporteur-rights-freedom-peaceful

[247] Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, Standard Operating Procedures to Deal with Public Agitations with Non-Lethal Measures, February 2011

With the minimal listing of weapons permissible for use, each state police should draw up a weapon-specific protocol that delineates the specific conditions under which each weapon can be used, and specifies the harm and/or injuries that can be caused by each, with the thrust being on minimised, limited use. These protocols should be made publicly available on police websites as they are directly related to public safety. Specific weapons training should be developed to orient police officers on the effects of each weapon and specific strategies to minimise harm or injury while using them.

10.2.6 Prohibit the use of technology/surveillance instruments on public assemblies

The July 2026 protests are a reminder of the growing trend of police departments using technology instruments such as Facial Recognition Technology and roving drones to conduct surveillance on protestors. We note that the use of such instruments in a roving manner to identify persons and conduct surveillance is absolutely illegal. In the context of public assemblies, we recommend that the use of any kind of technology for surveillance, intelligence-gathering or identification is banned for use by police or any security force, particularly as the legal position already disallows this.[248]

10.2.7 Prioritise the use of non-violent/non-forceful tactics in policing of assemblies

Police training must be reorganised to place the greatest emphasis on strategies of communication, de-escalation, and negotiation to be imparted to police officers in dealing with public assembly. At present, there is an outsized focus on arms and weapons training, which only prime police personnel to rely on weapons. We recommend that genuine institutional efforts are made to decrease the dependence on weapons towards tactics and strategies of communication, de-escalation and negotiation. We encourage police departments to facilitate knowledge and experience sharing of good practices, and use of non-forceful techniques, in dealing with public assembly.

10.3 Accountability

We restate the numerous violations of law and procedure committed by police personnel on July 20, as documented in this report, ranging from absence of nameplates, indiscriminate use of lathis, and the commission of brute, excessive force. We strongly reiterate that there can be no impunity for these blatant violations, most of which are caught on video and widely disseminated. The statutory requirement for prior sanction under Section 218, BNSS 2023 (formerly Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) for prosecution of public servants

[248] Using any such technology, not just Facial Recognition, in the context of public assembly, would violate the right to privacy as established by the Supreme Court in *K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr.* v. *Union of India & Ors.,* (2017) 10 SCC 1

cannot be used to shield any police personnel who committed excesses, in the name of dispersal of assembly.[249]

[249] Section 218 requires prior sanction from the relevant appointing authority in government before prosecution of a public servant can proceed, if it is held that the offence allegedly committed by the public servant was committed in the discharge of official duty.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is with regret that owing to the prevailing sense of fear among young dissenters, the three main contributors to the work that went into preparing this report, who researched, collated, structured and suggested many drafts of several portions and wrote the report, felt that they had to take a difficult decision that we should not make public their names in the report.

Besides this main team of the secretariat who worked intensely for nearly two months in the background but remain unnamed, we thank Samvedh and Devika Prasad who contributed to important sections of the report. The tribunal was also presented with visual evidence, and we are grateful to film maker Varrun Sukhraj who collected some 920 video recordings of the 20.07.26 protest and presented before the tribunal 25 verified video evidence along with their geotagging. The report draws from his work on forensically verified and geo-tagged videos. And Tanushree Panday, an investigative journalist who provided on the ground support for the tribunal's proceedings. We thank and are grateful to Hefzul Bahar for agreeing to use the photograph he clicked to be used for the cover of this report.

In particular, the report benefited from the expert opinions of the following: Chander Uday Singh, senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India, made a persuasive and comprehensive presentation on the issues of police actions, the law and court rulings. This report draws from his insights on several points, particularly about what constitutes lawful and unlawful assemblies and appropriate and inappropriate use of force. Maja Daruwala also contributed valuable insights as an expert on police actions and reforms.
And at last we thank the Constitutional Conduct Group for organising the Tribunal, providing the logistical assistance and the writing of this report in public interest and good practice.

Harsh Mander
Convenor, People's Tribunal

Annexure I

EVIDENCE • ACCOUNTABILITY • CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

VISUAL EVIDENCE DOSSIER

Reported use of force, treatment of protesters and related public-order conduct

Principal focus: 20 July 2026 | Jantar Mantar and adjoining areas, New Delhi
25 numbered exhibits | one separately identified comparative incident from Bihar

SUBMITTED TO

The Members / Jury of the People's Tribunal

SUBMITTED BY

Varrun Sukhraj | Filmmaker and Activist
26 October 2026

Nature of submission: Preliminary documentary and testimonial evidence review; not a forensic certification or judicial finding.

COVER SUBMISSION

To the Hon'ble Members of the Tribunal,

I submit this dossier in my capacity as a filmmaker and activist. My work involves documenting public life, including moments when the exercise of constitutional rights comes into direct contact with the power of the State. The events surrounding the demonstrations of 20 July 2026 in New Delhi demand an examination anchored not in rhetoric, but in material that can be preserved, tested and independently scrutinised.

The 25 numbered exhibits assembled here concern, among other matters, apparent firearm and crowd-control weapon use; serious projectile injuries; allegations of baton assaults, including against women and minors; questions about the identity of personnel exercising coercive powers; and accounts of possible hazards associated with barricades and improvised projectiles. One exhibit concerns a separately reported event in Siwan, Bihar, on 25 July 2026 and is identified as comparative material, not evidence from Delhi on 20 July.

I am conscious of the distinction between what a camera records, what a witness alleges and what a lawful investigation can ultimately establish. A video may reveal a disturbing act without establishing the preceding circumstances. A witness account may deserve immediate protection and investigation without being treated as a concluded finding. A claimed geolocation, equipment identification or algorithmic screening result must remain open to independent testing. This dossier states those boundaries deliberately; they strengthen rather than weaken the demand for accountability.

I respectfully request the Tribunal to receive these materials as an organised set of investigative leads and prima facie concerns; to secure the underlying digital files and relevant official records; to hear affected persons without exposing them to unnecessary risk; and to seek a meaningful response from the police and other forces concerned. Where the evidence supports misconduct, responsibility must be traced beyond the visible individual to authorisation, supervision, policy and the chain of command. Where an allegation is not substantiated, that too should be transparently recorded.

The essential question is not whether the State may maintain public order. It is whether the means adopted were lawful, necessary, proportionate, accountable and consistent with the dignity of the people whose rights it was duty-bound to protect. I place this record before the Tribunal in that spirit.

Respectfully submitted,

Varrun Sukhraj
Filmmaker and Activist

SCOPE OF THE MATERIAL

This volume contains 25 exhibit notes drawn from the supplied 51-page compilation and its listed evidence locations. An exhibit is not necessarily a discrete incident or an independently recorded event. Some contain interviews after the alleged incident; some report related allegations or overlapping testimony. Exhibit 08 relates to a different place and date and is segregated accordingly.

The present editorial review examined the text and structure of the uploaded compilation and checked selected legal authorities. It did not establish the chain of custody, original metadata, authenticity or precise geolocation of all underlying videos. Such matters are expressly reserved for verification.

TOOLS AND METHODOLOGY

The following subscription-based (Licensed) digital tools were employed to support AI-assisted video authentication, geolocation assessment, visual analysis, and preparation of the accompanying evidentiary documentation.

1. DeepfakeDetection.io (deepfakedetection.io)
Used for AI-assisted screening of video footage to identify potential synthetic content, digital manipulation, deepfake indicators, and other visual authenticity concerns.
2. Oceanir.ai (app.oceanir.ai)
Used for AI-assisted geolocation analysis, identification of potential geographical locations, and assessment of spatial and environmental indicators visible within the recorded footage.
3. ChatGPT 6.1 (OpenAI)
Used for the systematic consolidation of analytical findings, preparation of structured evidentiary reports, interpretation and organisation of geolocation data, and development of satellite-based location visualisations for illustrative and documentary purposes.

CORE QUESTIONS FOR THE TRIBUNAL

- Was each use of force necessary to address a specific, lawful objective, and proportionate to any imminent threat?
- Were weapons, ammunition and chemical devices duly authorised, fit for use, appropriately aimed and properly recorded?
- Were women, children, injured persons, reporters and passive participants protected from unlawful or discriminatory force?
- Were deployed personnel identifiable, supervised and subject to effective reporting and complaint procedures?
- Were incident logs, video records, medical documentation and technical evidence preserved so that disputed accounts can be tested fairly?

EVIDENCE THEMES - NAVIGATION

Projectile weapons, tear-smoke devices and associated injuries: Exhibits 01, 02, 04, 05, 08, 21, 22

Alleged physical assaults and treatment of vulnerable persons: Exhibits 07, 09, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20

Equipment, identification and operational control: Exhibits 03, 06, 13, 16

Stone-throwing and the reported truck of stones: Exhibits 18, 25

Alleged electrical hazards involving barricades: Exhibits 23, 24

READING CONVENTIONS

"Apparently" / "reportedly" describes what the submitted compilation or its witnesses represent; it is not a certification that this editor independently viewed an original camera file. "Prima facie" denotes a concern warranting further inquiry, not a finding of guilt. "Provisional" identifies information that lacks sufficient source, technical or independent corroboration. Unless specifically documented, coordinate decimal places do not measure the accuracy of the underlying geolocation.

EXHIBIT 01 / 25

USE OF A PELLET-FIRING WEAPON AGAINST PROTESTERS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Probable vicinity of Pind Baluchi, Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 01
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1CpZA03CVA8gwOdaIMHnl3tmlyiNP_-bm?usp=sharing

1. Observations

The recording appears to show personnel belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) discharging a weapon described in the submitted note as pellet-firing towards protesters. The firearm and ammunition have not been independently identified from the source note. No prior warning or dispersal announcement is discernible within the recorded sequence. This does not establish whether a warning was issued before recording began. A woman appears to appeal to security personnel with folded hands. Her visible conduct is peaceful and non-threatening, with no discernible act of aggression or resistance. The apparent deployment of a firearm in these circumstances raises prima facie concerns regarding necessity and proportionality.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, applicable crowd-control procedures and the operational rules governing use of force. The central questions concern the weapon and ammunition used, prior warnings, available alternatives, authorisation and the responsibility of supervising officers. Findings of specific violations require corroboration through witness testimony, additional footage and contemporaneous operational records.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 01 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.617274° N, 77.207708° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 01]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 01 raises substantial prima facie concerns regarding apparent firearm use against protesters, including a woman whose recorded conduct appears peaceful and non-threatening. Weapon identification, operational justification and individual accountability require corroboration.

EXHIBIT 02 / 25

APPARENT SHOTGUN FIRE TOWARDS PROTESTERS AND POSSIBLE BIRDSHOT USE

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]

Location: Probable vicinity of the Sansad Marg subway entrance near Palika Parking, Connaught Place, New Delhi

Nature of Evidence: Video Recording

Evidence Reference: Exhibit 02

Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1K8t3JxeYG2XXl1XchSey3AxfccNRCR-u?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording appears to depict uniformed security personnel discharging a firearm towards an area occupied by protesters. The submitted note provisionally identifies the personnel as CRPF/RAF; this attribution requires confirmation from markings and deployment records. The weapon resembles a pump-action shotgun, but the footage alone does not establish its gauge, model or cartridge contents. Shotguns may fire multiple-projectile ammunition, including birdshot; such cartridges can disperse small metallic pellets capable of striking more than one person. Visible features include riot shields, vehicles, a red-stone parapet and personnel within a public streetscape. The footage establishes an apparent discharge but does not conclusively establish that birdshot was fired.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

If metallic multiple-projectile ammunition was used in an occupied public area, its dispersion would create a foreseeable risk of injury to bystanders and persons beyond an intended target. Paragraph 7.5.6 of the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) cautions that simultaneously discharged multiple projectiles are inaccurate and generally incompatible with necessity and proportionality; it states that metal pellets fired from shotguns should never be used. This is international guidance, not by itself proof of a breach of a specific Indian statutory provision. The incident requires examination of the alleged threat, warnings, firing direction, ammunition selection, available alternatives, authorisation and contemporaneous operational records.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 02 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 02]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 02 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding apparent firearm use in the vicinity of protesters and the possible deployment of dispersive metallic pellets. Confirming the weapon, cartridge type, firing circumstances and operational authorisation is essential to a definitive finding.

EXHIBIT 03 / 25

MULTIPLE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CARRIED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL IN A PUBLIC AREA

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of a fuel station near the protest area, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 03
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Vo3P2G8GICD_1eXvDkohGCOHJJBoPOES?usp=sharing

1. Observations

The recording is reported to depict security personnel carrying multiple weapons and associated ammunition in the vicinity of a fuel station near the protest site. Of particular concern is the apparent possession of two or three weapons by an individual security operative, suggesting a concentration of weaponry requiring examination of deployment protocols and authorised equipment allocation. The footage also reportedly shows an individual dressed in civilian clothing carrying a police-style baton. The person's identity, official status and authorisation to carry such equipment remain unestablished. In addition to apparent crowd-control weapons, the recording is described as showing firearms potentially capable of delivering lethal force.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable rules governing the deployment, possession and handling of firearms during public-order operations. Particular concerns arise regarding the authorisation and allocation of multiple weapons to individual personnel, the deployment of potentially lethal firearms in proximity to civilian gatherings, and the identification and operational role of persons carrying enforcement equipment while dressed in civilian clothing. The reported presence of armed personnel at a fuel station also warrants scrutiny of applicable safety precautions and operational risk assessments. The recording therefore raises questions concerning weapons accountability, command responsibility, identification protocols and compliance with prescribed

Standard Operating Procedures. The possession of multiple weapons, by itself, does not establish a procedural violation.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 03 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.6100° N, 77.2100° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 03]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 03 raises prima facie concerns regarding the reported concentration of multiple weapons and ammunition among security personnel in a public area, including the apparent presence of potentially lethal firearms and an unidentified individual in civilian clothing carrying enforcement equipment.

EXHIBIT 04 / 25

APPARENT THROWING OF A TEAR GAS SHELL DIRECTLY AT SEATED PROTESTERS AND RESULTING EXPLOSIVE IMPACT

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 04
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1o2CRAwodMIBeDYSILMRizefBsGGDABqK?usp=sharing

1. Observations

The submitted description identifies a group of protesters seated in the roadway. A device resembling a tear-smoke munition appears to be projected towards or into the group, followed by an energetic event accompanied by visible flame or flash.

A visible flash, report or smoke is not, without examination of the device and deployment method, proof that a munition was defective or expired. Some pyrotechnic tear-smoke devices produce heat, flame or a report during ordinary operation. What requires investigation is whether the device was aimed at people and deployed at a safe distance.

No immediate aggression by those visible is described during the relevant interval. Events outside the camera's field of view and before recording began remain unknown.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures governing crowd-control measures and the deployment of tear smoke or similar chemical munitions. Particular concerns arise from the apparent throwing of a munition directly at seated individuals, rather than its deployment in a manner intended to create distance or facilitate dispersal. If established, such use would raise serious questions regarding necessity, proportionality, targeting and compliance with prescribed safety protocols. The apparent explosive impact visible in the recording further requires scrutiny as to whether the munition was used in accordance with manufacturer guidance, operational protocol and basic precautions against serious physical injury. The incident therefore requires investigation into the identity of the personnel involved, the type and condition of the munition used, the orders under which it was deployed, and whether less harmful alternatives were available.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 04 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.6115° N, 77.2272° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 04]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 04 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent throwing of a tear gas shell directly at seated protesters and the resulting explosive impact in close proximity to civilians.

EXHIBIT 05 / 25

APPARENT USE OF AN EXPIRED TEAR GAS SHELL DURING PROTEST OPERATIONS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 05
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1AE9EdMMluWbWuX5rxNrLKNIU2rscBfG0?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The submitted video description states that a protester displays a spent tear-smoke canister bearing the marking "12/25", interpreted by the speaker as an expiry date of December 2025.

If that marking is verified against the manufacturer's labelling convention as an expiry date, the item would have been beyond its stated service life in July 2026. The marking could alternatively denote a batch or other date designation; the manufacturer, product model and full label require verification.

The recording does not independently establish that this particular canister was deployed by police on 20 July, or that similarly marked munitions were used elsewhere.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The reported use of expired tear gas ammunition warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing ammunition storage, inspection, inventory management and operational deployment.

Tear gas munitions contain chemical and, in certain designs, pyrotechnic components whose reliability and performance may be affected by deterioration or improper storage. Deployment beyond the manufacturer's designated service

life may introduce additional operational and safety risks, although the nature and extent of such risks require technical examination.

The incident therefore raises questions regarding ammunition stock verification, expiry-date monitoring, issuance registers, supervisory authorisation and compliance with prescribed safety procedures.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 05 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 05]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 05 raises a prima facie concern about a potentially out-of-date tear-smoke munition. Confirmation requires the manufacturer's label interpretation, lot number, inventory register and issuance or recovery records.

EXHIBIT 06 / 25

APPARENT USE OF ELECTRIC SHOCK BATONS AGAINST FEMALE PROTESTERS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 06
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bypih8SidaOmTV0eclQWZvQuio-9m1LO?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a female security operative, provisionally identified as belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), applying a baton-like device, apparently capable of delivering electric shocks, against female protesters. The protesters appear to be standing peacefully, with no visible indication of aggression or immediate threat warranting the application of such force. An audible crackling sound, described as consistent with an electrical discharge, accompanies the incident. A female protester is also heard expressing concern regarding the dangers of using such a device during rainfall. The apparent application of an electrical-discharge weapon against non-aggressive individuals raises serious concerns regarding the deliberate infliction of pain and the physical safety of protesters. The precise device, whether an electrical charge was delivered, and the extent of any resulting injuries require independent verification.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the use of force and electrical-discharge weapons.

Paragraph 7.4.11 of the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) specifically cautions against using conducted electrical weapons to overcome purely passive resistance through the infliction of pain. The alleged direct application of such a device against peaceful protesters raises substantial questions concerning necessity, proportionality and potential cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The reported rainfall further warrants examination of the device's operating conditions, electrical safety requirements and prescribed precautions. The incident therefore requires investigation into the authorisation, deployment and justification of the weapon, the identity of the personnel involved, and compliance with applicable operational protocols.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 06 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.60° N, 77.20° E
Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 06]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 06 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent use of an electrical-discharge baton against female protesters whose reported conduct appears peaceful and non-threatening.

EXHIBIT 07 / 25

APPARENT ASSAULT ON PROTESTERS BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 07
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1MVbGPrgye-KMx2TTCSpQ_FR6lNMTDxVb?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts two individuals dressed in civilian clothing, carrying police-style batons and striking protesters in separate instances. In the first instance, an individual wearing a helmet and concealing his face with a handkerchief is seen striking a young protester with a baton, apparently following a request to disclose his identity. Aggressive verbal expressions are also reportedly audible. In the second instance, another individual in civilian clothing is seen striking a passing protester with a baton. Neither individual appears to display identifiable police insignia, name badges or visible official credentials. Their conduct, equipment and apparent involvement in crowd-control activity raise serious questions regarding their identity and authority. No immediate physical aggression or threat from the affected protesters is discernible within the incidents described. The official status of the assailants and circumstances preceding the confrontations remain unverified.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the identification of security personnel, crowd control and the use of physical force.

The apparent use of batons against individuals presenting no discernible immediate threat raises substantial concerns regarding necessity, proportionality and possible unlawful assault. The absence of visible identification, combined with deliberate facial concealment, further raises questions concerning transparency, traceability and accountability in public-order operations. The incident therefore requires investigation into the identity and official status of the individuals involved, their authorisation to carry and use enforcement equipment, and the responsibility of supervising authorities, if any.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 07 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E
Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 07]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 07 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent physical assault of protesters by unidentified, facially concealed individuals in civilian clothing, carrying police-style batons and displaying no visible official identification.

EXHIBIT 08 / 25

APPARENT DISCHARGE OF AN AK-SERIES FIREARM DURING STUDENT PROTESTS IN BIHAR

Date of Incident: 25 July 2026 [reported; outside the principal Delhi event]
Location: Reported incident in Siwan, Bihar; supplied coordinates correspond to the Patna area.
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 08
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1MJxL2iFgSlQ8AFJITTngKKT4TgYtwe_U?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The source account describes a uniformed constable advancing on a public road and discharging a firearm resembling an AK-series rifle during student demonstrations. An immediate threat is not apparent within the described frame, but events outside the field of view remain unknown.

According to the submitted account, Bihar Police maintained that the constable discharged the firearm into the air after being surrounded, in claimed self-defence. That account requires testing against the full recording, witnesses and contemporaneous records. Discharging such a firearm in a populated street presents a foreseeable risk of death or serious injury.

This reported event concerns Siwan, Bihar, on 25 July 2026, and is presented solely as comparative material. It is not evidence of the Delhi operations on 20 July. The supplied coordinates correspond broadly to Patna, not Siwan.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the applicable Bihar Police Manual provisions and Principles 9, 10 and 14 of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms provide a framework for examining the necessity, warning requirements and justification for resort to potentially lethal force.

Relevant material includes complete unedited footage, witness accounts, any injuries, the police version of events, the duty and firing logs, number and direction of rounds, and the orders governing the constable's action. The dossier does not establish whether the legal threshold for self-defence was met.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 08 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 25.60° N, 85.10° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 08]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 08 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent discharge of an assault rifle by a police constable during student protests, in circumstances where an immediate threat justifying potentially lethal force is not discernible within the described recording.

EXHIBIT 09 / 25

POLICE ASSAULT RESULTING IN HEAD AND FACIAL INJURIES TO CONTENT CREATOR RAMIT VERMA

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 09
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1kbc5PckK57pjZhOLukWV4IxDgyih3adz?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts YouTube content creator Ramit Verma, popularly known as Peeing Human, being interviewed by a journalist following an alleged assault during the protests. Verma is visibly bleeding from a head injury while recounting the circumstances of the incident. He alleges that he was struck on the head by a police officer while documenting the protests, followed by another baton strike to his jaw despite already being visibly injured.

The reported sequence raises serious concerns regarding the repeated application of physical force against an individual engaged in documenting a public demonstration. The recording provides visual evidence of apparent injuries and a contemporaneous account from the injured individual. However, the actual strikes are not captured in the described interview footage, and the precise circumstances of the assault require independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the use of force against civilians and persons documenting public assemblies. Paragraphs 7.1.4 and 7.1.5 of the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) specifically caution against baton strikes to the head, face and other vulnerable parts of the body due to the risk of serious injury or death. The alleged continuation of baton strikes against an already injured individual raises substantial concerns regarding necessity, proportionality and potentially punitive use of force. The incident therefore warrants investigation into the identity of the personnel involved, the justification for each reported strike, the nature and severity of the injuries, and possible interference with the documentation of a public protest.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 09 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 09]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 09 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding an alleged police assault resulting in visible head injuries to content creator Ramit Verma, including his account of a subsequent baton strike to the jaw despite his already injured condition.

EXHIBIT 10 / 25

ALLEGED POLICE BATON ASSAULT CAUSING HEAD INJURY TO A MINOR PROTESTER

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 10
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/16Qh5W4-kxAXXwrnYJbhbj6kvZL-7VSfx?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a young protester, identified in the accompanying account as a 16-year-old minor, with an apparent head injury allegedly sustained following a police baton assault. The video shows fellow protesters and civilians attending to the injured minor and providing basic first-aid assistance. The visible injury and the reported circumstances raise serious concerns regarding the use of physical force against a child participating in a public demonstration. While the recording documents the apparent injury and immediate assistance provided, the alleged baton strike itself is not established by the described footage. The minor's age, cause of injury and circumstances of the alleged assault require independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing crowd control, the use of batons and the protection of minors. Paragraphs 7.1.3-7.1.5 of the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) address the serious risks associated with baton strikes to the head and other vulnerable parts of the body. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child further establishes safeguards concerning children's protection from physical violence, injury and degrading treatment. The alleged assault therefore raises substantial questions regarding necessity, proportionality, the protection of minors during public-order operations and the provision of timely medical assistance. The incident requires investigation into the identity of the personnel involved, the justification for the reported use of force and compliance with applicable child-protection and operational safeguards.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 10 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 10]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 10 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding an alleged police baton assault resulting in a head injury to a reportedly 16-year-old protester, with the recording documenting the apparent injury and immediate assistance provided by fellow civilians.

EXHIBIT 11 / 25

APPARENT SEXUALISED ASSAULT, VERBAL ABUSE AND INTIMIDATION OF FEMALE PROTESTERS BY POLICE PERSONNEL

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording and Supplementary Testimony
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 11
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1srA64Zub9OJNi_taPtQJtdjh525cG-bg?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a police officer directing a baton towards the buttocks of a young female protester in a sexually inappropriate manner, apparently unrelated to any legitimate crowd-control requirement. In a subsequent sequence, another police officer is reportedly seen striking a female protester on her buttocks with a baton and smiling immediately thereafter. A supplementary video reportedly contains the testimony of a woman describing further alleged misconduct by police personnel. She recounts being subjected to sexually degrading verbal abuse, including protesters being called "prostitutes" and threatened with being stripped naked at the police station. She further alleges that female protesters were repeatedly slapped by security personnel. The reported conduct raises grave concerns regarding sexualised physical assault, humiliation, intimidation and the abuse of official authority. The supplementary testimony provides a direct account of alleged misconduct requiring independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside Sections 74 and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning assault or criminal force against women with intent to outrage their modesty, and words or gestures intended to insult their modesty.

The reported threats of forced public or custodial stripping further warrant examination under Section 351 concerning criminal intimidation, subject to establishing the requisite legal elements. The alleged targeting of intimate body parts, sexually degrading language, threats of humiliation and repeated physical assaults raise substantial concerns regarding bodily autonomy, human dignity and potentially criminal misconduct by public officials. The incident therefore requires investigation into the identity of the personnel involved, the circumstances of the alleged assaults and threats, the accompanying survivor testimony, and the responsibility of supervising officers.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 11 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 11]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 11 raises grave prima facie concerns regarding the apparent sexualised misuse of police batons against female protesters, compounded by allegations of sexually degrading verbal abuse, threats of forced stripping and repeated physical assault.

EXHIBIT 12 / 25

APPARENT PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON A MINOR BY SECURITY PERSONNEL

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 12
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Enh0IBST7bkvKngXCryhSZL7Z3bwSNsA?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a young boy, appearing to be below 15 years of age, walking along a public street with a bag on his back when a uniformed security operative approaches and strikes him across the face with an open hand. The boy appears to be walking without displaying aggression, raising slogans or engaging in any conduct suggesting an immediate threat to security personnel. The apparent unprovoked use of physical force against a child raises serious concerns regarding bodily safety, dignity and the treatment of minors during public-order operations. The recording does not independently establish the child's precise age, the extent of any resulting injury or the circumstances preceding the incident.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside Sections 115 and 131 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning voluntarily causing hurt and the unlawful use of criminal force, subject to establishing the requisite legal elements. Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child further establishes protections against physical violence and abuse.

The apparent striking of a non-threatening child raises substantial questions regarding the necessity and proportionality of force, compliance with prescribed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and the heightened duty of care owed to minors. The incident therefore requires investigation into the identity of the security operative, the justification for the physical force employed, and compliance with applicable child-protection safeguards.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 12 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.62° N, 77.21° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 12]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 12 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent unprovoked use of physical force against a reportedly underage individual walking peacefully along a public street, without any discernible conduct justifying such intervention.

EXHIBIT 13 / 25

APPARENT POSSESSION OF A NAIL-FITTED POLICE BATON DURING PROTEST OPERATIONS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 13
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1hBaQD-SkaiQZyX9_By_fo2Vt9Bq7o3_4?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a young protester displaying a police-style baton (lathi) with an apparent sharp metal nail protruding from its surface. The baton is alleged to have been carried by police personnel deployed during the protests. The presence of a sharp metallic projection on an instrument ordinarily used for crowd control raises serious concerns regarding its potential to cause penetrating wounds and severe bodily injuries. Similar allegations concerning nail-fitted police batons emerged during the protests on 20 July 2026 and were subsequently examined in independent investigative reports. While the recording reportedly documents the apparent modification of the baton, it does not independently establish who attached the nail, whether the alteration was authorised, or whether the instrument was used to inflict injuries.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing approved crowd-control equipment, weapon modifications and the use of physical force. The United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) establishes standards concerning the safety, design and responsible deployment of batons and other less-lethal equipment. The addition of a sharp metallic projection fundamentally alters the injury risks associated with an ordinary baton, potentially rendering it capable of causing penetrating injuries.

Any established use of such an instrument to cause bodily injury would warrant examination under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. The incident therefore requires investigation into the origin and authorisation of the apparent modification, the personnel responsible for possessing the instrument, and compliance with prescribed equipment and operational safeguards.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 13 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.62° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 13]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 13 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent possession of a nail-fitted police baton during public-order operations, representing a potentially dangerous modification of standard crowd-control equipment.

EXHIBIT 14 / 25

ALLEGED ASSAULT BY MULTIPLE RAF PERSONNEL RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURIES TO A YOUNG PROTESTER

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 14
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1CBEFF66udI20J2ls_2C8-HCg4jY3nuGv?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts an individual describing an alleged assault in which several personnel belonging to the Rapid Action Force (RAF) collectively beat a young protester at a relatively isolated location. The injured protester is reportedly seen in a severely incapacitated condition, apparently unable to move without assistance. The circumstances raise serious concerns regarding the severity of the physical force allegedly employed and the possibility of significant bodily injuries. The recording also reportedly shows a group of RAF personnel carrying multiple weapons, including a firearm resembling a pellet-firing weapon. The alleged involvement of multiple armed personnel in the assault of a single individual raises substantial concerns regarding excessive and potentially punitive use of force. The precise sequence of the assault, the nature of the injuries and the weapons employed require independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing crowd control, physical restraint, use of force and medical assistance to injured civilians. The United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) establishes that the use of batons and other crowd-control weapons must comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality, with particular precautions against serious bodily injury.

The alleged collective assault on an individual who was subsequently observed in an apparently incapacitated condition raises serious questions regarding the justification, duration and intensity of force employed, including whether such force continued after the individual ceased presenting any threat. The incident therefore warrants investigation into the identity of the personnel involved, the circumstances of the reported assault, the availability of timely medical assistance and the responsibility of supervising officers.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 14 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.21° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 14]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 14 raises grave prima facie concerns regarding the alleged collective assault of a young protester by multiple RAF personnel, resulting in apparent severe physical incapacitation, alongside the reported presence of multiple weapons.

EXHIBIT 15 / 25

ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUALLY DEGRADING VERBAL ABUSE, THREATS AND PHYSICAL VIOLENCE BY SECURITY PERSONNEL

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 15
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/19xz7V4FZUme14Bw5TcV_BovRnlsRdo1J?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The submitted recording describes a visibly distressed woman wearing a white shirt who alleges that police or security personnel verbally abused female protesters, called them "prostitutes", and threatened to take them to a police station and strip them naked.

She also alleges that an elderly man was struck on the head by police personnel and subsequently placed in an ambulance. The recording documents her account and emotional distress, but it does not independently establish each alleged incident or identify those responsible.

The allegations overlap in substance with those recorded in Exhibit 11. Neither note should be treated as an independent corroborating account without confirming the identity of the speakers and whether the underlying episodes are distinct.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The allegations require scrutiny under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and potentially Sections 79 and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, relating respectively to words or gestures intended to insult the modesty of a woman and criminal intimidation, where their legal elements are established.

The reported head injury to an older civilian calls for medical records, eyewitness testimony, identification of the alleged assailants and review of the operational use-of-force rules. The allegations of sexually degrading threats likewise require confidential, trauma-informed examination and a fair opportunity for the personnel concerned to respond.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 15 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 15]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 15 raises grave prima facie concerns regarding allegations of sexually degrading verbal abuse, threats of forced stripping and intimidation of female protesters by security personnel, alongside a reported physical assault on an elderly civilian.

EXHIBIT 16 / 25

APPARENT ABSENCE OF VISIBLE IDENTIFICATION BADGES ON CRPF PERSONNEL DURING PROTEST OPERATIONS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 16
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/17ZXCcYaz5POJGWKYw0EnI_Z27bnTybQe?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a group of uniformed personnel, apparently belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), equipped with protective gear, body-worn cameras and other operational equipment, without discernible name badges or individual identification markings. The individual recording the video questions the personnel about the absence of identification, stating that protesters participating in a peaceful demonstration should be able to establish the identity and official status of the security personnel deployed. None of the personnel reportedly provides a verbal explanation. Instead, one individual appears to gesture towards the person recording, indicating that further questioning should cease. The apparent absence of visible identification, despite the personnel being equipped for public-order operations, raises serious concerns regarding transparency, individual accountability and the ability to identify personnel in the event of alleged misconduct.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable service regulations, uniform requirements and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the identification of security personnel during public-order operations.

Paragraph 89 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 37 (2020) establishes that uniformed law enforcement officials should display readily recognisable identification during public assemblies to ensure effective accountability. The Supreme Court's directions in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) additionally require visible identification and name tags for police personnel conducting arrests and interrogations, although their direct applicability depends on the operational circumstances. The incident therefore warrants examination of applicable CRPF identification protocols, deployment records, supervisory instructions and any authorisation permitting the omission of visible identification.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 16 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 16]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 16 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent absence of visible identification on uniformed CRPF personnel deployed during public protests, potentially undermining transparency, traceability and individual accountability.

EXHIBIT 17 / 25

ALLEGED ASSAULTS BY UNIDENTIFIED BATON-CARRYING INDIVIDUALS DURING PROTEST OPERATIONS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 17
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1uK5EujWy3AnJYvgmGZkt9a2Q-Z50zfJK?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a young protester recounting his encounter with unidentified individuals carrying police-style batons and allegedly exercising enforcement authority without displaying any visible official identification. The individual alleges that these persons were indiscriminately assaulting protesters and civilians with batons. He further recounts being personally struck in his private parts, raising serious concerns regarding the nature and severity of the physical force allegedly employed. The testimony also describes a broader pattern of unidentified individuals, whose official status remains unclear, reportedly participating in violent crowd-control activities during the protests. While the recording documents the individual's account of the alleged assaults, the identity, official affiliation and authority of the persons involved, as well as the precise circumstances of the reported violence, require independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The allegations warrant examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside Sections 115 and 131 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning voluntarily causing hurt and the unlawful use of criminal force, subject to establishing the requisite elements.

Paragraph 92 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 37 (2020) establishes that plainclothes law enforcement officers

deployed during public assemblies must identify themselves before resorting to the use of force.

The alleged participation of unidentified individuals in violent crowd-control activities raises substantial concerns regarding lawful authority, identification requirements, necessity, proportionality and possible criminal assault. The incident therefore warrants investigation into the identity and official status of the alleged assailants, the circumstances of the reported physical violence, and any authorisation, coordination or supervisory responsibility attributable to law enforcement agencies.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 17 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.63° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 17]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 17 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding allegations of physical assaults by unidentified baton-carrying individuals apparently exercising enforcement authority, including a reported strike to a protester's private parts.

EXHIBIT 18 / 25

APPARENT STONE-PELTING BY UNIFORMED POLICE PERSONNEL TOWARDS CIVILIANS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest area, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 18
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1JUpqDn46eej9wJhEKbNkK4pIB11uSykM?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts uniformed police personnel, identifiable by their khaki attire, throwing stones in the direction of a civilian gathering during the protests. The personnel appear to be throwing stones openly across a public area, without any clearly identifiable individual target or discernible attempt to control the direction of the projectiles. The apparent use of stones as improvised projectiles raises serious concerns regarding the risk of indiscriminate injury to protesters and bystanders, particularly given the potential for serious head and bodily injuries. The precise circumstances preceding the recorded sequence, including any immediate threat confronted by the personnel, remain to be independently established.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing crowd control and the use of force. Principles 4 and 5 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) establish requirements concerning necessity, proportionality and minimisation of injury during law enforcement operations.

The apparent use of stones by uniformed personnel, rather than prescribed crowd-control equipment, raises substantial questions regarding lawful authority, operational discipline and the foreseeability of indiscriminate harm. The incident therefore warrants investigation into the circumstances prompting the stone-throwing, compliance with operational instructions, the availability of less harmful alternatives and the responsibility of supervising officers.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 18 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.64° N, 77.24° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 18]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 18 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent use of stones as improvised projectiles by uniformed police personnel towards civilians, potentially exposing protesters and bystanders to indiscriminate physical injury.

EXHIBIT 19 / 25

APPARENT DELIBERATE OBSTRUCTION AND BATON ASSAULT ON A YOUNG PROTESTER BY SECURITY PERSONNEL

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest area, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 19
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1icyTaWkivwr5fUCtseRZer1R2rd1ZYNr?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a uniformed security operative, apparently belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), extending his leg into the path of a young protester, seemingly obstructing his movement and causing him to fall. In the subsequent sequence, other uniformed police personnel are reportedly seen striking the young protester with batons (lathis), apparently following a confrontation arising from the initial obstruction. The apparent initiation of physical interference by security personnel, followed by the use of batons against the same individual, raises serious concerns regarding unnecessary provocation, excessive force and the possible misuse of enforcement authority. No immediate act of violence or physical threat by the protester is discernible from the described sequence. The precise circumstances preceding the confrontation and the intention behind the initial obstruction require independent verification.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside Sections 115 and 131 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning voluntarily causing hurt and assault or criminal force, subject to establishing the requisite legal elements. Principles 4 and 5 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) establish requirements concerning necessity, proportionality and minimisation of injury during law enforcement operations.

The apparent deliberate obstruction of a civilian, followed by physical assault, raises substantial questions regarding the justification for the use of force, possible provocation by security personnel and compliance with prescribed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The incident therefore warrants investigation into the conduct of the personnel involved, the sequence of events leading to the assault, the nature of any resulting injuries and the responsibility of supervising officers.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 19 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.64° N, 77.24° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 19]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 19 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent deliberate obstruction of a young protester by uniformed security personnel, followed by a reported baton assault, in circumstances suggesting possible provocation and disproportionate use of force.

EXHIBIT 20 / 25

REPORTED SLAPPING OF A FEMALE PROTESTER BY A POLICE OFFICER

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 20
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1CM77BhEu4Nrnjqtk3AkSygNwu9GDZGP1?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a senior Delhi Police officer, identified in the submitted account as Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police Sandeep Lamba, subject to independent identity confirmation, striking a female protester across the face with an open hand. The woman appears to be participating in the public demonstration, with no immediate act of aggression or physical threat discernible from the described sequence that would justify such force. The apparent physical assault by a senior police officer raises serious concerns regarding the misuse of official authority, the treatment of female protesters and the standards of conduct expected from personnel responsible for maintaining public order. The precise circumstances preceding the incident, the justification for the officer's actions and any resulting injury require independent examination.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside Sections 115 and 131 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning voluntarily causing hurt and assault or criminal force, subject to establishing the requisite legal elements. The apparent striking of a female protester without any discernible immediate threat raises substantial questions regarding necessity, proportionality, lawful authority and compliance with prescribed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The alleged involvement of a senior police officer further warrants scrutiny of command responsibility, professional misconduct and adherence to standards governing the use of force against civilians.

The incident therefore requires examination of the officer's conduct, the circumstances of the confrontation, any resulting injuries and the departmental accountability mechanisms applicable to the reported assault.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 20 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: 28.62° N, 77.22° E

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 20]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 20 raises serious prima facie concerns regarding the apparent physical assault of a female protester by a senior Delhi Police officer, in circumstances where no immediate threat justifying such force is discernible from the described recording.

EXHIBIT 21 / 25

SEVERE PELLET INJURIES AND REPORTED LOSS OF VISION AMONG YOUNG PROTESTERS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the protest site, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording and Tribunal Testimony
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 21
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1d-K4oBFawo7i2Xe0Kk5JdtMy3gTmTAsV?usp=sharing

1. Observations

The submitted report describes Sahil Lochab following hospitalisation for multiple projectile injuries. It states that he also testified before the Tribunal and reported serious injury to his right eye, with loss of vision.

The recording reportedly also features an injured person identified as Irshad. The described distribution of small wounds is compatible with multiple-projectile exposure, but does not, without clinical or ballistic examination, establish birdshot, firing distance or source weapon.

The record raises serious questions about medical consequences, continuing disability and the economic effect of injury on affected households. Medical records are essential to establish the extent and prognosis of any visual loss.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the applicable rules for authorisation and use of crowd-control weapons. Paragraphs 7.5.6 and 7.5.8 of the UN Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons (2020) address the indiscriminate risks of multiple-projectile munitions and the vulnerability of the head and face.

The Tribunal should obtain clinical and ophthalmological records, imaging and recovered fragments where available, together with deployment orders, cartridge and weapon inventories, warning records and witness testimony, before assigning ammunition type or responsibility.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 21 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: Not supplied
Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 21]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 21 raises grave prima facie questions about projectile injuries described by Sahil Lochab and a second injured individual, including reported loss of sight in Lochab's right eye. The extent and prognosis of visual impairment must be established through medical records; the injury pattern alone does not determine the ammunition used.

EXHIBIT 22 / 25

SEVERE PELLET INJURIES TO THE FACE AND UPPER BODY OF A YOUNG PROTESTER

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of Connaught Place, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 22
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1tQ7v6c-CMkpSUiDr-bPvxBfhEbbyNhnX?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts Irshad Sheikh, a young protester hospitalised after sustaining multiple projectile injuries to his face and upper body during the protests. The visible distribution of injuries appears consistent with the impact of multiple small projectiles, potentially discharged from shotgun ammunition containing metal pellets, including birdshot. The precise ammunition type and firing distance cannot be conclusively established from the injury pattern alone. Independent medical reporting concerning the injured protester documents multiple metallic foreign bodies recovered during surgery, including injuries affecting vulnerable areas of the face and neck. The video report further depicts a substantial deployment of anti-riot units equipped with protective gear and crowd-control equipment in the vicinity of the demonstrations, raising questions regarding the scale and nature of the security response to the reportedly peaceful protests. The severity and distribution of the reported injuries demonstrate the potentially devastating consequences of dispersive projectile ammunition, including penetrating wounds, damage to vital anatomical structures and the risk of permanent disability.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing the deployment of firearms, crowd-control ammunition and anti-riot units. Paragraph 7.5.6 of the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) identifies the inherent inaccuracy of simultaneously discharged multiple projectiles and expressly advises against the use of metallic shotgun pellets. Paragraph 7.5.8 further cautions against directing kinetic impact projectiles towards the head, face or neck. The reported concentration of injuries around the face and upper body, alongside the substantial deployment of anti-riot personnel, raises questions regarding ammunition selection, firing direction, necessity, proportionality and precautions against serious bodily harm. The incident therefore warrants examination of medical and ballistic evidence, ammunition deployment records, operational authorisations and the responsibility of personnel and commanding officers involved.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 22 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: Not supplied

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 22]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 22 raises grave prima facie concerns about multiple facial and upper-body projectile injuries attributed to the protest operations, together with the reported presence of anti-riot deployments. Medical records, projectile recovery and deployment logs are needed to connect the injuries to particular weapons, locations and personnel.

EXHIBIT 23 / 25

ALLEGED ELECTRIFICATION OF POLICE BARRICADES AND PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON PROTESTERS

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Janpath, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording and Witness Testimony
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 23
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1FqX32OcETggDdVvU6ArH9H5e5h9DkOFD?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a visibly distressed and apparently injured protester recounting his experience of alleged physical assault by security personnel during the demonstrations. The individual further alleges that he and several fellow protesters experienced electric shocks upon coming into contact with police barricades, causing them to fall to the ground. The testimony raises serious concerns regarding the possible electrification of crowd-control barricades and the potential exposure of civilians to electrical injury during a public demonstration. While the recording documents a direct allegation of electrical shocks, it does not independently establish whether the barricades were electrically charged, the source of any current, or whether the alleged exposure resulted from deliberate action or an electrical fault.

Allegations of electric shocks at barricades are separately recorded in Exhibit 24. Repetition of the allegation is not proof of an electrical supply or of independent corroboration.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The allegations warrant examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing crowd control, public safety and the use of force. If substantiated, the deliberate electrification of barricades accessible to civilian protesters would raise grave concerns regarding the use of hazardous and potentially lethal methods of crowd control, particularly in the absence of individualised threat assessment or adequate safety precautions.

The incident also warrants examination under applicable electrical safety requirements, including the Central Electricity Authority (Measures relating to Safety and Electric Supply) Regulations, 2023, where relevant to the electrical installation or equipment involved. The allegations therefore require investigation into the barricade deployment arrangements, possible electrical connections, technical inspection records, witness accounts, medical evidence and the responsibility of officers supervising the operation.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 23 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: Not independently established

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 23]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 23 records an allegation that protesters experienced electric shocks when touching barricades; it does not independently demonstrate electrification. The allegation warrants prompt electrical examination, independent witness accounts and review of any medical records.

EXHIBIT 24 / 25

MULTIPLE PROTESTERS ALLEGE ELECTRIFICATION OF POLICE BARRICADES; POLICE PERSONNEL DECLINE TO RESPOND

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording and Witness Statements
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 24
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1PWPHKziQRqr7Q8nl2Z-gCiomTOeXL0G_?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a journalist interviewing multiple young protesters who independently allege experiencing electric shocks upon coming into physical contact with police barricades during the demonstrations. The journalist subsequently approaches uniformed police personnel and directly questions them regarding these allegations. The personnel reportedly decline to provide a substantive response, instead repeatedly directing the journalist to move back. The absence of either confirmation or denial from the personnel approached is noteworthy, given the seriousness of the allegations and the immediate public safety concerns involved. However, their refusal to respond cannot, by itself, be interpreted as an admission of wrongdoing. The recording documents multiple eyewitness allegations and the apparent absence of an immediate explanation from the police personnel questioned. It does not independently establish whether the barricades carried an electrical current or the source of any alleged electrical discharge.

The accounts may overlap with those in Exhibit 23. The police personnel's failure to answer a question on camera does not amount to an admission that the barricades were electrified.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The allegations warrant examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing crowd control, public safety and the protection of persons participating in peaceful assemblies. If substantiated, the deliberate electrification of barricades accessible to civilian protesters would raise grave concerns regarding the use of potentially lethal crowd-control measures, the foreseeability of serious bodily injury and compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

The reported absence of a substantive response from the police personnel questioned further highlights the need for an official explanation and an independently verifiable account of the barricade deployment arrangements. The incident therefore warrants examination of electrical safety records, barricade inspection reports, witness testimonies, relevant medical evidence and operational instructions, together with the responsibility of officers supervising the deployment.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 24 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: Not supplied

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 24]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 24 records further allegations of shocks from barricades and a reporter's unsuccessful request for an explanation from nearby police personnel. Neither the allegations nor the non-response establishes that the barricades carried an electrical current.

EXHIBIT 25 / 25

STONE-LADEN TRUCK REPORTED NEAR THE DEMONSTRATION SITE

Date of Incident: 20 July 2026 [reported]
Location: Reported vicinity of the Jantar Mantar, New Delhi
Nature of Evidence: Video Recording and Witness Statement
Evidence Reference: Exhibit 25
Source: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1sC5Cy1Z-bfwahOmzzuDkz4O-yNAyuqZo?usp=share_link

1. Observations

The recording reportedly depicts a video correspondent interviewing a protester who draws attention to a truck loaded with stones and construction debris, allegedly parked in close proximity to the protest site. The protester claims that the vehicle was not present at the location earlier and appeared around the time of the Sansad Chalo March, raising questions regarding its sudden presence in an area experiencing heightened security deployment and ongoing demonstrations. The individual subsequently climbs onto the vehicle and displays its contents, comprising stones and debris of varying sizes, including smaller pieces that could readily be picked up and thrown. The presence of an accessible quantity of stones near an active protest site raises concerns regarding their potential misuse during confrontations. However, the recording does not independently establish the vehicle's ownership, purpose, time of arrival or any deliberate intention to facilitate violence.

2. Legal and Procedural Concerns

The incident warrants examination under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, alongside applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) governing public-order management, security arrangements and the prevention of violence during public assemblies. The unexplained presence of a stone-laden vehicle near a sensitive protest location raises legitimate questions regarding security oversight, traffic restrictions, vehicle access and the possible availability of materials capable of being used as improvised projectiles.

Of particular relevance are separate allegations of stone-pelting during the protests, including those documented in Exhibit 18. Any possible connection between the vehicle and those incidents requires independent investigation and cannot be presumed from the recording alone. The incident therefore warrants examination of the vehicle's registration and ownership, movement records, purpose of transportation, relevant CCTV footage and any official authorisation permitting its presence near the protest site.

3. Preliminary Authenticity Assessment

The accompanying exhibit note states that preliminary screening identified no apparent indicators of AI generation or digital manipulation. The underlying screening output, tool settings and original recording have not been independently authenticated in this editorial review. The reported result is not proof that the video is original, unedited, accurately dated or accurately captioned.

Authenticity Assessment Report: Referred to in the supplied Exhibit 25 materials.

4. Geographical Reference

Coordinates: Not supplied

Map Reference: [Map image available in the drive link provided for Exhibit 25]

5. Tools and Methods Employed

Reported by submitter: Oceanir | Deepfake Detection | ChatGPT 6 Astra.

6. Concluding Observations

Exhibit 25 identifies a reported truckload of stones near a protest location and a witness allegation concerning its arrival. This is a legitimate preservation and investigation lead, not evidence by itself of a conspiracy, prior planning or involvement by the police.

SYNTHESIS OF THE RECORD

The dossier sets out serious and recurring allegations, but it is not yet an independently authenticated reconstruction of the entire operation. Read together, the exhibits identify distinct factual questions that merit compulsory or voluntary production of records, technical scrutiny and testimony. The Tribunal should distinguish corroborated observations from apparently related allegations, and avoid counting the same incident multiple times merely because it appears in more than one video.

Firearms, ammunition and injury mechanisms

Exhibits 01–02 and 21–22 concern apparent firearm use and injuries attributed to pellets. The recordings as described cannot alone establish the precise firearm model, shot type, chemical or metallic composition, firing distance or trajectory. Ballistic examination and medical imaging or recovered fragments are critical. Exhibit 08 is a separate Bihar event and must not be used to establish the Delhi deployment.

Force against individuals and protected groups

Exhibits 07, 09–12, 14–15, 17 and 19–20 contain visible-conduct descriptions, injury accounts or testimonies alleging force against people, including women, children, reporters and injured persons. These call for injury records, identities, contemporaneous footage and the officers' version of events. Injury visible in an interview is not by itself proof of the reported attacker.

Command, equipment and traceability

Exhibits 03, 05–06, 13 and 16 raise questions concerning the equipment displayed or reportedly used, ammunition inventory, device identification, inspection and the visibility of individual officers' identities. The applicable operational requirements must be produced; neither wearing multiple weapons nor an absent name badge proves a particular statutory offence without the governing rules and circumstances.

Barricades, stones and possible hazards

Exhibits 23–24 repeat allegations of electrical shocks near barricades; neither includes an independently documented electrical measurement in the submitted notes. Exhibits 18 and 25 concern, respectively, alleged stone-throwing and an allegedly nearby stone-laden truck. A causal connection or a coordinated plan cannot be presumed without independent evidence.

MATERIAL RECORDS AND ACTIONS REQUESTED OF THE TRIBUNAL

- Order or request preservation of original CCTV, body-worn camera, drone, vehicle-camera and control-room recordings, including retention logs, camera positions and any gaps in recording.
- Obtain deployment and command rosters, operation orders, dispersal announcements, use-of-force forms, after-action reports and radio or wireless logs for the relevant locations and periods.
- Obtain firearm and less-lethal weapon issue registers, weapon serials, ammunition types, batch/lot numbers, quantities issued and returned, authorisation logs, inspection history and manufacturer specifications.
- Invite independent qualified forensic examinations of the original video files, recovered projectiles or cartridges, alleged modified batons, tear-smoke canisters and any allegedly electrified barricades.
- Seek medico-legal records, radiology, ophthalmological findings and consent-based medical expert review for injured individuals, with special protection for children and survivors of alleged sexual misconduct.
- Secure the identity and status of uniformed and plainclothes personnel; permit the authorities and named persons a fair opportunity to respond to specific allegations and produce exculpatory material.
- Preserve all submitted files with controlled access, original filenames, receipt times, hash values, transfer logs and a manifest tying each item to its exhibit reference and chain of custody.
- Record findings separately as established, corroborated but disputed, plausible requiring further inquiry, or unsubstantiated on the present material.

FACTS, QUALIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

1. Provenance, scope and independence

The source compilation supplies 25 numbered exhibit notes, associated descriptions and most evidence links. Some notes refer to external screening reports and map images that have not been independently inspected for this edited submission. The actual number of distinct incidents or independent witnesses cannot safely be inferred from the number of exhibits. Exhibit 08 is a reported 25 July 2026 Bihar incident and is not part of the Delhi chronology.

2. Geolocation Disclaimer

The stated location is an assessment based on available visual clues, metadata and reference material as described in the source dossier. Unless independently corroborated, coordinates indicate a possible location and should not be treated as an exact or verified recording position. Their printed decimal precision must not be mistaken for measurement accuracy.

The submitting team reports that geolocation assessments used licensed, internationally recognised tools. Minor pin-placement differences may not affect a reasonably established broader vicinity where consistent landmarks support that location. This assurance does not apply automatically to all points: coarse coordinates and material mismatches, including Exhibit 08, require resolution. Underlying tool licences, settings and location analyses were not independently audited for this edition.

3. Deepfake / AI Assessment Disclaimer

This assessment is limited to the submitted file and the methods used. No detection method can conclusively establish authenticity or rule out all AI generation or manipulation. The absence of detected anomalies does not prove that the video is original, unedited or accurately captioned. No blanket assertion of forensic authenticity is made here.

4. Limitations When Using Social Media Videos

Social media platforms may compress, resize or re-encode videos and remove original metadata, including GPS coordinates, recording time and device details. Downloading, forwarding, cropping or screen-recording can further reduce the information available for verification. Upload dates, captions and location tags do not independently establish when or where a video was recorded.

Reduced quality may obscure location clues and manipulation indicators, limiting geolocation and deepfake assessments. The absence of detected anomalies does not establish authenticity. Findings apply only to the submitted file; access to the original camera file and independent corroboration may be necessary for stronger conclusions.

5. Attribution and interpretation

Uniform colour, helmet style, shields and generic weapon shape do not conclusively establish force affiliation, individual identity, weapon gauge, loading or ammunition type. Facial expression or gesture does not prove motive. A statement by an injured witness is evidence of the account given, but not necessarily direct footage of the alleged blow or discharge. The absence of warning in a short clip does not establish that no earlier warning occurred.

6. Medical and vulnerable-witness safeguards

Visible injuries cannot establish clinical severity, permanent disability, mechanism of injury or perpetrator without appropriate clinical and other corroboration. The identities of children and complainants alleging sexual or gender-based abuse should be protected as required by applicable law, consent and the Tribunal's safeguards. Distribution of raw or identifying material should be restricted to persons with a legitimate evidentiary purpose.

7. Admissibility and integrity of digital records

SHA-256 hashes can show whether two digital copies are byte-for-byte identical, but cannot prove the footage's original source, date or truthfulness. Original files, transfer logs and documented chain of custody should be preserved. Where judicial reliance on electronic records is contemplated, the applicable provisions of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, especially Sections 61–63 and the prescribed certificate mechanism, require advice and compliance appropriate to the mode of tendering evidence.

8. Legal character and fairness of the submission

This is a preliminary fact-finding submission, not an adjudication of criminal culpability, a certified forensic opinion or an assertion that every allegation is true. International principles and UN guidance assist analysis of necessity, proportionality, precaution and accountability; they are not by themselves a substitute for establishing the applicable Indian legal rule or the elements of an offence. Authorities and any individually named person should be afforded a fair and specific opportunity to respond.

SELECTED AUTHORITIES AND METHODOLOGICAL REFERENCES

[1] Constitution of India, Articles 19 and 21
https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india/

[2] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023)
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/20062/1/a202345.pdf

[3] Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act 47 of 2023), Sections 61–63 and Schedule
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/20063/1/a2023-47.pdf

[4] UN Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020)
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3973649

[5] UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990)
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93796

[6] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 37 on Peaceful Assembly (2020)
https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/hrc/2020/en/149609

[7] D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416; arrest and interrogation safeguards
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/235756/

This list identifies legal and methodological references used in evaluating the source dossier. It does not suggest that the cited instruments alone resolve the disputed facts.

Annexure II

LEGAL FRAMEWORK: STATUTES, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE AND STANDING ORDERS GOVERNING THE EXECUTIVE'S ACTIONS

This Section sets out the rules that govern what the Delhi Police and the other forces could do on 20.07.2026. The rules come from several levels. The Constitution is at the top. Article 19(1)(b) protects the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and Article 19(3) allows the State to restrict that right only by reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order. Below it are international standards that India has accepted, the statutes passed by Parliament, the rules and orders made under them, and the internal instructions of the police.

A. International Standards for the Use of Force in Protests

1. The Basic Principles

The main international text is the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990. In plain terms, the Principles say the following.

- Governments must adopt rules on the use of force and keep them under review (Principle 1). Equipment that is intended to incapacitate without killing must be carefully evaluated and its use carefully controlled (Principle 3).
- Officials must, as far as possible, use non-violent means first, and may use force only if other means remain ineffective (Principle 4).
- Where force is unavoidable, officials must show restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate aim, minimise damage and injury, ensure that medical aid is given to the injured at the earliest possible moment, and ensure that relatives or close friends are notified (Principle 5).

- Arbitrary or abusive use of force must be punished as a criminal offence, and a public emergency does not allow any departure from the Principles (Principles 7 and 8).
- Everyone may take part in lawful and peaceful assemblies. In dispersing an assembly that is unlawful but not violent, officials must avoid force or, where that is not practicable, keep it to the minimum necessary (Principles 12 and 13). Firearms may be

used against a violent assembly only when less dangerous means are not practicable, and only to the minimum extent necessary (Principle 14).

- Superior officers are responsible if they knew, or should have known, of unlawful force by those under their command and did not take all measures to prevent, stop or report it. Obeying an order is no defence where the order was manifestly unlawful (Principles 24 and 26).

2. Guidance on particular equipment

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has issued guidance on the equipment used in crowd control. The Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020) and the Resource Book on Human Rights and Law Enforcement are the main documents.

Batons

Over-arm baton strikes on bones and joints carry a heightened risk of dislocations, fractures and soft-tissue injury, and jabs or driving strikes at the chest, neck or head can injure vital organs. Strikes to the head, neck and throat, spine, kidneys and abdomen are to be avoided, and neck holds are not to be used. A baton is not to be used against a person who is neither engaged in nor threatening violence, and such use is likely to amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or even torture.

Electric devices

Direct-contact electro-shock devices, which include stun guns, stun batons and stun shields, work by using pain to obtain compliance. The Resource Book says that this is incompatible with the principle of necessity, and that only projectile devices should be permitted, and then only in conformity with human rights norms. Their use for the sole purpose of securing compliance with an order is inadmissible. The UN Committee against Torture has said on several occasions that such devices could in some situations amount to torture, and the Resource Book says that they should be used only with advance warning wherever possible, and in line with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and precaution.

Tear gas

The Chemical Weapons Convention defines a “riot control agent” as any chemical, not listed in its Schedules, that can rapidly produce in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical

effects that disappear within a short time after exposure ends (Article II(7)). The Convention and the Geneva Protocol ban the use of such agents in war, and the Convention permits their use for law enforcement, including domestic riot control. The permission rests on two assumptions: that the agent causes no long-term harm, and that it is used responsibly and in line with the Basic Principles. The Resource Book says that officials should never use more than the minimum effective amount and should assess the effect after each projectile, grenade or burst. It says that hand-held launchers should never be fired directly towards a person, that tear gas should not be used over wide areas against larger groups unless violence is so high that violent persons cannot be targeted directly, and that only experienced and specially trained officers should use it when it is dispersed at a distance.

Pellets and other projectiles

The Resource Book says that projectiles such as rubber bullets may be permitted if they have been tested and confirmed to be less lethal and sufficiently accurate, and if the instructions for their use are compliant with human rights. They should generally be fired only at the lower abdomen or legs of a violent individual, and only to address an imminent threat of injury. Ammunition that fires a large number of small pellets over a wide area is by its nature inaccurate and indiscriminate. The Resource Book says that officials should never use such projectiles at close range, never target the head, neck, chest or groin, never use equipment that fires multiple projectiles because of the risk to bystanders, and never use them indiscriminately against a crowd.

B. The Statutory Basis for Dispersal and the Use of Force

The statutes give the police and Magistrates power at four stages of a protest. Before it, they may regulate where and when it takes place. If they fear that it will threaten order, a Magistrate may prohibit it by order. If it becomes an unlawful assembly, it may be commanded to disperse. And if it does not disperse, force may be used. Each power has its own conditions, and each is limited by the Constitution. The statutes say little about how much force may be used and with what equipment, and that detail is left to the rules and instructions in Part C.

1. Before the protest: regulating assemblies and processions

The Delhi Police Act, 1978 gives the police a general power to regulate how assemblies and processions use the streets. Section 28(1)(p) allows regulations on the conduct of those taking part, and, for processions, on the routes, the order and the times at which they may pass. Section 29 allows the Commissioner of Police, and any officer of the rank of Inspector or above, to

give directions, orally or in writing, to control the conduct of assemblies and processions, to fix their routes and times, and to prevent obstruction in the streets and other public places.

2. When a protest is thought to threaten order: the prohibitory order

The main power of prohibition is in section 163, BNSS, 2023, which replaced section 144 of the CrPC. In plain terms, it works as follows.

It is a power of an Executive Magistrate, such as a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or another Executive Magistrate specially empowered. It can be used only where there is sufficient ground and immediate prevention or a speedy remedy is desirable. It is an emergency power.

The Magistrate must make a written order that states the material facts of the case. The order may direct a person to abstain from a certain act, and it can be addressed to the public in general in a particular place.

The order must be aimed at preventing specific harms. These are obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, danger to human life, health or safety, a disturbance of the public tranquillity, a riot or an affray.

Where there is no time to serve notice on the people concerned, the order may be made without hearing them (ex parte). An order does not last for more than two months unless the State Government extends it, and a person affected may ask the Magistrate to change or cancel it.

Disobeying an order made by a public servant who is authorised to make it is an offence under section 223, BNS, 2023.

In Delhi, police officers can exercise the powers of an Executive Magistrate. Under section 70(1)(b) of the Delhi Police Act, the Central Government may confer these powers, and the order of 24.06.2026 on which the Delhi Police rely states that the Assistant Commissioner of Police for Sub-Division Parliament Street holds them by a notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 09.09.2010 (No. U-11036/1/2010-UTL). The Delhi Police also rely on a Public Advisory issued before the march.

3. When an assembly is “unlawful”: sections 189 to 191 of the BNS

These sections replaced sections 141 to 151 of the IPC, 1860. They answer three questions: when does a crowd become an unlawful assembly, what offences are committed by those in it, and when is it a riot.

What makes an assembly unlawful

The law does not call a crowd unlawful because it is large, loud or unwelcome. Two things are needed. The first is numbers: five or more persons. The second is a common object, which is a shared aim of the people in the assembly, and it must be one of five that the law lists.

To use criminal force, or a show of it, to overawe the Central or a State Government, Parliament, a State Legislature, or a public servant exercising lawful power.

- To resist the carrying out of a law or legal process.
- To commit mischief, criminal trespass or any other offence. This is the only one of the five that does not need force.
- To use criminal force, or a show of it, to take possession of property, to deprive a person of a right such as a right of way or the use of water, or to enforce a right that the group believes it has.
- To use criminal force, or a show of it, to compel a person to do something he is not legally bound to do, or to stop him doing something he is entitled to do.

"Criminal force" means force used on a person without consent, and a "show" of it means threatening to use it. An assembly that was lawful at the start may become unlawful later if its members come to share one of these objects. An assembly whose members have none of these objects is not an unlawful assembly, however many people there are.

What happens to people in an unlawful assembly

The law sets out several offences, and the penalty rises as the conduct becomes more serious.

A person becomes a member only if he knows the facts that make the assembly unlawful and intentionally joins it or stays in it. The penalty is up to six months' imprisonment, or a fine, or both (section 189(2)).

A person who stays in the assembly knowing that it has been commanded to disperse "in the manner prescribed by law" faces up to two years ' imprisonment, or a fine, or both (section 189(3)). The command must have been given as the law requires, which means by an authorised person and in the way described in Part B, point 4.

A member who is armed with a deadly weapon, or with anything likely to cause death if used as a weapon, faces up to two years ' imprisonment, or a fine, or both (section 189(4)).

A separate offence applies to a person who stays in any assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb the public peace after it has been lawfully commanded to disperse. It applies even if the assembly is not unlawful under section 189(1), and carries up to six months ' imprisonment, or a fine, or both (section 189(5)). If the assembly is in fact unlawful, the person is punished under section 189(3).

The remaining sub-sections deal with those who hire or engage persons to join an unlawful assembly, who harbour them, or who are hired and go armed (sections 189(6) to 189(9)).

Collective responsibility (section 190)

If any member of an unlawful assembly commits an offence in pursuing the common object, or an offence the members knew was likely to be committed in pursuing it, every member present at that time is guilty of that offence. The rule is a strong one, and the courts have therefore insisted that the common object and each person's share in it be shown, and that mere presence in a crowd is not enough.

Rioting (section 191)

When an unlawful assembly, or any member of it, uses force or violence in pursuing the common object, every member is guilty of rioting. The penalty is up to two years' imprisonment, or a fine, or both, and up to five years, or a fine, or both, if the person is armed with a deadly weapon or with anything likely to cause death if used as a weapon. The IPC set the penalty for armed rioting at three years. There can be no riot without an unlawful assembly, and no riot without force or violence.

How the prohibitory order and the unlawful assembly rules fit together. Breaking a prohibitory order is an offence in itself under section 223 of the BNS. It does not follow that every assembly held in breach of the order is an unlawful assembly. For that, the members must share one of the five objects. The State's argument may be that defying the order is itself a common object to commit an offence, which is the third object. Whether that is right depends on whether the order was lawful, whether the members knew of it, and whether they in fact shared that object.

4. Commanding a crowd to disperse: sections 148 to 151 of the BNSS

These sections replaced sections 129 to 132 of the CrPC. They regulate who may order a crowd to disperse and when force may follow.

Section 148: dispersal by the civil force

The command to disperse is the legal gateway to force. It may be given by an Executive Magistrate, or by the officer in charge of a police station and, if he is not there, by an officer of at least the rank of sub-inspector. It may be given to an unlawful assembly, or to any assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb the public peace. Once the command is given, it is the duty of the members to leave. Only if they do not leave, or show a determination not to, may the Magistrate or officer disperse them by force, ask for help from any person who is not a member of the armed forces, and arrest and confine those in the crowd. Force is therefore the third step, after the assembly has been identified and has been commanded to disperse and has refused.

Section 149: dispersal by the armed forces

If the civil force cannot disperse the assembly and dispersal is necessary for public security, the Executive Magistrate of the highest rank present may call in the armed forces. The officer who obeys is to use"as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly and arresting and detaining" its members (section 149(3)).

Section 150: the armed forces acting alone

If public security is manifestly endangered and no Executive Magistrate can be reached, a commissioned or gazetted officer of the armed forces may disperse the assembly himself, and must then communicate with an Executive Magistrate, who will say whether the action is to continue.

Section 151: protection from prosecution

A person who has acted under these sections cannot be prosecuted unless the Central Government (where he is a member of the armed forces) or the State Government (in other cases) sanctions it. A Magistrate or police officer who has acted in good faith is not taken to have committed an offence. The protection therefore depends on good faith, and on the sanction of the Government, which means that accountability for the use of force in a protest depends on the Government 's willingness to sanction a prosecution.

None of these sections names the lathi charge, tear gas or any other equipment, or says how much force is permitted beyond "minimum" and "as little as consistent with dispersal". Two questions arise on the facts of 20.07.2026. The first is whether the Rapid Action Force, a central armed police force, falls within the "armed forces" in sections 149 to 151, or acts as a police force under section 148. The second is who gave the command to disperse, and in what form.

5. The Arms Act, 1959 and the Arms Rules, 2016

The Arms Act and the Arms Rules deal with the manufacture, sale, possession and carrying of arms. They do not tell the police how to use equipment on a crowd, and no statute or rule before the Tribunal specifically regulates the use of pellet guns against a crowd. That question is governed by the provisions above, and by the rules and instructions in Part C. The words "pellet gun" do not appear in the Act or the Rules. The Rules define an"air weapon" as a device that discharges a projectile from a barrel under the pressure of compressed air or other gas, without an explosive charge. A device that discharges its projectiles by an explosive charge, such as a shotgun cartridge, falls outside that definition and would be a firearm. Which kind of device was used on 20.07.2026, if any was, is a question of evidence.

6. The Delhi Police Act, 1978

Section 28(1)(p) allows regulations on the conduct of assemblies and processions on streets, including the routes, the order and the times at which processions may pass. Section 29 allows the Commissioner of Police, and every police officer not below the rank of Inspector, to give orders, orally or in writing, to direct the conduct of assemblies and processions, to specify their routes and times, and to prevent obstruction. Under section 70(1)(b), the Central Government may confer Executive Magistrate powers on police officers, and the order relies on a notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 09. 09.2010 (No. U-11036/1/2010-UTL) for this.

C. Delhi Police Standing Orders, Circulars and SOPs

1. How the Delhi Police instructions work

Standing Orders are instructions issued internally to all police personnel by Police Headquarters (PHQ). A Standing Order continues for five years, and circulars and other orders are kept in an annual file at each police station and destroyed after two years. These instructions are not published in the way that statutes are, and several of the documents below were obtained from the Delhi Police website or by Right to Information applications.

2. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 14.56[1]

This Rule, which applies in the Punjab, Haryana and the Union Territory of Delhi, is the most detailed statement of how force is to be used on a crowd. It provides as follows.

- Force is to be regulated according to the circumstances of each case. Its object is to quell a disturbance of the peace or to disperse an assembly that threatens a disturbance

[1] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

and has refused to disperse."No ulterior objects, such as punitive or repressive effect, shall be taken into consideration."

- If a Magistrate is present or can be reached, a police officer may not call for dispersal of an unlawful assembly without the Magistrate's orders. If a Magistrate is not available, a gazetted police officer may act independently, but must report to the senior Magistrate.
- All attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings and exhortation are to be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly and ordered to disperse. Once an order to disperse has been defied, or the crowd is obviously defiant, force is to be used without hesitation.
- The degree of force is to be the minimum that the responsible officer, with due care and attention, decides is necessary for the effective dispersal of the crowd. The degree and duration of force are to be limited as much as possible, and "the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit shall be used".
- The responsible officer is to decide, in each case, which methods and equipment to use, after considering the strength and attitude of the crowd and the force available.
- Before firearms are used, the crowd is to be warned that fire with live ammunition will be opened. The orders of the District Magistrate or sub-divisional officer, if present, are to be obtained. The minimum volume of fire is to be ordered, aimed low at the most threatening parts of the crowd, and never over the heads or at the fringes of the crowd. The Rule adds that buckshot is not an effective charge at any range at which it is safe to use, and that the Government has directed that buckshot ammunition not be used against crowds. The order to cease fire is to be given as soon as the assembly shows a disposition to disperse.
- A full report is to be prepared, noting all the circumstances and the rounds issued and used, and describing all action taken by the police including for medical aid to the wounded.

3. Standing Order No. 72[2] (instructions regarding dispersal of unlawful assemblies)

This order says that the principle of minimum force is to be kept in view, but that where force has to be used it should be used with determination and firmness. It directs that Rule 14.56 of

[2] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

Punjab Police Rules, 1934,[3] and sections 28(1)(p) and 29 of the Delhi Police Act[4] (discussed above) are to be followed.

4. Standing Order No. 309 (demonstrations, rallies and processions)[5]

This is a checklist of the whole sequence of action that the district concerned "must meticulously follow". The main points are these.

- Arrangements at the site (item 7)

Barricading in three layers. Staff at the first barricade are without lathis, with helmets and body protectors only. Staff at the second are without lathis, with body protectors, cane shields and helmets. The third barricade is fully equipped with riot control equipment: sticks, body protectors, helmets, cane shields and tear gas. A banner is to be displayed to announce that Section 144 CrPC (now section 163 BNSS) has been promulgated. Water cannon, the tear gas section and the force equipped with lathis are each to be under one officer. At least two videographers are to be on either side to record both the demonstrators and the police response. Ambulances and loud hailers are to be at hand.

- Contact with the leaders and appeals (items 9 and 12)

Constant liaison is to be kept with the leaders and organisers. A responsible officer is to make repeated announcements on the public address system, advising the leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful and to come forward with a memorandum or deputation, and the announcements are to be videographed.

- Declaration and warning (items 13 and 14)

If the demonstrators do not follow the appeal and turn violent, the assembly is to be declared unlawful on the public address system, and this is to be videographed. A warning on the public address system is to be given before any kind of force, and is to be videographed.

- The use of force (items 11 and 17)

Staff are to be re-briefed according to the situation, with "utmost restraint". Only a controlled cane charge is to be used, only for dispersal, and there is to be "no action on [a] retreating crowd".

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[3] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

[4] Delhi Police Act, No. 34 (1978). https://licensing.delhipolice.gov.in/V2/GetActsnRulesPDFPdf?fileName=36629_The%20Delhi%20Police%20Act-1978.pdf

[5] Sekhri, A. (2020, February 6). Delhi Police circulars & standing orders for regulating protests. *The Criminal Law Blog*. https://thecriminallawblog.in/2020/02/06/delhi-police-circulars-standing-orders-for-regulating-protests/

- Care of the injured (items 19 and 25)

An announcement is to be made for the injured to be taken to hospital, with stretchers to carry them to the vehicle or ambulance, and this is to be videographed. Staff at the hospital are to be briefed so that the injured are recorded and treated in time.

- Women (item 22)

Special attention is to be paid in dealing with women's demonstrations, and only women police are to tackle them.

- Records and reports (items 24, 26 and 28)

When a case is registered, evidence of the use of stones, lathis and sticks is to be videographed and taken into possession from the site. Details of detentions are to be entered in the daily diary. Where a demonstration turns violent and lathi charge or tear gas is used and people are injured, the District's Deputy Commissioner is to send an incident report to the Joint Commissioner concerned, with copies to the Special Commissioner, the Principal Secretary (Home) of the Government of NCT and the Joint Secretary (UT) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, without delay, particularly when Parliament is in session.

5. Circulars

- Circular No. 19/2012[6] says that the application of Section 144 CrPC (now section 163 BNSS) should be reasoned and justified, with all the facts considered and brought on record, and issued only after proper application of mind. It says that any use of force to disperse a crowd should be preceded by proper warnings, such as announcements on a public address system or loud hailers, and the display of banners declaring the assembly unlawful, and that Standing Order No. 72[7] must be strictly followed by all field officers.
- Circular No. 35/2011[8] records that, under Supreme Court and High Court guidelines, the onus of maintaining peace during a protest is on the organisers. The Tribunal notes this as a point on which the Delhi Police may rely.
- Circular No. 56/2011[9] deals with permission for processions and events. It requires the Districts to send complete reports and recommendations to PHQ at least two or three days before the event so that PHQ can pass them to the Ministry of Home Affairs in

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[6] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

[7] Delhi Police. (1967, September 27). *Unlawful assemblies: Dispersal of: Instructions regarding . . .* (Standing Order No. 72). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pmnnokjN2uqRBYhP73WbjC49lbOjGMku/view

[8] Office of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. (2011, June 22). *Title of the circular exactly as printed, in sentence case* (Circular No. 35/2011). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JSdTb8gjpPXrSfjhmqBPTUuiQJzVRBJr/view

[9] Sekhri, A. (2020, February 6). Delhi Police circulars & standing orders for regulating protests. *The Criminal Law Blog*. https://thecriminallawblog.in/2020/02/06/delhi-police-circulars-standing-orders-for-regulating-protests/

time for it to grant permission. It shows that permission for a procession passes from the District through PHQ to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

6. The Code of Conduct for the Police in India (1985)

Clause 4 of the Code of Conduct issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs says that, in securing the observance of law or maintaining order, the police should as far as practicable use the methods of persuasion, advice and warning, and that where force becomes inevitable, only "the irreducible minimum of force required in the circumstances" should be used.

7. Identification of police personnel

Standing Order No. 51 (Uniform Regulations, 2017) requires officers to be in uniform on working days, which includes field officers of the districts, and requires all ranks to wear name plates in Hindi and English on the right chest above the breast pocket. In *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal*, the Supreme Court directed that police personnel who make an arrest or handle interrogation must bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. That direction concerns arrest and interrogation, and it applies to the events of 20 July 2026 by analogy.

8. Instructions that the Tribunal has not seen.

- The 2011 SOP of the BPRD on dealing with public agitations with non-lethal measures. The SOP provides for a graded approach, beginning with persuasion, negotiation and warnings, then minimum force, and that it does not mention pellet guns among the approved measures. This SOP is not available in the public domain
- Standing Order L&O/10/2022, said to have been issued on 25.05.2022, on rallies, demonstrations and processions is not available in public domain.

D. The Gap Between the Prescribed Procedure and the Conduct on the Ground

Parts A to C set out what the rules required. This Part sets out, point by point, where the testimonies before the Tribunal differ from them. For each point, the rule comes first and the testimony follows. The Delhi Police have stated before the Supreme Court that graded force was used only after the crowd breached the barricades. The Tribunal could not obtain the original affidavit, and this is taken from a media report. The points below do not decide the difference between the two accounts. They show where the rules required a step and the witnesses described something else.

1. An order made known in time

The rule: a reasoned order, made by a person who holds the power and brought to the notice of the people it binds, with a banner at the site (section 163 BNSS; Circular No. 19/2012[10]; Standing Order No. 309, item 7).

The testimony and the record: the order was dated 24.06.2026, covered only the Parliament Street sub-division, and was posted publicly on the evening of 19 July. The Public Advisory said that an order was in force across the whole district. Blessy K. Abraham stated that the only announcement made before 10 AM concerned the imposition of section 163. No witness described a banner.

2. Contact with the leaders

The rule: constant liaison with the leaders and repeated appeals to stay peaceful and to come forward with a memorandum (Standing Order No. 309, items 9 to 12); warning and exhortation before the assembly is declared unlawful (Rule 14.56).

The testimony: Anish Gawande and Saurav Das stated that the only talks were an invitation to two leaders to a minister's house on the morning of 20 July, and that no police officer approached the leaders at the site.

3. Barricades without lathis at the first two layers

The rule: three layers of barricades, with no lathis at the first two and the heavy equipment held back at the third (Standing Order No. 309, item 7).

The testimony: Sohini, Aameen and Blessy stated that the police met the march with lathis and tear gas at or near the start, before any layer was reached in the order the Standing Order describes. Anish Gawande stated that the charge began without warning as the march moved off the Kerala Bhawan side.

4. Announcement, declaration, command and warning

The rule: repeated announcements on a public address system, a declaration that the assembly is unlawful, a command to disperse by a person who has the power, and a recorded warning

[10] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

before force (Standing Order No. 309, items 12 to 14; Section148 BNSS; Rule 14.56 of Punjab Police Rules).

The testimony: Blessy K. Abraham stated that no warning was made before force and that no dispersal order was issued. Anish Gawande stated that no warning or negotiation preceded the charge. Mr Ali stated that the police closed all the exits of Jantar Mantar and only then ordered the crowd to disperse.

5. Force on people who were not resisting

The rule: force only to quell a disturbance or disperse an assembly that has refused to disperse, never to punish (Rule 14.56); a controlled cane charge only for dispersal (Standing Order No. 309, item 17). Where an assembly is peaceful, the Supreme Court has said that police force is not warranted at all (*Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*[11]).

The testimony: Disha stated that tear gas was fired while protesters were handing roses to the police. Aameen stated that tear gas was used on protesters who sat on the road. Abhisht stated that police charged at fallen students who were not allowed to stand. Sunny Tomar stated that police kept striking after protesters came forward to cover him.

6. No action on a retreating crowd, and a way to leave

The rule: no action on a retreating crowd (Standing Order No. 309, item 17). A command to disperse presumes that the crowd can leave.

The testimony: Prerna stated that police continued while protesters were fleeing Sansad Marg, and did not stop when told that they were leaving. Sohini, Aameen, Prerna and Muskan stated that the exits were closed, the metro was closed and the police narrowed the area step by step. Disha stated that she was crushed by the crowd in the stampede.

7. The least deadly means, and care on the body

The rule: "the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit" (Rule 14.56). Baton blows to the head, neck, spine and abdomen are to be avoided, and tear gas is not to be fired directly at a person (OHCHR guidance, Part A).

The testimony: Sunny Tomar and Ramit Verma stated that they were struck on the head with lathis. Bewesh stated that RAF personnel struck him in a way that broke his leg. Utkarsh Gaur

[11] 2016 INSC 597

stated that a tear gas shell hit a protester on the chest. Blessy stated that shells were thrown directly at the crowd.

8. Equipment that the instructions do not list

The rule: the Delhi Police instructions seen by the Tribunal mention lathis and tear gas only, and no instruction mentions electric batons, nail-fitted batons or pellets.

The testimony: Bewesh, Utkarsh Gaur and Sajid Khan stated that they saw or were struck by lathis with nails. A video, with the investigation of Ankita Bhardwaj, shows a nail-fitted baton in a police official's hand. Ali and Muskan stated that electric current was used, and a video presented by Varrun that passed a preliminary check for manipulation, appears to show a woman member of the security forces applying a baton-like device, with a sound like an electrical discharge, to women protesters who were standing and not resisting. The Delhi Police, as described in the published account of the affidavit, say that the only nail-fitted object seen was a protester's stick carrying a flag.

9. Expired tear gas

The rule: the Tribunal has not seen any rule on the stock or expiry of tear gas. Abhisht stated that every shell is to be entered in a log and expired shells removed. Prerna and Abhisht stated that expired shells were used, and a photograph of an expired shell was posted on 21 July.

10. Medical aid

The rule: an announcement for the injured, stretchers, advance notice to the hospital (Standing Order No. 309, item 19; Basic Principles, Principle 5).

The testimony: Dr Anaya saw 40 to 60 patients between 11 AM and 4:30 PM, including a man brought in unconscious, a boy with a fractured leg and others with crush injuries. No witness described a police announcement, stretchers or a hospital that had been told in advance. Bewesh and Aameen reached the hospital with the help of other protesters, and Bewesh stated that a tear gas shell exploded near him on the way. No help to reach the injured to a hospital was provided by the police.

The shape of the gap

On the witnesses' accounts, the procedure was not followed at the order, the talks, the warning, the choice of force, the way out, the medical care or the records. The police position is that the

procedure was followed. The records that would decide the point are with the Delhi Police and should be requested.

E. Judicial Rulings on Dispersal and the Use of Force

The right to assemble is not absolute, but the State's power over it is a power to regulate and not to prevent people's protest assemblies. In *Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad*,[12] the Supreme Court recognised that the authorities may regulate meetings in public streets, and held that the regulation must not become an arbitrary denial of the right. In *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India,*[13] the Court held that the authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order, but cannot extinguish the right to protest altogether.

The conditions for force

In *Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh*, the Punjab and Haryana High Court said: "Before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly with the object of committing violence or an assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, such assembly does not disperse."

Reasonable force only

In *Police Commissioner v. Yash Pal Sharma*, the Delhi High Court considered a lathi charge on an unarmed and peaceful march. The Court said that it is only reasonable force that the police are authorised to use to disperse an unlawful assembly, and that this flows from the fundamental right of citizens to speech and expression and to assemble. Justice A.K. Sikri said that the object of section 129 of the Code and of Rule 14.56 is to use force to quell a disturbance of the peace, or to disperse an assembly that threatens one and has refused to disperse or shown a determination not to disperse, and that, forgetting this, the act of the police was "punitive and repressive".

Excess, and compensation

In *Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*,[14] the Supreme Court observed that where an assembly is peaceful, the use of police force is not warranted at all, and that where it becomes violent, reasonable force may be justified. It said that it becomes a more serious problem when the police use excessive force, or do not stop even after they have controlled the situation,

[12] (1973) 1 SCC 227
[13] AIR 2018 SC 3476

[14] 2016 INSC 597

because this violates human rights and human dignity and threatens the rule of law. The Court awarded compensation to the petitioners, although they had pelted stones.

Prohibitory orders

In *Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re*,[15] the Supreme Court examined the use of Section 144 against a gathering of people who were asleep at night, and held that the power may be used only in grave circumstances for the maintenance of public peace, where the emergency is sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave. In *Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr*,[16] the Court held that the power is to be applied carefully, where specific.

Who decides how much force

In *State of Karnataka v. B. Padmanabha Beliya*, the Karnataka High Court held that once the Magistrate has decided on the kind of force to be used, the police officer in charge is solely responsible for deciding the exact amount of force, the manner of using it and the details of the operation, bearing in mind that no more force than necessary is to be used.

E. The Sequence the Rules Require

Taken together, the rules above set out the sequence of action that the Executive was required to follow. The events of 20 July 2026 are to be measured against it.

1. A prohibitory order made on stated facts, by a person holding the power, published, and displayed on a banner at the site (Section.163 BNSS; Circular No. 19/2012[17]; Standing Order No. 309, item 7).

2. A request for permission through the District and PHQ to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Circular No. 56/2011)[18].

3. Barricades, equipment, videographers, ambulances and loud hailers arranged as the Standing Order requires, with no lathis at the first two barricades (Standing Order No. 309, item 7).

4. Constant contact with the leaders, and repeated, recorded appeals (Standing Order No. 309, items 9 and 12).

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[15] (2012) 5 SCC 1

[16] AIR 1978 SC 47

[17] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

[18] Sekhri, A. (2020, February 6). Delhi Police circulars & standing orders for regulating protests. *The Criminal Law Blog*. https://thecriminallawblog.in/2020/02/06/delhi-police-circulars-standing-orders-for-regulating-protests/

5. A declaration, on the public address system and on record, that the assembly is unlawful, and a command to disperse from a Magistrate or authorised officer (Standing Order No. 309, item 13; Section 148 BNSS; Rule 14.56).

6. A warning, recorded, before any force (Standing Order No. 309, item 14; Circular No. 19/2012)[19].

7. The minimum force, with the least deadly means, a controlled cane charge only for dispersal, and nothing used on a retreating crowd (Rule 14.56; Standing Order No. 309, item 17).

8. Medical aid, with an announcement and stretchers (Standing Order No. 309, item 19; Basic Principles, Principle 5).

9. Records, evidence taken into possession, and an incident report up the chain (Rule 14.56; Standing Order No. 309, items 24 and 28).

[19] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

COMPOSITION OF SECURITY FORCES AND THE OFFICIAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCE

When a crowd gathers in Delhi, several forces may be called on to deal with it. They belong to different organisations, answer to different authorities and work under different rules. To know who is answerable for what happens to a crowd, it is necessary to know who commands these forces, how they come to be at a particular place, what orders come before they act, and who decides that force will be used. This Section describes that structure as the law and the instructions set it out. It does not apply it to any particular event. It has three parts: the chain of command and the decision to deploy force; the composition and authorisation of the forces deployed; and the administrative orders that come before an action.

A. Chain of Command and Decision to Deploy Force

1. The authority over policing in Delhi

Delhi is a Union Territory, and its police are not controlled by the elected Government of Delhi. Police and public order in the capital are matters for the Central Government. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) therefore stands at the head of the chain, and the Union Home Minister is the political authority answerable to Parliament for the police of the capital.

2. The Commissioner of Police

The Delhi Police are headed by the Commissioner of Police, an officer of the Indian Police Service. The Commissioner commands the whole force and is responsible for its operational orders. The Commissioner also issues the general instructions on how crowds are to be handled, in the form of Standing Orders and circulars (see Section IV, Part C).

3. The ranks below

Special Commissioners and Joint Commissioners of Police supervise the main branches and the ranges into which the city is divided. A Joint Commissioner in charge of a range is the senior officer for the districts in it.

Deputy Commissioners of Police (DCPs) command the districts. New Delhi District, which includes the area around Parliament and Jantar Mantar, is one of them. The DCP is the officer most closely responsible for the policing of a protest in the district, and Standing Order No. 309 places the duty of planning and carrying out the arrangements for a demonstration on the district.

Additional Deputy Commissioners assist the DCP

Assistant Commissioners of Police (ACPs) head the sub-divisions of a district. Each sub-division has several police stations. Station House Officers (SHOs), usually inspectors,

command a police station, and sub-inspectors, head constables and constables make up the rest of the force on the ground. Orders pass down this chain and reports pass up it. Standing Order No. 309 requires an incident report to go up to the Joint Commissioner, the Special Commissioner, the Government of the National Capital Territory and the MHA whenever a demonstration turns violent, force is used and people are injured.

4. Police officers who hold the powers of a Magistrate

In most of India, the powers that bear most on a crowd are held by Executive Magistrates, who are civil officers such as the District Magistrate and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. An Executive Magistrate may make a prohibitory order under section 163 of the BNSS, 2023, may command an assembly to disperse under section 148, and, under Rule 14.56 of the Punjab Police Rules,[20] decides in the first instance whether dispersal is to take place. The idea is that the decision to restrict or disperse a gathering is taken by a civil officer who is separate from the police officers who carry it out.

Section 70 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 allows the Central Government to give the powers of an Executive Magistrate to police officers, and the Central Government has done so by notification. Officers of the Delhi Police of certain ranks therefore hold powers that elsewhere belong to civil Magistrates. The effect is that in Delhi the same line of officers may decide that a gathering is to be prohibited, direct the policing of it, and command the crowd to disperse. A Commissioner who holds these powers is sometimes described as acting as a District Magistrate. The District Magistrate is a separate civil officer, and the Commissioner holds only the powers of an Executive Magistrate that the notification confers.

5. How the decision to use force is made

The rules do not allow force to be the first step. They describe a series of decisions, each taken by an identified person.

- The planning decision covers the barricades, the equipment, the staff and the videographers. It is taken by the DCP of the district under Standing Order No. 309.
- The decision to prohibit a gathering is taken by an Executive Magistrate, who in Delhi may be a police officer holding the powers.
- The decision to declare the assembly unlawful and to command it to disperse is taken by a Magistrate, or by the officer in charge of the police station or a sub-inspector, under section 148 of the BNSS.

[20] Punjab Police Rules, vol. 2 (1934). https://barnala.punjabpolice.gov.in/uploads/pdf-legal-corner/025-Punjab-Police-RulesVol.-II.pdf

The decision to use force follows

Rule 14.56 says that the degree of force is decided by the senior police officer present, and that a Magistrate who is present counts as the senior officer.

In practice, the officer who decides is the senior officer at the site, usually the DCP or the Joint Commissioner. The officers below him pass the decision on and carry it out. The Standing Orders require the announcements and warnings that come before force to be made on the public address system and videographed, so that the decision is recorded. Standing Order No. 309 also requires a record of the declaration, the warning, the care of the injured, and the evidence taken into possession, together with an incident report up the chain where force has been used and people are injured. These records show who decided what, and at what time.

6. Responsibility up the chain

The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms provide that superior officers are responsible if they knew, or should have known, that those under them were using force unlawfully and did not take all measures to prevent, stop or report it, and that obeying an order is no defence if the order was manifestly unlawful (Principles 24 and 26) (Section IV, Part A). Under the Indian statute, section 151 of the BNSS protects an officer who has acted in good faith, and a prosecution needs the sanction of the Government (see Section IV, Part B). Whether anyone is held to account therefore depends on being able to show who took each decision.

B. Composition and Authorisation of Forces Deployed

1. The Delhi Police

The Delhi Police are the force with the primary duty. They include the officers in the districts, the Special Cell, the traffic staff, the women police, and the Delhi Armed Police, whose battalions are trained and equipped for crowd control. Standing Order No. 309 describes how they are to be arranged at a demonstration: three layers of barricades, with staff in light equipment at the first two, and the fully equipped staff, with water cannon and tear gas, held back at the third.

2. The Central Armed Police Forces

The Central Government maintains a number of forces under the MHA that assist State and Union Territory police. They are the Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Sashastra Seema Bal, the Assam Rifles and the National Security Guard. They are not part of the Delhi Police. They are raised, trained, paid and administered by the Centre, and each has its own chain of command and its own rules.

3. The Central Reserve Police Force and the Rapid Action Force

The CRPF is the largest of the Central Armed Police Forces. It handles internal security, counter-insurgency and the policing of disorder. The Rapid Action Force (RAF) is a wing of the CRPF, made up of battalions that are specially trained and equipped for riot control and crowd management. The RAF is the force most often sent to a city in response to a disturbance. A "company" is a unit of about 100 personnel, and several companies make up a battalion.

4. The armed forces of the Union

The Army, Navy and Air Force are in a different class. The law allows them to be called on to disperse an assembly only when the civil force has failed and public security requires it, and then within the limits of sections 149 and 150 of the BNSS (see Section IV, Part B). They are not ordinarily used in this way.

5. How central forces come to be deployed in Delhi

The usual practice is that the police ask the MHA for additional forces when they judge that their own strength is not enough. The MHA examines the request, decides how many companies of which force are to be made available, for how long and from where, and issues an order. The order normally also provides for accommodation and transport, and the forces are moved to where they are needed, sometimes by air. Because the MHA is itself responsible for the police of the Union Territory, an order may also come from the MHA without a request from the police.

6. Who commands them once they arrive

A central force that has been sent to assist the police remains part of its own organisation and under its own officers. It is placed at the disposal of the authority that asked for it, and acts on that authority's directions on what is to be done, while its own officers decide how their personnel carry it out. The Delhi Police Standing Orders do not bind the CRPF or the RAF, which follow their own manuals and SOPs. This is a source of difficulty when several forces are on the same site, because the rules on equipment, warnings and the use of force may not be the same for all.

7. Whether a central force is "civil" or "armed"

Section 148 of the BNSS deals with dispersal by the civil force, and sections 149 and 150 deal with dispersal by the armed forces. The sections do not say which of these a central police force such as the RAF is. If it is a police force acting in aid of the civil power, the rules for the civil force apply. If it is an armed force of the Union, the more limited rules for the armed forces apply, with their requirement of "as little force as may be consistent" with dispersal.

C. Administrative Orders Preceding the Action

Before a force is placed at a site, the authorities usually issue orders that set the legal ground on which they will act. These are the prohibitory order, the decision on permission for a procession, and the notices to the public. The rules for each are set out below.

1. The prohibitory order

Section 163 of the BNSS allows a Magistrate to prohibit an act, or to forbid people to gather in a place, where there is sufficient ground and immediate prevention or a speedy remedy is desirable. The order must be in writing and must state the material facts. It may be made without hearing the people it affects (ex parte) where there is no time to serve notice. It can last for up to two months unless the State Government extends it, and a person affected may ask the Magistrate to change or cancel it. Breach of the order is an offence under section 223 of the BNS, 2023.

In Delhi, a police officer who holds Magistrate powers under the 2010 notification may make the order. Delhi Police Circular No. 19/2012[21] requires that the order be reasoned and justified, that the facts be considered and brought on record, and that it be issued only after the mind has been applied to the case. The Supreme Court has said that the power may be used only in grave circumstances where the emergency is sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave, and that it must rest on specific material facts (*Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re*[22]*; Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate*[23]). Three features of an order are therefore important: who made it and whether that person held the power, what area and what time it covers, and whether it states reasons.

2. The extent of the order

A prohibitory order may cover a district, a sub-division, a police station area or a single road, and it may exempt places. It is in force only in the area that it names. A statement by the police that an order is in force "in the district" is accurate only if the order, or a set of orders, in fact covers the district. The text of the order is the only reliable guide to its extent.

3. Publication

An order that restricts a right can bind people only if they can know of it. The usual means of publication are a notice in the area, an announcement, and press and social media notices. Standing Order No. 309 requires a banner at the site saying that an order under section 144

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[21] Delhi Police. (2012). *Circular No. 19 of 2012*. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IWxyOkLPg0yI3nj2NHioma0ylcAlh3r8/view

[23] AIR 1978 SC 47

CrPC (now section 163 BNSS) has been promulgated, so that the crowd is informed. The time between publication and the event is relevant to whether the people concerned could know of the order and obey it, and to whether they can be said to have shared a common object to disobey it.

4. Permission for a procession or protest

Under the Delhi Police Act, the Commissioner and officers of Inspector rank and above may give directions that control assemblies and processions, and fix their routes and times (sections 28(1)(p) and 29). Delhi Police Circular No. 56/2011[24] describes how a request is processed: the district reports to Police Headquarters, Police Headquarters recommends, and the MHA decides, and the reports are to reach Police Headquarters two or three days before the event. Permission is also tied to place. Jantar Mantar is the site set aside for protests in the capital, and the Supreme Court has held that the authorities may regulate protests to such sites but may not extinguish the right to protest. (*Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan*[25] and *Amit Sahni*[26])

5. Permission refused or withdrawn

The power to regulate is a power to say where, when and how, and not to forbid a peaceful assembly altogether. A refusal or withdrawal of permission is an administrative decision that restricts a fundamental right, so it has to meet the test that Article 19(3) sets for any restriction on the right to assemble, which is that it must be reasonable, with a legitimate aim, necessary for that aim, and no more restrictive than needed. It should be in writing, give reasons, and be communicated to the organisers in time for them to challenge it. An organiser who wishes to challenge it may go to the High Court under Article 226 or to the Supreme Court under Article 32.

6. Notices to the public

The police commonly issue a public advisory before an event, to tell people that no permission has been given, that an order is in force, and that those who disobey it may be prosecuted. An advisory is not an order. It does not make anything unlawful that the order itself does not make unlawful. It is evidence of what the police said they would do and of what the public was told.

7. Why the order matters to what follows

---

[24] Sekhri, A. (2020, February 6). Delhi Police circulars & standing orders for regulating protests. *The Criminal Law Blog*. https://thecriminallawblog.in/2020/02/06/delhi-police-circulars-standing-orders-for-regulating-protests/

[25] AIR 2018 SC 3476

[26] *Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police*, (2020) 10 SCC 439

The prohibitory order, and the refusal or absence of permission, are the legal basis on which a gathering is called unlawful. They do not decide whether the gathering was an "unlawful assembly" under sections 189 to 191 of the BNS, which depends on whether five or more people shared one of the five common objects in section 189(1). Nor do they decide how much force may be used. Both questions have to be answered separately.

D. Summary


The police of Delhi answer to the Central Government through the MHA and the Commissioner of Police, and below the Commissioner the force is organised by district and sub-division. Police officers of certain ranks hold the powers of an Executive Magistrate, so the same chain can prohibit a gathering, command it to disperse, and use force on it. Central Armed Police Forces such as the CRPF and its Rapid Action Force can be sent to Delhi on the order of the MHA. They remain under their own organisation and rules, which the Delhi Police Standing Orders do not cover, and the statute does not settle whether such a force acts as a civil force or as an armed force. Before any force is used, the authorities issue orders: a reasoned prohibitory order of stated extent, publication of it, and a decision on permission. The decision to use force is meant to be taken by a named senior officer after a sequence of steps, and the rules require records that show who took it.

Annexure III

MEDICO-LEGAL CERTIFICATES (MLC)

&

LIST OF PEOPLE WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL



UID no - 202607 52 862
IP no - M180012126222 56 FDA
सफदरजंग अस्पताल, नई दिल्ली-110029
SAFDARJUNG HOSPITAL, NEW DELHI-110029
विवरण-पत्र
CASE-SHEET
S.J.H.-11


संख्या No. | नाम Name [redacted] | पुरुष/स्त्री Sex M | जाति Caste | आयु Age 28 yrs
व्यवसाय Occupation | पता Address AK Puram, SD.
प्रवेश तिथि Date of admission 21/7/26 @ 9:16 PM
वर्ष Year | उन्मोचन तिथि Date of discharge
रोग Disease A/H/o physical assault | आहार DIET self
दिनांक Date | परिणाम Result

History given by (8448827921)

C/S/B CD.O.D) fMT

22/7/26
- Patient presented to ER-3 c A/H/o physical assault on 21/7/26 @ around 4PM during Jantar Mantar protest.
- As per informant, the patient went to attend the protest during which the circumstances changed & situation escalated resulting in panic, to get the situation under control tear gas & pellets were used.
- No H/o LOC, vomiting, Dizziness, ENT bleed, SOB.
- The patient was brought to SJH hospital for medical management.

O/E - The patient is concious, oriented to time, place & perso



Treatment/Operation notes

Condition on discharge

Advice on Discharge & Follow up visits

Advice

Dr Love Gupta
Dept. of Cardiac Surgery
AIIMS and Dr. RML Hospital
New Delhi - 110001


Sign & Stamp of Head of unit

ILH/GF/FM/07, VER-01, W.E.F.-01 04 2024,REV-00

Page 2 of 2

who deliver unmatched patient care.

Medico-legal certificate of Nisha (name changed)



FDA

सफदरजंग अस्पताल, नई दिल्ली-110029
SAFDARJUNG HOSPITAL, NEW DELHI-110029
विवरण-पत्र
CASE-SHEET

सं॰ज॰अ॰-11
S.J.H.-11


संख्या No. | नाम Name | पुरुष/स्त्री Sex | जाति Caste | आयु Age
व्यवसाय Occupation | पता Address
प्रवेश तिथि Date of admission
वर्ष Year | उन्मोचन तिथि Date of discharge | आहार DIET
रोग Disease
दिनांक Date | परिणाम Result

c/o lb & R ↓54.

A/H/O physical assault at Jantar mantar by pellete gun.
sustained injury over ®arm and chest tback.
xray - multiple foreign bodies in subcut planes.

Adv - Discharge.
tab PCM 650mg P/O SOS.
Review in surgery OPD.

Dr MONA AGGARWAL
MBBS, MS (AIIMS)
Senior Resident
Department of General Surgery
VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital
New Delhi-110029



UID no - 202607522862
IC no - H1800121262256

FDA

सफदरजंग अस्पताल, नई दिल्ली-110029
SAFDARJUNG HOSPITAL, NEW DELHI-110029
विवरण-पत्र
CASE-SHEET


सं॰ज॰अ॰-11
S.J.H.-11

संख्या No. | नाम Name [redacted] | पुरुष/स्त्री Sex M | जाति Caste | आयु Age 28 yrs
व्यवसाय Occupation | पता Address RK Puram, SD.
प्रवेश तिथि Date of admission 21/7/26 @ 9:16 PM
वर्ष Year | उन्मोचन तिथि Date of discharge | आहार DIET History given by self (8448827921)
रोग Disease A/H/O physical assault
दिनांक Date | परिणाम Result


C/S/B CD-O-D) FMT

21/7/26
- Patient presented to ER-3 ⇄ A/H/O physical assault on 21/7/26 @ around 4PM during Jantar Mantar protest.
- As per informant, the patient went to attend the protest during which the circumstances changed & situation escalated resulting in panic, to get the situation under control tear gas & pellets were used.
- No H/O LOC, vomiting, Dizziness, ENT bleed, SOB.
- The patient was brought to SJH hospital for medical management.

O/E - The patient is concious, oriented to time, place & perso



UHID no - 202607 52862
mole on Rt side of Neck.
< old scar mark on chest
make Hrs MLC.
NOTED
Dr. CHALLAANEEDH
PG Resident
Department of General
VMMC & SJH
MLC
SCANNED
विभाग/Deptt ..... एकक/UNIT .....
नाम/Name [redacted]
पिता/पुत्र/पत्नी/पति/पुत्री E/S/W/H/D of
लिंग/Sex M
आयु/Age 26 Yrs
निदान/Diagnosis MLC - MLC01212622256 @ 10:54 Pm on 21/07/26
तारीख Date
उपचार/Treatment
AP 117/86
P 67/m
3pm o sig. cm
A/H/o physical assault at Jantar Mantar at 4pm on 2017/26 as informed by the pt himself.
h/o pain over injury sites.
NO h/o LOC / fittus / vomiting / BOV.
NO h/o any ENT bleed
NO h/o abd pain / distress
no h/o chest pain / dyspnea.
- The patient was brought to SJH hospita




UHID no - 202607 52862
MLC no - MLC01212622256 EDA
सफदरजंग अस्पताल, नई दिल्ली-110029
SAFDARJUNG HOSPITAL, NEW DELHI-110029
S.J.H.-11
विवरण-पत्र
CASE-SHEET
संख्या No.
नाम Name [redacted] पुरुष/स्त्री Sex M जाति Caste आयु Age 28 yrs
व्यवसाय Occupation पता Address RK Puram, SD.
प्रवेश तिथि Date of admission 21/7/26 @ 9:16 PM
वर्ष Year उन्मोचन तिथि Date of discharge
रोग Disease A/H/o physical assault
दिनांक Date परिणाम Result
History given by self (8448827921)
आहार DIET
C/S/B CD.O.D) fMT
22/7/26
- Patient presented to ER-3 c A/H/o physical assault on 21/7/26 @ around 4PM during Jantar Mantar protest.
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O/E - The patient is concious, oriented to time, place & perso


O/E:- Conscious, oriented.

BP - 117/86
PR - 67/min
SpO2 - 99% RA

No active bleed.
Localising.


L/G:-





Soft tissue swelling + erythema.

Ref to for evaluation & management



Ref to for FMT opinion

CVS
CNS
RS
} WNL.

Advice:-

→ x-ray D/L
U/L → USG local site for
→ C+R PA view.
→ USG thigh -
→ R/W c renally.
→ 9:15 pm Inj. { Pantop 40mg, Inset 4mg, Diclo 75mg, P cm. 1gm } stat

---

CNS - Eq Vs Mc


X-ray - No bony lesion seen on X-ray clinically

Adv - STI of pellet wound over (M) Elbow region & (R) back.
(Out ward)

Advice:
- Wax dress, pregnant, Advice explained
- Lib diet & Active physiotherapy
- T. Dicla 50mg BD
- T. Ca 500mg OD
- T. Pcm 1gm SOS
- T. Cyclopf 500 } x 7 days
- Mouth wash.
- Refer to G. Surgery, Medicine, Forensic Medicine ? Indication
- F/c in ortho opd in unit 4 - Dr. Mc Sosidhar

Dr. Manish Kumar
PG Resident
MS(Orthopaedics)
Central Institute of Orthopaedics
Central Institute of Orthopaedics, Delhi-110029

Dr. Mridul BASRA
Senior Resident
MBBS, MS (Orthopaedics)
Central Institute of Orthopaedics
VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital
New Delhi - 110029



B.P - 118/80 mm Hg
H.R - 87 bpm
RR - 21/min
SpO_2 - 99% on R.A


CNS - $E_4 V_5 M_6$
CVS - $S_1 S_2$ (+)
R.S - B/L AE (+)
P.A - Soft -

L/E - Multiple (>10 in number), small, uniform, circular to oval, punched-out skin defects of varying 2-4 mm in diameter present on (R) elbow & back of (R) arm, with its uppermost defect situated 5 cm below (R) shoulder tip & along its long axis. The defects cover an area of 32 cm x 12 cm with inverted margins & circumferential abrasion collars surrounding the individual perforations with patchy bluish coloured contusions surrounding the perforations suggestive of pellet entrance wounds.

- Multiple (>9 in number), small, circular to oval, punched out skin defects of varying 2-4 mm in diameter present on (R) flank, with its lowermost perforation situated 1 cm above (R) ASIS & 36 cm outer to midline. The defects cover an area of 39 cm x 17 cm with inverted margins & circumferential abrasion collars, patchy bluish coloured ~~discoloration~~ contusions surrounding the individual perforations with few lower lesions present slit-like or elongated morphology consistent with pellets striking curved area of flank at an oblique angle.

Adv:-
- Monitor vitals - Treat as per protocol
- No active f/t intervention needed





Medico-legal Certificate of Vishal (name changed)

List of people who testified before the tribunal (identity of some testifiers have been kept anonymous, as per the request of the person)

Name	Mode of participation	Designation
Witness 1 (Medical professional on the ground	Online	Doctor
Witness 2	Online	Student
Witness 3	In-person	Student
Prerna	Online	Student
Witness 4	Online	Student
Witness 3	Online	Student
Md Ali	In-person	Student
Abdul Rahman	Online	Student
Witness 3	In-person	Advocate DHC
Witness 4	In-person	Advocate DHC
Witness 5	In-person	Advocate DHC
Witness 6	In-person	Student
Witness 7	In-person	Student
Witness 8	In-person	Outlook Journalist
Harsh Yadav	In-person	Youtuber
Witness 9	In-person	Artist
Sanjiv Krishna Sood	In-person	Former ADG BSF
H.R. Singh	In-person	Former ADG CRPF
Tanushree	In-person	Investigative journalist
Varrun Sukhraj	In-person	Filmaker and activist
Ameen (AISA)	In-person	Student leader
Utkarsh Singh	In-person	YouTuber
Witness 10	In-person	Student
Ramit Verma	In-person	Youtuber
Muskan Sharma	Online	Corporate professional
Saurav Das	In-person	Student leader
Aneesh Gawande	In-person	Student leader
Shrishti Jaiswal	Online	Journalist
Kaushik Raj	Online	Journalist
Avdhesh kumar	In-person	Newslaundry
Sunny Tomar	In-person	Advocate
Bewesh	In-person	Youtuber
Ankita Mahalanobish	Online	Alt news

Mandeep Punia	Online	Journalist
Suroor Mander	In-person	Advocate
Chandra Uday Singh	Online	Expert
Devika Prasad	In-person	Expert
Maja Daruwala	In-person	Expert

Annexure IV

CIRCULARS, STANDING ORDERS ANS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

STANDING ORDER NO. Tec. & PI/06/2022

CCTV SYSTEM IN MARKETS, BORDER CHECK POSTS, CRIME PRONE AREAS FOR SURVEILLANCE IN DELHI

1. INTRODUCTION

Delhi Police started an ambitious project of installation of CCTVs in major markets, border check posts & vulnerable/ crime prone spots, for surveillance to prevent crime & criminal activities in Delhi. These CCTV systems are/shall be designed to keep surveillance over particular areas/markets from the monitoring room as well as by the SHO directly from Monitoring control station. These systems have features like recording facility of 15 days, retrieval of recorded data date & time wise, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) System, PA system for making announcement from the Monitoring Control Station to the market area and proved to be very useful/handy tool for prevention/ detection of crime and security of the area. As on date, CCTV system has been installed and functional in some of the markets and border check posts. Delhi Police has planned to extend this project to cover other markets/border check posts and vulnerable places in Delhi. The installation of CCTV Systems involves heavy expenditure from the State and therefore, the work of assessment of location of CCTVs, type of CCTVs (PTZ/Fixed/ANPR) at any particular location, its direction and orientation cannot be left to the lower formations. With the availability of two Addl.DCsP in each District, it is, therefore, necessary that this work of CCTV installation in each District should be personally supervised under overall supervision of DCP of the district.

2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The AIM of the CCTV system is to enhance the safety and inculcate sense of security among the people. As a tool for security, CCTV System can meet the objectives of theft reduction, asset protection, security, crime investigations, providing evidence and creating a safe environment. This could be handy tool, deterrent in reducing the Crime and criminal activities.

3. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF POLICE OFFICERS:

The following instructions are hereby issued for meticulous compliance by Jt.CsP/Ranges, Addl. CsP/DCsP, Addl. DCsP, of the district ACsP/Sub Divisions and SHOs of the Police Station, to ensure that the CCTV system requirement is correctly assessed, the selected CCTV vendors execute the Projects in most professional manner to build a useful system which meets our requirement.

3.1 DURING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION:

3.1.1 TECHNICAL COMMITTEE/SUB-TECHNICAL COMMITTEE'S

i) Technical committee would be coordinator for inspection/ acceptance & requirement of CCTV System for use in Delhi Police. The specifications for CCTV systems shall be finalized by the Technical Committee.

ii) Sub-Technical committee would access the requirement; carry out inspection/acceptance of CCTV System being installed in respective ranges.

iii) CCTV requirement & layout plan would be prepared by the District DCsP as per area specific requirement depending on crime pattern & type prevalent in proposed area & sensitivity of the area.

3.1.2 DCP P&L:

i) Purchase of CCTV System would be done as per G.F.R and standing order 229.

ii) To prepare and tabulate in detail the specification of infrastructural works to be carried out by CCTV vendors so that the SHO/ACP Sub-Division and designated Addl.DCP District know what they have to check and monitor and thus ensure strict compliance aspects such as height of pole, qualities of cable, depth at which pole is to be embedded in ground etc. etc.

ii) A list of names, addresses and contact numbers of all officers contacted with the installation part and maintenance part who will rectify which fault and the duration in which a particular fault is supposed to be rectified.

3.1.3 Jt. CP/RANGES:

i) Review the initial CCTV layout plan prepared by the District thereby ensuring that the proposed area is adequately covered and CCTVs have been deployed in consonance with the established norms of area policing.

ii) Hold a monthly meeting with district police officers & CCTV vendors to monitor the project and issue instructions to ensure that the project is completed in given time schedule.

iii) Designate an Addl. DCP by name in each District to supervise the implementation of the Projects.

iv) Careful selection of markets/borders/vulnerable places and check points for initiation of the scheme.

3.1.4 DISTRICT DCsP:

i) Personally check and vet each aspect of project including location of Cameras, their field of vision, directions/angle, cabling, location of LCS/MCS, etc. and approve it.

ii) Hold a fortnightly meeting with district police officers & CCTV vendors to monitor the project and issue instructions to ensure that the project is completed in given time schedule.

iii) Ensure appropriate liaison with the Market Associations, land owning agencies so that operational bottlenecks are resolved quickly.

iv) Visit CCTV monitoring control room and oversee the progress of implementation of the system.

v) Planning, installation of CCTV Cameras at strategic locations by the RWA's, MWA's and PPP mode.

vi) Guide RWA's, MWA's and under PPP mode to install IP based systems to facilitate integration with the existing and proposed CCTV system of Delhi Police.

3.1.5 DISTRICT ADDITIONAL DCsP:

i) The designated Addl. DCP would be assisted by the team of concerned ACP Sub Division and SHO of the area, to plan and implement the project.

ii) The designated Addl. DCP of the District shall visit the market/border check post/vulnerable places, where the installation of CCTVs is proposed, along with the officers of CCTV vendors, and his own team to study its layout plan, prepare the sketch of entire market/border check posts showing its entry-exit, lanes/roads, shopping area and important/sensitive locations like shops/offices like banks, ATM booths, cinema halls, popular restaurants, parking area etc.

iii) Requirement of illumination in the markets/dark spots should also be examined. Wherever the illumination is not sufficient, an endeavour should be made to get more lights installed through the local stake holders. The location of the cameras viz a viz our requirements should be worked out accordingly.

iv) Based on the actual spatial incident report of the Police Station and probable vulnerable areas, decide upon the areas/ locations that require electronic surveillance.

v) Select the best possible location of each camera so as to provide adequate coverage of the designated area.

vi) Depending upon the field of view at each location, select a PTZ, or a Fixed camera, to be deployed.

vii) On the basis of capability of each type of camera and available illumination, work out the exact placement of the camera, direction and angle of view, height of the mount etc.

viii) Ensure that the cameras at the Entries, Exits, outside Banks etc. are positioned and placed in such a manner that the images so generated allow facial recognition. ANPR cameras may be planned at entry/Exit to capture the number plate of the vehicle.

ix) The number, layout, position, orientation and type of camera should be selected in such a manner that a minimum number of PTZ and Fixed cameras cover most of the areas.

x) The actual location of cameras with height and direction along with distance between each of them should be plotted on to the scale sketch, to avoid any confusion at later stage.

xi) The plan for laying cables along with its depth, should be got prepared with the help of CCTV vendors. The fixtures should be so designed that they are theft proof/water proof/tamper proof.

xii) The Control/Monitoring room should be located at Police Station concerned. No structure in the form of cabin or hut or small room permanent or temporary should be allowed to be constructed or fabricated in the market area/near border check post in public area to put up server or switchboard etc. (Local Control Station). At locations where spot placements of hardware is essentially required, efforts should be made to obtain a secure and legally sanctioned space (purchase/lease/rent/allotted by Govt. etc. etc.) through the Market Association and/or Land Owning Agencies, which will not require round the clock guarding with a proper electricity meter sanctioned, tax etc if payable. We need to totally avoid construction of any local control station which may require deployment of staff for watch and ward purpose.

xiii) Prepare a joint survey report along with officers of CCTV vendors, ACP/SHO/ Inspector Law &Order/Inspector investigation concerned, alongwith a scaled sketch showing the entire layout plan of the system including cameras, cables, location of switches, UPS and other associated hardware, duly signed by all concerned.

xiv) Monitor the installation as per joint survey report & terms of contract.

3.1.6 ACsP SUB DIVISION:

i) He would be assisted by the SHO of the concerned Police Station who would be directly responsible for the Project.

ii) He would provide all possible assistance to the designated Addl. DCP and carry out all such tasks so assigned, which are deemed to be required for the successful planning and implementation of the Project.

iii) He should conduct a detailed vulnerability study of the designed area, study the crime pattern in consultation with the staff of the Police Station and provide assistance to the designated Addl. DCP in deciding the areas/locations that require electronic surveillance.

iv) He should make himself fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of the system at the planning and implementation stage itself so that an optimum use can be made of the same.

v) He should take a daily report from the SHO about the progress in the installation of the Project.

vi) He shall ensure that there are no obstructions/delays on the part of police in the assessment, service and installation of the project. In case of any such problem, he should bring it to the notice of designated Addl.DCP of the District immediately in writing.

vii) He should monitor the implementation of project by the agency and in case, CCTV vendors is not carrying out the work as per the time schedule or agreed upon specifications and standard, he shall intimate it to the designated Addl. DCP of the District immediately. He should follow it up with CCTV vendors. In case there is no progress, he should send a weekly report to Addl.DCP till work is restored or becomes smooth.

viii) He would hold weekly meetings with the concerned land owning agencies, market associations and other stake holders to remove bottlenecks during implementation.

ix) He will personally visit the markets/border check posts where CCTVs are being installed and verify, whether the work is being carried out as per the plan/joint survey report/terms & conditions of the contract.

3.1.7 SHOs OF THE POLICE STATION:

i) He would provide all possible assistance to the ACP Sub Division and carry out all such tasks so assigned, which are deemed to be required for the successful planning and implementation of the Project.

ii) SHO shall actively participate in joint survey of areas, the requirement of CCTV in the market/border check posts and be fully aware of the entire project.

iii) SHO should remain in touch with CCTV vendor's officers responsible for the installation of CCTV in his area to monitor and ensure that all the work is being done strictly as per the decision taken in joint survey and terms & conditions of the contract.

iv) Extend the helping hand to CCTV vendors for obtaining permissions from the competent authority for road cutting etc., though vendor will apply for the same and meet the expenditure on this work.

v) Deploy staff in the area for the safe keeping of the equipments during the laying/fixing stage.

vi) Provide one appropriate size room for development as the CCTV monitoring room and suitable place for keeping the UPS Batteries/ Generator in the Police Station.

vii) Extend help CCTV vendors to get location/space for LCS as per policy finalized by PHQ.

3.2 POST IMPLEMENTATION:

3.2.1 JT. CP/RANGES:

i) Essentially visit CCTV monitor room and examine its functioning, during P.S. visits and make an entry in Register No.13 in this regard and in case of defects, ensure sorting out/rectification.

ii) Discuss the camera availability report of each location during the fortnightly crime review meetings and review the corrective measures taken for ensuring 100% availability.

iii) Monitor the performance of CCTVs system in the entire range to see that complaints are attended to by CCTV vendors promptly. In case complaints are not attended by CCTV vendors promptly, take up matter with Special CP/P&L for further necessary action as per terms and conditions of the contract.

iv) Obtain report from district DCsP about detection etc made by the local police using the CCTVs system.

v) Designate a Committee comprising of an Addl. DCP/ACP(HQ)/ ACP(Sub-Division) and SHO concerned for overseeing maintenance work for each location.

3.2.2 District DCsP:

i) Ensure that CCTV system is put to its best use, to detect different types of crime taking place in that particular area.

ii) Ensure that complaints are attended to by CCTV vendors promptly. In case it is not so, take up with DCP/P&L in writing, through Jt.C.P/Range so that punitive clauses of contract are invoked.

iii) Visit CCTV monitor room and see its functioning, on regular basis.

iv) He should fully acquaint himself with the Terms and Conditions of the Contract and be clear about the responsibilities of CCTV vendors towards maintenance, the penalty clauses and the responsibilities of Delhi Police.

v) He would make weekly Maintenance Report for each location from the concerned ACP with the time taken for each repair/rectification clearly indicated.

3.2.3 DISTRICT ADDITIONAL DCsP:

i) He would prepare a Project Finalisation report alogwith the officers of CCTV vendors, ACP/HQ, concerned ACP and SHO. It has to be ensured that all materials, equipments listed in the BOQ are physically available and accounted for. The laid cable also has to be actually measured along the laying route and documented.

ii) He would Head the Maintenance Committee and would be assisted by ACP(HQ)/ACP(Sub-Division)/SHO concerned.

iii) He would take a weekly Maintenance Report for each location from the concerned ACP with the time taken for each repair/rectification clearly indicated.

iv) He should fully acquaint himself with the terms of the Contract and be clear about the responsibilities of CCTV vendors towards maintenance, the penalty clauses and the responsibilities of Delhi Police.

v) All maintenance/replacement/repair issues not attributed to CCTV vendors should be examined by the concerned Maintenance Committee under the Chairmanship of Addl. DCP and proposals be moved as per approved financial norms for rectification.

3.2.4 SUB DIVISION ACsP:

i) He would be assisted by the SHO of the concerned Police Station who would be directly responsible for the Project.

ii) He should ensure that CCTV system is being used by Police Station to its best capacity and utility.

iii) He would provide all possible assistance to the designated Addl. DCP and carry out all such tasks so assigned, which are deemed to be required for the successful functioning of the Project.

iv) He should take a daily feed back about the camera functioning from the SHO.

v) He should ensure that prompt and adequate steps have been taken for rectification of problems and defects in the project.

vi) He should examine the monitoring room during visits to the Police Station and work out methods to make the system more efficient in consultation with the Police Staff and operators.

vii) He should check log book of the monitoring room at least once a week to ensure that the system is functioning to his satisfaction and that complaints are being lodged as and when system malfunctions and rectified promptly. A weekly maintenance report indicating the camera functioning and time taken for each repair/rectification would be compiled and sent to the designated Addl. DCP.

viii) In case complaints are not being rectified by the CCTV vendors, as per terms & conditions of the contract, he should make an entry in the log book to that effect and should send a report to the designated Addl. DCP so that punitive action can be taken against CCTV vendors as per the terms & conditions of the contract.

ix) In case the topology of the area is altered due to changes made by land owning agencies etc. appropriate plans for relocation, re-orientation of the cameras should be worked out in consultation with the officers of CCTV vendors and SHO concerned.

3.2.5 <u>SHOs:</u>

i) Maintain operational performance of CCTV system round the clock.
   a) Only the authorized person would be allowed in CCTV monitoring Room.
   b) Layout of the CCTV equipment and locations of CCTV cameras would be available at CCTV monitoring room.
   c) SHO and Operators would be trained by the CCTV vendor about the basic functional and operating knowledge of CCTV surveillance equipment installed alongwith Capability and limitations.
   d) Ensure safety precautions and correct handling of equipments.
   e) Ensure to carry out basic operational checks / inspection to confirm that the equipment is in operational use.
   f) Respond to signals/ alarms from equipment and accordingly report the CCTV vendor.
   g) To maintain records and media pertaining to operations, retrieve recorded media from archives as per procedure.
   h) Share the recorded media with authorized person (s) on instructions from senior officers and maintain documentation pertaining to events and recorded media.

ii) SHO shall examine the health of the system on the daily basis and make an entry in the log book and the daily diary register accordingly. The orientation i.e. Focus, angle view etc. of each camera should be checked and got corrected on a daily basis, if necessary.

iii) He would provide all possible assistance to the sub division ACP and carry out all such tasks so assigned, which are deemed for the successful functioning of the Project.

iv) He should ensure that the tiles on the LED/LCD screens are arranged in such a way that it is easy to trace any person entry, exiting the monitored area actively participate in joint survey of areas, the requirement of CCTV in the market/border check posts and be fully aware of the entire project.

v) He would ensure that proper communication between operators in the monitoring room and the beat staff is maintained at all times.

vi) Ensure that the area staff are fully acquainted with the physical location and layout of the deployed equipments and that they regularly check the same so as to prevent theft, damage etc.

vii) SHO should remain in touch with CCTV vendors officers responsible for the maintenance of the System and ensure that all maintenance work are done timely and strictly as per the terms & conditions of the contract.

viii) Extend a helping hand to CCTV vendors for obtaining permissions from the competent authority for road cutting etc., for the repair work etc.

ix) Liaise closely with the land owning agencies, other stake holders so that the cables and other equipment do not get damaged during digging, repairs etc.

x) Deploy a set of officers to man the monitoring room round the clock. They should be given training from time to time with the help of CCTV vendors.

xi) Maintain a log book in the monitoring room for recording daily report of the functioning of the system.

xii) As soon as the system shows any malfunction or if any camera breaks down or pictures are not clear, shaking/poor quality, it should be recorded in the log book with details of problem, date & time etc. and a complaint to this effect be lodged with CCTV vendors.

xiii) He should be aware of the name, contact number of the concerned CCTV vendors representative responsible for maintenance of CCTV for each market and border check posts. In case of any fault, SHO should inform the designated officer immediately and record the same in the log book. Time of complaint and time when the same was rectified should be entered in the log book.

xiv) In case there is no problem, such an entry should be recorded in Log Book and daily diary register at 8 AM and 8 PM every day and in case the SHO is not available in the PS then by the Inspector/L&O.

xv) SHO through ACP will send a fortnightly report on 1st & 16th of every month to District DCP about the CCTV system, number of complaints lodged, number of rectifications made, delays in

rectification, detections if any, and specific incidents when CCTV system was made use of.

xvi) SHO shall ensure that the deployed CCTV system is integrated into the area policing of the Police Station and that all staff and operators are fully aware about the capabilities of the system.

xvii) Inform Crime – Prevention/detection cases facilitated by CCTV separately and keep a proper record thereof.

xviii) A daily report about defects and maintenance status of CCTV system should be sent to C4i online every day by 11 A.M.

3.2.6 DIVISION OFFICER:

i) He would be assisted by the Beat officer of the concerned beat to ensure safety and functioning of CCTV system in his area of jurisdiction.

ii) Ensure appropriate liaison with the Market Associations, for illumination of dark spots.

iii) He would report to SHO any theft/damage to CCTV system functioning in his jurisdiction.

iv) He will physically check the status of all equipments of CCTV system in his jurisdiction on daily basis.

3.2.7 BEAT OFFICER:

i) He shall be fully acquainted with the physical location and layout of the deployed equipment's and regularly check the same so as to prevent theft, damage etc.

ii) He would ensure proper illumination of all dark spots in his area of jurisdiction.

iii) He would ensure that the cameras field of view is clear and no obstacle/banner/hording is placed in the field of view.

iv) He would ensure trimming/pruning of trees by the concerned agencies for proper field of view.

It should be an endeavour of all officer's/men of the range/district/Police Station to ensure that the CCTV system installed in the Market/Border check post and other places is always functional and put to best use.

4. Instructions at 3.1.5(xii) in particular need attention officers of all ranks since there have been problem in this regard. We need to totally avoid construction of any local control stations which may require deployment of staff for watch and ward purposes.

All concerned to ensure meticulous compliance of instructions.

5. SUPERSESSION CLAUSE

This Standing Order supersedes the previous Standing Order No.397/2010 issued vide No.15701-850/Record Branch/ PHQ dated 04.11.2010.

6. DISCLAIMER

It is made clear that this Standing Order is exclusively for internal smooth functioning of Police Department.

Rakesh Asthana

(RAKESH ASTHANA)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE:
DELHI.

02.06.2022

No. 39751-39900/Record Branch/PHQ dated Delhi, the 2/6/22.

Copy forwarded to:-

1. All Special Commissioners of Police, Delhi.
2. All Joint Commissioners of Police, Delhi including Jt. Director, Delhi Police Academy, Delhi/New Delhi.
3. All Additional Commissioners of Police, Delhi.
4. OSD to C.P., Delhi.
5. All Deputy Commissioners of Police, Districts/Units including PHQ, C.P. Sectt., FRRO and Deputy Director/Delhi Police Academy, Delhi/New Delhi.
6. DCP/HQ(IV)/PHQ with the direction to upload the Standing Order on Intra-DP.
7. LA to CP and FA to C.P., Delhi.
8. All ACsP/Insprs./PHQ.
9. PS/Reader to C.P., Delhi.
10. HAR/PHQ.
11. Librarian/PHQ.

No. 19 /2012

CIRCULAR

In view of the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of SUO MOTO W.P.(Crl.) No. 122 of 2011, Ram Lila Maidan incident dated 4/5.06.2011 Versus Home Secretary, Union of India & Others, the following directions are issued: -

1. Whenever an officer/Executive Magistrate/Police Officer of the rank of ACP or above issues an order u/s 144 Cr.PC, it should be well reasoned and justified. It must be ensured that all the facts have been considered and brought on record, so that it is a speaking order. The order must be issued only after proper application of mind and considering all the facts and circumstances of the case placed before the officer concerned.

2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the order *"Section 144 Cr.PC deals with immediate prevention and speedy remedy. Therefore, before invoking such a provision, the statutory authority must be satisfied regarding the existence of the circumstances showing the necessity of an immediate action. The sine qua non for an order under Section 144 Cr.PC is urgency requiring an immediate and speedy intervention by passing of an order. The order must set out the material facts of the situation. Such a provision can be used only in grave circumstances for maintenance of public peace. The efficacy of the provision is to prevent some harmful occurrence immediately. Therefore, the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave".*

3. Whenever any arrangement is issued for maintenance of law & order in connection with big assemblies/gathering, it must be ensured that a proper dispersal plan is also envisaged in the arrangement order, to ensure orderly, peaceful and smooth dispersal of the crowd from the place of assembly. In the written undertaking submitted by the Organizers to the local police/DCP/Addl. CP of the District concerned, it must also be taken in writing that **"The organizer(s) will cooperate in carrying out the lawful orders passed by any competent Court/Authority/Forum at any stage of the commencement of an agitation/dharna/procession and/or period during which the permission granted is enforced, whenever the police officers direct the organizers/participants to leave the premises, it will be the responsibility of organizers along with the participants to leave the premises without delay and without making and protest. They must leave the premises peacefully in shortest possible time".**

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY DELHI POLICE (RTI ACT)

4. Proper drill should be followed for dispersal of crowd. Use of any kind of force for dispersing a crowd should be **preceded** by proper warnings such as announcements from a Public Address System or Loud Hailers, proper display of Banners etc. declaring the assembly unlawful and directing the crowd to disperse. Sensitization of staff at all levels should be ensured by the Supervisory staff through repeated briefings, training, roll calls etc. The S.O. No. 72/2009 must be strictly adhered to by all field officers.

In various law and order arrangements, it has been observed that the police party comes under attack by brick batting, pelting of stones by the protestors. Subsequently, police personnel too resort to brick batting, which totally illegal, not desirable and unwarranted. Under no circumstances shall the police personnel resort to brick batting/stone pelting etc. In such situations, the police party must strategically retreat to safer locations, re-organize, call for reinforcements, make new strategies and then advance in a systematic manner to control the unruly crowd/protestors with minimum use of force.

6. All procedural requirements for implementing the orders under Section 144 Cr.PC should be complied with by the police officials on duty before dispersal of unlawful assembly.

16/3/12

(B. K. GUPTA)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE:
DELHI

No. 1891-1900 /Record Branch/PHQ dated Delhi, the 16/03/2012

Copy to: -

1. All Special Commissioners of Police, Delhi/New Delhi.
2. All Joint Commissioners of Police, Delhi/New Delhi.
3. All Addl. Commissioners of Police, Delhi/New Delhi.
4. All Dy. Commissioners of Police, Districts/Units, Delhi/New Delhi.
5. SO to Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
6. LA to Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
7. All ACsP/PHQ.
8. All SHOs in Delhi/New Delhi.
9. Reader to Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
10. I/C Central Library, PHQ, Delhi with 5 spare copies.
11. HAR/PHQ with 10 spare copies.
12. Guard File.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PHQ

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: DELHI.

CIRCULAR

CIRCULAR NO. 20 /2012

Detailed instructions have been issued by PHQ for the grant of permission for taking out processions/rally/Dharna/Demonstration etc. within the jurisdiction of Delhi. The guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.77 of 2007 read with Writ Petition (Criminal) No.73 of 2007 and Delhi High Court Judgement in W.P. (C) No.2208/96 Chandni Chowk Sarav Vyapar Mandal Vs LG & Ors were incorporated in Circular No.35 issued vide No.3573-3672/Record Branch/PHQ dated 22.06.2011. Similarly, written Undertaking is taken from the organizers of the Rally/Dharna that they would abide by the terms and conditions and maintain peace. The format of the Undertaking was circulated vide No.119-37/SO/Spl. CP/L&O dated 30.06.2011.

2. Now the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in W.P. (C) NO.122/2011 while taking suo-moto action into Ramlila incident of dated 4/5th June 2011 has issued certain directions which have already been circulated to all Spl. CsP, Jt.CsP/Ranges, Addl.CsP, Distt. DCsP vide Circular No.19/12 issued vide No.1801-1900/Record Branch/PHQ dated 16.03.2012.

3. In view of the latest Judgement of the Apex Court in W.P. (C) No.122/11, the Undertaking to be submitted by the organizer for holding rally/dharna/processions etc. has been re-drafted and is enclosed herewith. The Undertaking must be taken on the new format under the proper signature of the concerned officer of the organization.

(MANGESH KASHYAP)
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
HEADQUARTERS, DELHI.

No. 1901-2000 /HAR/PHQ dated Delhi, the 28/3/2012

Copy forwarded for information & necessary action to the :-

1. All Spl. CsP./New Delhi.
2. All Jt.CsP/Delhi/New Delhi.
3. All Addl.CsP/Delhi/New Delhi including Principal/PTC.
4. DCsP all Distt./Unit including FRRO Delhi/New Delhi.
5. SO to C.P./Delhi.
6. L.A. & F.A to C.P./Delhi.
7. All ACsP/PHQ including I.T Centre
8. Reader to CP/Delhi.
9. Inspr. Court Cell/PHQ.
10. Central Library/PHQ with 05 spare copies.

DOCUMENTS INCLUDED BY PHQ

UNDERTAKING BY THE ORGANIZER

Date _____
Venue of Procession/rally/dharna/demonstration_____
Time w.e.f. _____**Hours to** _____**Hours**
No. of Participants _____
No. of Volunteers_____
Route of Procession from_____**to**_____

I, _____ (Name & designation of the Organizer) of the _____ (Name of the Organisation) do hereby undertake that our organization shall abide by the following terms & conditions based on the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.77 of 2007 read with WP (Criminal) No.73 of 2007 in the matter of "Destruction of Public and Private Properties vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.", the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) No.2208/1996, Chandni Chowk Sarv Vyapar Mandal Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. and the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Writ Petition (Cri) No.122 of 2011 Vs Home Secretary, Union of India & Others for conducting the above programme:-

1. "No Objection Certificate" from the land owning authority with regard to holding rally/meeting etc. is enclosed.
2. I shall carry the permission granted in original to be shown to any police officer on duty on demand.
3. I shall depute a responsible person with whom the police can liaise. _____ (Name , designation and telephone number of the liaison person deputed by the organizer).
4. I shall make adequate arrangements for drinking water (by providing tankers) and First Aid/Medical Aid in consultation with the civic/local bodies at the site and also during the procession.
5. I & the other organizers shall ensure that the procession will proceed in an orderly manner along the sanctioned route keeping to the left and will not halt on the way or cause impediment to the normal flow of traffic.

DOCUMENTS DELIVERED
BY PRO UNDER RTI ACT, 2005

6. I & the other organizers shall ensure that sufficient number of volunteers are deployed at the crossing to assist the police.

7. I & the other organizers shall ensure that processionists would not occupy more than one fourth of the width of the road. The traffic will be allowed to flow on the road in both directions during the procession. Sufficient number of volunteers will be kept to assist the police to maintain flow of traffic at road crossing and the processionists would be stopped to allow any cross traffic before proceeding further.

8. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no demonstration/rally/meeting etc. is held on roads and road crossings, except at _____(places). The meeting shall be held only on grounds or on footpaths leaving the road clear for other users.

9. I shall be responsible for ensuring that the route permitted by the police authorities is strictly followed.

10. I & the other organizers shall ensure that procession will not take more than a maximum of four hours from start to finish. The tail of the procession shall reach the finishing point within four hours of the start positively.

11. I & the other organizers shall ensure that the participants in the procession will not carry lathis, firearms, spears, swords, brickbats and other articles likely to be used as a weapon of offence. Besides, the carrying of imitation firearms, resembling sten gun, SAF, Carbine or AK-47, pistol, rifle or any other firearm will also not be allowed as it is likely to cause danger to human life or safety or disturbance of public tranquility or a riot. The participants may carry flags, banners etc. on sticks purely for display purposes.

12. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no participant shall make provocative speeches or use language calculated or likely to inflame passions of the crowd or incite them or promote enmity between different groups or ground of religion, race, place or birth, residence language etc. or act in any manner which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or disturb public tranquility.

13. I & the other organizers shall ensure that the participants of the procession/rally shall immediately comply with all lawful directions given to them by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi or any other police officer on duty at any stage of the procession/rally or Dharna.

14. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no participants shall act in a manner as to result in damage to public property, assault on Govt. servant, arson, etc.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PIO UNDER RTI ACT, 2005

15. I & the other participants shall ensure that no participant shall destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting any religion or any class of persons.

16. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no inflammatory slogans etc. would be raised within 200 meters of any place of religious worship.

17. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no shamiana etc. is erected on any road for any function including public meetings.

18. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no loudspeaker or public address system shall be used at the venue of the rally/procession without specific permission from the Addl. CP/DCP of District. Loudspeakers shall be used only between 0600 hours td 2200 hours as provided in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and in compliance of the Supreme Court orders.

19. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no animal like horses, elephants, camels, etc. would be brought in the rally/procession.

20. I & the other organizers shall ensure that no crackers will be lit nor firing by weapons, etc. will be held.

21. I shall be responsible to keep the followers under control, failing which I along with other protesters may be prosecuted under the law.

Date_____
Place_____

_____
(Signature)

_____
(Name in CAPITAL LETTERS)

_____
(Designation)

_____
(Name of the Organisation)

Mob. No. _____

Any other telephone. No. _____

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PIO UNDER RTI ACT, 2005

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE : DELHI

No 35/2011

CIRCULAR

1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court have issued detailed guidelines regarding the conduct of rallies, processions, demonstrations & protests etc. The onus of maintaining peace during the protest has been laid on the organisers.

2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the **organisers** will **meet** the police to discuss the conditions in which the protest can be organised and will **give an undertaking** that they shall maintain peace during the event and have also been banned from carrying any kind of weapon. These guidelines are:-

   i) The organizer shall **meet** the police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest.

   ii) An **undertaking** is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction.

   iii) All **weapons** including knives, lathis & the like shall be prohibited.

   iv) The Police and State Government **shall ensure videograph** of such protests to the maximum extent possible.

   v) In the event that demonstration turns violent, the officer-in-charge shall ensure that the events are properly videographed through private operators and also request such further information from the media and others on the incidents in question.

   vi) The Police shall immediately **inform the State Government** with reports on the events, including damage, if any, caused.

3. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision of 1996 has clearly directed that **permission should be obtained for taking out a** rally, public procession, holding of meeting etc **from the district DCP.** The Hon'ble Court has also directed that the organiser shall obtain permission from the land owning authority, comply with all lawful directions given by police and keep members of the procession under proper control.

4. These two judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court crystallize the powers of police to direct and regulate assemblies and processions in specific terms and the guidelines laid down in these judgements have been incorporated in the enclosed Terms and Conditions which have to be served on the organisers during the meeting to negotiate arrangements for the proposed rally/protest etc.

5. Therefore, it is imperative that in order to bind down the organisers, a copy of the terms and conditions (enclosed) quoting the relevant orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court, be served on them along with the meeting notice as well as the permission.

22/6/2011

(B. K. GUPTA)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
DELHI.

No. 3573-3678 /Record Branch /PHQ, dated 22/6/ 2011.

Copy to :-

1. All Special Commissioners of Police, Delhi.
2. All Joint/Additional Commissioners of Police, Delhi.
3. All Deputy Commissioners of Police of District/Units, Delhi.
4. SO, LA and FA to Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
5. DCP/Legal Cell, Delhi.
6. Record Branch, PHQ, Delhi with 10 Spare Copies.
7. Guard File.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PHQ UNDER RTI ACT

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR TAKING OUT RALLIES/PROCESSIONS/DHARNAS.

The permission for taking out a procession/rally/dharna is subject to the following terms and conditions, which are based on the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2007 read with W.P. (Criminal) No. 73 of 2007 in the matter of "Destruction of Public and Private Properties Vs. Sate of Andhra Pradesh & Ors." and the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) No. 2208/1996, Chandni Chowk Sarv Vyapar Mandal Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors:-

1. The organizer shall meet the police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest.

2. An undertaking is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction.

3. All weapons including knives, lathis and the like shall be prohibited

4. The organizer shall also obtain a "No Objection Certificate" from the land owning agency with regard to holding rally/meeting etc.

5. The organizer shall carry the permission granted to them in original to be shown to a police officer on demand.

6. They will depute a person with whom the police can liaise for various purposes.

7. Organizers would make adequate arrangements for drinking water (by providing tankers) and First Aid/Medical Aid in consultation with the civic/local bodies at the site and also during the procession.

8. The procession will proceed in an orderly manner along the sanctioned route keeping to the left and will not halt on the way or cause impediment to the normal flow of traffic.

9. The organizers shall allow cross traffic at intersection as prescribed by the police.

10. The organizer shall keep more volunteers at these crossing to help the police.

11. No procession would normally occupy more than one fourth of the width of the road. Traffic should be allowed to flow on the road in both directions during any procession. The organizers would keep adequate number of volunteers to held the police to keep flow of traffic. At road crossing, the processionists would stop to allow any cross traffic to be cleared before proceeding further. In case a road is not sufficiently broad, the local police should regulate the procession suitably.

12. No demonstration/rally/meeting etc. would be allowed on roads and road crossings. Except at places especially earmarked for such a purpose by the police authorities, meeting should be held on grounds or on footpaths only.

13. Organizer of processions will be responsible for ensuring that the route permitted to them by the police authorities is strictly followed.

14. No procession should take more than a maximum of four hours from start to finish. The tail of any procession shall reach the finishing point within four hours of start positively.

15. The participants in the procession will not carry any lathis, firearms, spears, swords and other articles likely to be used as a weapon of offence. Besides the carrying of imitation firearms, resembling sten gun, SAF, Carbine or AK-47, pistol, rifle or any other firearm is also not allowed as it is likely to cause danger to human life or safety or disturbance of public tranquillity or a riot. The participants may carry flags, banners, etc. on sticks purely for display purposes.

16. No participant shall make provocative speeches or use language calculated or likely to inflame passions of the crowd or incite them or promote enmity between different groups or ground of religion, race, place or birth, residence language etc. or act in any manner which si prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or disturb public tranquility.

17. The participants of the procession/rally shall comply with all lawful directions given to them by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi or any other Police Officer on duty.

18. No participant shall act in a manner as to result in damage to public property, assault on Govt. servant, arson, etc.

19. No participant shall destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting any religion or any class of persons.

20. No inflammatory slogans etc. would be raised within 200 meters of any place of religious worship.

21. No shamiana etc. would be erected on any road for any function including public meetings.

22. No loudspeaker or public address system shall be used in the venue of the rally/procession without specific permission from the DCP in whose district the procession/rally is being taken out. Loudspeakers shall be used only between 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. as provided in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and in compliance of Supreme Court orders.

23. The licence shall be responsible to keep his followers under control, failing which he will be prosecuted under the law.

24. No animal like horses, elephants, camels, etc. would be allowed in a rally/procession.

25. Crackers, firing by weapons, etc. is prohibited in any procession.

26. In the event of non-compliance of any of the above conditions/restrictions, the procession/meeting/gathering/ religious procession/religious function shall be declared as unlawful and prosecution would be launched against the violators. Regarding use of loudspeakers, action would be taken as per provisions of Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY

No.56/2011

CIRCULAR

It has come to notice that the Districts/Units are not furnishing timely reports/comments about dharnas/processions/rallies and many other events/programmes held by various organizers or by the Govt. agencies in Delhi. As a result, it creates lot of difficulties while according such permission by the PHQ in time. It has also been experienced that the reports/comments of Distts./Units are being sent to this Hdqrs. very late i.e. at the eleventh hour i.e. when the procession/programmes are about to start. This has also been observed that the reports of the Districts/Units concerned are either incomplete or without clear comments i.e. total gathering of persons, expected no. of vehicles and whether the procession/programme is traditional or non-traditional etc., as a result, in the absence of complete/correct report necessary permission for many of the programmes/events are not given by PHQ or decided well in time especially when the recommendations for such processions/programmes are to be sent to M.H.A. It is also important to note that M.H.A. has requested many a times for sending recommendations atleast 2/3 days before so that they can grant permission to the applicant well in time after proper examination.

The Special C.P./Admn. has taken a serious view on the relevant file and further directed that all Addl.CsP/DCsP of the Districts/Units concerned should send their complete reports/recommendations to PHQ well in advance atleast 2/3 days before the date of procession/programme/event after proper examination of such matters.

A serious view will be taken against the erring officials for such lapse.

(MANGESH KASHYAP)
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
HEADQUARTERS, DELHI.

No. 6101-6150 /Record Branch/PHQ, dated Delhi, the 21-12-2011

Copy to the:-

1. All Joint Commissioners of Police(Ranges), Trafic, Security and Special Branch, Delhi.
2. Addl. Commissioners Of Police/DCsP/Security, Special Branch, Traffic(SR,NR,CR & NDR).
3. Addl.DCP/IT Centre with the request to get upload the Circular in Intra DP net.
4. ACP/C&T and Inspr./C&T for information.
5. SOs to the Special Cs.P./Admn., Traffic, Intelligence, Security.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED ... BY PIO

STANDING ORDER NO.309/

In supersion of existing circulars on regulation of processions in the city, the following instructions are issued:-

(a) Application for grant of permission for all rallies/processions must be applied at least 7 days in advance, excluding the day of the event.

(b) For a procession/rally confined to one district only, the concerned District shall examine the request and grant the permission for the same after obtaining views of Traffic & SB. However, where more than one District is involved, the permission is granted by PHQ after obtaining comments of the concerned District DCsP, Traffic and the Special Branch.

(c) When more than one District is involved, all such permissions should be processed in PHQ, which would send such applications first to DCP/SB for immediate assessment. DCP/SB after contacting the organizer would furnish details like number of participants, nature of demand, leaders who are likely to participate, whether programme would remain peaceful or otherwise,last procession & its conduct and whether it is desirable to grant such permission.

(d) Apart from the DCP/SB, PHQ would also obtain NOC from the District concerned as well as from the DCP/Traffic.

(e) A list of 23 items have been included under the head of terms & conditions for the grant of permission to processions and rallies. These must invariably be given to the organizers along with a copy of permission, if accorded against proper acknowledgement.

(f) If, however, the permission has to be rejected, the same must be conveyed to the organizer much before the date of the event, so that he could inform the participants in time.

(g) No new religious rallies/processions should be granted permission. Permission should be granted only to traditional processions and there also negotiations should be held to reduce the size/route of the procession as far as possible.

(h) In the recent past, we have witnessed that Parliament Street (Jantar Mantar) cannot accommodate more than 5000, persons nor can vehicles be allowed to be brought by the organizers. In case there are large numbers of vehicles involved and they come with the organizers, the venue should be shifted to Ram Lila Ground where the vehicles can be parked.

BY PHQ ON 31/MAY/2005
DOCUMENTS DELIVERED

In case the ground of demonstration is going to be upward of 5000 then venue can only be Ramlila Ground. From Ramlila ground they cannot go to Jantar Mantar but the organizers can form a small group of 3 to 4 persons who can be taken to Jantar Mantar or VVIP offices for submission of memorandum. If, however, the demonstrators are less than 5000 at Ramlila ground, they can be allowed to go to Jantar Mantar in the form of a procession of 2 to 3 per line provided volunteers from the organizers are available at Tolstoy Marg/Barakhamba Road crossing and Tolstoy Marg/Janpath crossing. These volunteers will assist the Traffic police in Traffic Control at the crossings, which should be permitted intermittently by stopping the processionists.

In case the gathering is expected to be upward of 50000 then the number of vehicles accordingly swell up which create major problems for traffic at intersections like Rajghat, ITO, W point, Delhi Gate etc. Any gathering of over 50000 should not be permitted at Ramlila Ground but should be offered Burari grounds as an alternative. If, however, the organizers select a park or an open area elsewhere in Delhi, the same can be examined on merits.

Following checklist containing complete sequence of action in handling such demonstrations/rallies must be meticulously followed by the concerned district: -

1. Application for demonstration/rally received in the office of DCP.

2. Other sources of information i.e. IB/Spl.Branch/newspapes etc. be used to get more details.

3. Contact with the organizer be established by ACP/SHO to find out more details, report to DCP/Distt.

4. Permission/rejection with specific terms and conditions prescribed to be accorded to the applicant. In case of rejection, reasons must be mentioned and it should be ensured that both permission or rejection is received by the organizers.

5. Elaborate police arrangements must be issued for each demonstration with complete details of deployment.

6. Actual force demanded and received for the arrangement be recorded.

DOCUMENTS
BY PRO INFORMATION

7. Arrangement at the place of demonstration should include the following:-

(a) Barricading.

(b) Positioning of staff – at First Barricade without lathis and be equipped with only helmet and body protectors. Second Barricade should again be without lathis but should be equipped with body protectors, cane shields and helmets. However, Third Barricade should remain fully equipped with all riot control equipments, such as sticks, body protectors, helmets, cane shields and teargas component.

(c) Display of banner indicating promulgation of Section 144Cr.P.C.

(d) Positioning of water cannons, teargas shell section and force equipped with lathis should be assigned under one officer each.

(e) At least 2 video graphers be available on either side of the demonstration to capture both demonstrators as well as police response/action.

(f) Location of Ambulance/PCR vans for shifting injured persons.

(g) Loud hailers should be available.

8. Proper briefing of staff before deployment and this should be included in the write up of police arrangements.

9. Constant liaison with the leaders/organizers must continue when they reach the venue and address the gathering and control them.

10 Message to Control Room on all the important activities of demonstrations/rally/processions etc. from time to time.

11. Re-briefing of the staff according to the situation-utmost restraint to be shown.

12 Repeated use of PA system by a responsible officer-appealing/advising the leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful and come forward for memorandum/deputation etc. or court arrest peacefully. Announcements should be videographed.

13 If they do not follow appeal and turn violent declare the assembly unlawful on PA system & videograph.

14 Warning on PA system prior to use of any kind of force must be ensured and also videographed.

DOCUMENTS RELATED
BY PHQ UNDER

15 Police action to be taken on the specific orders of the SHO/ACP/DCP or the senior officer present at the spot.

16 For cane charge, only specific force should be identified for action under the supervision of SI/Inspector, Leaders to be protected from injury particularly. Separate party to be made for this.

17 Use of controlled cane charge only for dispersal – no action on retreating crowd.

18 Logbook of Control Room be properly maintained (briefing of Control Room staff).

19 Announcement for injured to take them to hospital for medical aid-use of stretchers to carry the injured up to the vehicle/ambulance etc. & videographed.

20 Send the police personnel injured during the assault by demonstrators, for medical opinion and treatment.

21 In case of arrest/detention of MPs, MsLA, MsLC, information to be given to concerned department, Speaker Lok Sabha, Chairman, Rajya Sabha, Speaker Assembly, by quickest means both in writing and on wireless.

22 Special attention be paid while dealing with women's demonstrations-only women police to tackle them.

23 Even after the demonstration is over, proper liaison with the leaders specially political leaders be ensured to maintain cordial relations.

24 During registration of case-evidence regarding use of stones, lathis, dandas etc. to be videographed and taken into possession from the site.

25 Staff detailed at RML to be briefed in advance to ensure proper record of the injured and keep the hospital staff ready to ensure timely treatment.

26 Details of peaceful demonstration/detention u/s 65 D.P.Act details be mentioned in the daily diary.

27 In case MPs, Central Cabinet Ministers, State Ministers and former PMs are leading the demonstrations, specific group may be detailed to ensure their personal safety in the event of any police action. Besides, such leaders would be available with the police to control the violent mob.

DOCUMENT ACT-2005

28 In the event of any demonstration turning violent and force in the form of lathi charge or teargas is resorted to in which people get injured, an incident report must be sent by DCP/District addressed to Jt. C.P./concerned with a copy to SO to C.P., Principal Secretary (Home), Govt of NCT, Joint Secretary (UT), MHA for information of the Govt. without any loss of time, particularly when the Parliament is in session.

The terms and conditions for taking out and handling any major rally/procession are enclosed herewith for necessary action in the matter.



(T.N.MOHAN)
DY. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
HEADQUARTERS : DELHI.

Encls : As above.

No. 4062-4140 /C&T (AC-IV) PHQ, dated, Delhi the 27-6-03

Copy forwarded to the: -

1. All Spl.CsP/Jt.CsP/Addl.CsP, Delhi. For favour of information.
2. SO to C.P., Delhi.
3. DCsP/All Distts. Special Branch, PCR and Traffic Delhi/New Delhi for necessary compliance.
4. All ACsP/PHQ including computer centre.
5. LA & EA to C.P. Delhi
6. All Insprs./PHQ including C.A. Delhi.
7. MAP/PHQ with 10 spare copies.

DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY POLICE

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR TAKING OUT RALLIES/ PROCESSIONS/HOLDING MEETINGS BY POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNION ETC.

Permission for taking out a rally/procession/holding meeting is subject to the following conditions:-

1. Permission should be obtained for taking out a rally/procession/ holding meeting, etc. from the District DCP. In case the event is spread to more than one district, the same should be obtained from the DCP/Hdqrs, Police Headquarters, I.P. Estate, New Delhi. The police will give permission after obtaining clearance from the concerned Circle Traffic Office. In case loudspeaker is intended to be used, permission should be taken for the same also. Permission should be carried by the organiser and shown to a police officer when asked for.
2. Note: Such permission for rally/procession/meeting/ use of loudspeaker shall be decided within 48 hours after submission of application. In case of Police Hdqrs, such a request would be decided within a week. However, in urgent requests like sudden demonstration, the matter may be decided immediately.
3. The organizer shall obtain the required NOC/permission from the concerned land owning authority for use of a place for rally/meeting.
4. The organizer shall depute a person by name to liaise with the police.
5. The participants may carry flags, banners, etc. on sticks purely for display purpose. They would, however, not carry lathis/firearms/spears/swords or any other article likely to be used as a weapon of offence or likely to pt members of public to fear or be used to cause danger to human life, public tranquillity, disturbance, riot etc.
6. The participants in a rally/procession/meeting shall comply with all lawful directions given to them by any police officer on duty. The organizers would adhere to the timings of processions failing which the same would not be allowed to take place.
7. The organizer/licensee shall be duty bound to keep all members of the rally/procession/meeting under proper control.
8. No participant shall make provocative speeches or use language calculated or likely to inflame the passions of the crowd or incite them or promote enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. or act in a manner which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or disturb public tranquillity.
9. No participant shall act in a manner as to result in damage to public property, assault on govt. servant, arson, etc.
10. No participant shall destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting any religion or any class of persons.
11. No procession would normal occupy more than one fourth of the width of the road. Traffic should be allowed to flow on the road in both directions during any procession. The organizers would keep adequate number of volunteers to help the police to keep flow of traffic. At road crossings, the processionists would stop to allow any cross traffic to be cleared before proceeding further. In case a road is not sufficiently broad, the local police should regulate the procession suitable.
12. No demonstration/rally/meeting etc. would be allowed on roads and road crossings. Except at places especially earmarked for such a purpose by the police authorities, meetings should be held on grounds or on footpaths only. However, meetings could be held in a portion of the road where such grounds are not available with least inconvenience to flow of traffic.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PIO UNDER RTI ACT 2005

13. Organizers of processions will be responsible for ensuring that the route permitted to them by the police authorities is strictly followed.

14. loudspeakers without stereo system are allowed in any rally/meeting/processions. The limits of volume of loudspeakers in open places including vehicles shall conform to Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000. loudspeakers shall not be installed at any place beyond the place of meetings and should face the meeting place and not outside. No loudspeaker would be allowed on roads, telephone poles, electric poles etc. used in closed places should be such that it is not heard beyond the precincts and likely to cause annoyance to people in the neighbourhood.

15. Loudspeakers shall be used only between 6 AM and 10 PM as provided in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) rules, 2000. framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and in compliance of Supreme Court orders.

16. No procession would normally/ordinarily be allowed before 11.00 AM and after 5.00 PM. In case it becomes necessary to take out a procession beyond the above timings, a specific dispensation should be taken from the Distt. DCP or PHQ, as the case may be.

17. Demonstration, dharma, etc. at the residence of any person would be allowed only away from such a residence and at a place earmarked by the police.

18. No procession should take more than a maximum of for hours from sart to finish. The tail of any procession shall reach the finishing point within four hours of start positively. In exceptional cases, the Distt. Police/PHQ can give permission to a procession to exceed four hours.

19. No inflammatory slogans etc. would be raised within 200 metres of any place of religious worship.

20. No Shamiana etc. should be erected on any road for any function including public meetings. A Shamiana could, however, be erected in bye-lanes of localities with not much traffic with the prior permission of the local police who will get clearance from the Circle Traffic Inspector's office before granting permission. Erecting a Shamiana on a portion of a road would be permitted in very exceptional cases only if a bye-lane is inadequate to hold the number of persons expected on an occasion like public meeting. This should in no manner dislocate free flow of traffic/movement of public on that road.

21. No animals like horses, elephants, camels, etc. would be allowed in a rally/procession.

22. Crackers, firing by weapons etc. is prohibited in any procession.


23. Organizers would make adequate arrangements for drinking water (by providing tankers) and First Aid/Medical Aid in consultation with the civic/local bodies at the site and also during the procession.

24. The organizers shall allow cross traffic at intersection as prescribed by the police and shall keep some volunteers at these crossing to help the police.

25. In the event of non-compliance of any of the above conditions/restrictions, the procession/meeting/gathering shall be declared as unlawful and prosecution would be launched against the violators. Regarding use of loudspeakers, action would be taken as per provisions of Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) rules, 2000 frame under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

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DOCUMENTS RELEASED BY PHQ UNDER RTI ACT-2005



STANDING ORDER No.-79

Subject:- Unlawful assemblies - dispersal of - instructions regarding.

I. INTRODUCTION For the maintenance of public order & tranquility law authorises any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a Police Station & in his absence any police officer not below the rank of ASI to Command any unlawful assembly or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause disturbance of public peace to disperse and it shall there-upon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse accordingly. If on being commanded, such assembly does not disperse or if without being so commanded, it conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination, not to disperse, any Executive Magistrate or police officer referred to above may proceed to disperse such assembly by force & may require the assistance of any male person not being an officer or member of armed forces and acting as such for the purpose of dispersing such assembly & if necessary for arresting & confirming the persons, who form part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law.

II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES. Situations requiring dispersal of such assemblies differs from place to place & time to time. It is therefore necessary for the police officers of all ranks to be fully acquainted with the legal provisions contained in sections 129 to 132 of Cr.P.C. and to act with utmost restraint and patience, taking care at the same time that the situation does not take an ugly turn & that there is no loss to life & property. The handling of such situations demands intelligence, alertness and coordination of various agencies particularly intelligence & law enforcing agencies and thoughtful anticipation of events to come. Hence much will depend upon the personal capability of the officer incharge of the situation. However, following guidelines are issued for the information of and compliance by all concerned including gazetted officers-

i) The various functions required in dealing with a riot can be carried out by accustomed drill movements with modifications necessitated by the situation. For example, if a single line is required, it should be formed in the usual way and not by endeavouring to get individual men to adopt the formation.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED BY PHQ UNDER RTI ACT 2005

ii) There is a tendency from G.Os. to ASIs to give orders for a concerted movement to men individually instead of in the proper manner and through the proper channel. For example if a gazetted officer is required to form a cordon with four reserves, it is useless for him to endeavour to give orders personally to the one hundred constables involved. On the contrary, he should first explain to two or more upper sub-ordinates at this disposal, the nature of the operations to be effected and they should then issue appropriate drill orders to their commands, which are usually small enough to hear the orders and carry them out. This initial briefing should be ensured so that the staff down the line is aware of their roles.

iii) It is essential that units should be kept together and that formations should be preserved. For example, it is extremely dangerous for men armed either with rifles, muskets or tear smoke guns to open fire unless they are in lines. Again foot or mounted police seeking to disperse a crowd must maintain a line. Failure to maintain line may result in individuals being isolated in the crowd and severely hurt by its members, or in the heat of the movement by their own comrades. Further, a disciplined movement by a few men has far more greater effect than individual efforts by a large number in a heterogeneous way.

iv) Individual members of the force may, when excited by provocation or injury, start shouting thereby causing confusion and preventing the orders of responsible officers from being heard. It is therefore necessary that when dispersal action is on, no one should open his mouth except the officers who are required to give orders.

v) The principle of minimum force to be used shall be kept in view, but whenever force has to be used it should be used with determination and firmness. The instructions laid down in P.P.Rs, 14.56, section 28(1) (b) and section 29 of D.P. Act read with the Delhi (Control of Processions, Assemblies and playing of music in public places) Regulations, 1980, notified vide No.3218/Spl. Cell, dated 7.10.1980, should be followed.

vi) Whenever police force is expected to go into action they should wear steel helmets, carry cane shields & other defensive equipment. The tear gas squad and the force which supports the tear gas squad shall wear duty and service respirators respectively. Tear gas guns and grenades shall be fired only by the officers/men trained in their use.

vii) The force shall always be divided into small sections and placed under the charge of section and platoon commanders in order to have effective control on them. In no case the strength of force used for dispersal of such assemblies shall be less than on section (commander and 5 constables) and they shall work under their own officers. This, however, shall not deter police officer of authorised rank to act for controlling situations likely to take an explosive turn in the circumstances mentioned in para 1 above till the arrival of reinforcements.

DOCUMENTS RELEASED BY PRO UNDER RTI

viii) Whenever it is decided to use gas or open fire, all policemen present in between the procession and the gas squad or armed squad must be withdrawn forthwith by the sounding of a bugle or making a suitable announcements.

ix) For every major arrangement a suitable signal for withdrawing/recalling the force shall be arranged and included in the briefing.

This supersedes old S.O.No.72 issued vide this Hdqr.No.21916-22016/C&T, dated 27.9.1967.

Sd/-
(KANWALJIT DEOL) DCP:HQ(II)
for COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: DELHI.

No. 4656-4856/XXI/151/Spl.88, C&T.AC.IV, dated, Delhi the 19-1-89

DOCUMENTS RELEASED
BY PHQ UNDER RTI ACT-2005

STANDING ORDER NO. 51

UNIFORM REGULATIONS OF DELHI POLICE

INTRODUCTION

It has been noticed that sometimes there is lack of uniformity in the dress worn on different occasions by the officers of Delhi Police. It has also been observed that police personnel on duty in uniform are improperly dressed or wear uniform not in conformity with the approved muster pattern. A determined effort is required to be made by all officers to ensure that the uniform worn by the members of the force on law and order duties, on guards, on parades and on ceremonial and special occasions are of the approved pattern as laid down under the Rules.

This Standing Order is being issued in order to remove any confusion and ambiguity regarding wearing of uniform on different occasions. Unless otherwise directed, these instructions should be strictly followed by all members of Delhi Police.

PATTERN OF UNIFORM

PART-1 :- GAZETTED OFFICERS (MEN/WOMEN)

The officers of Indian Police Service and of NCT of Delhi, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli Police Service shall wear the uniform as prescribed under the Indian Police Service Rules, 1954. However, the latter's uniform is modified as per their appointment letter issued by Ministry of Home affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi's letter No. 14016/15/2006-UTS-II GOI,MHA dated 11.12.2006 . Their dress regulations will be as under:-

Part 1 A. WINTER UNIFORM

i) **Working**

Blue beret/Peak cap with brown strap and cap badge (Sikh male Officers shall wear khaki turban), Serge khaki trousers and Angola khaki shirt (with or without jersey), shoulder badges according to their rank, brown leather belt, khaki woollen socks, Brown derby shoes (with toe cap), blue lanyard with brass whistle and medal ribbons. D.P. emblem on left bicep, Plastic name plate (Bi-lingual-Hindi and English) in white letters on black background (for Selection Grade DCP & above embroidered in Zari on black background). While carrying arms on duty, the holster of the weapon should be of brown leather with a blue cord which should be compulsory.

ii) **Parade**

Same as 1 A (i) above except that Sam browne ankle boots to be worn by those participating in the parade, rest of those attending the parade will wear brown derby shoes(with toe cap).

iii) **General Parade**

Same as 1A(i) & (ii) above except that Sam Browne Belt will be worn instead of brown leather belt.

iv) **Ceremonial - Review Order**

Peak cap with brown strap and cap badge (Sikh male Officers will wear khaki turban), Shirt-Angola-khaki(with or without jersey), khaki cotton drill trouser, Sam Browne belt, khaki woolen socks, brown ankle boots to be worn by those participating in the parade, rest of those attending the parade will wear brown derby shoes (with toe cap), medals & decorations and blue lanyard with brass whistle, D.P. emblem on left bicep, plastic name plate in white letters on black background (for selection grade DCP and above embroidered in zari on black background) and neck scarf of approved pattern.

v) **Mess Dress:**

(1) Black buttoned-up short coat with black trousers/lounge suit unless otherwise ordered.

(2) Plain black leather derby shoes with plain toe-caps.

vi) **P.T.**

White T-Shirt, Khaki woolen jersey, White TC Trousers, White woolen Socks, Sports shoe white, white patka for Sikh male Officers.

N.B. See Rule 38 and 39 of The IPS (Uniform) Rules, 1954 regarding (Annexure I &II):

I) Special Provisions for women officers.

II) Alternative uniform for lady officers in advanced stage of pregnancy.

Part 1 B. SUMMER UNIFORM

i) **Working**

Same as Part I A (i) except that they will wear Khaki T.C. or cotton trousers and shirt (Sleeves rolled) and Nylon khaki socks.

ii) **Parade**

Same as 1B(i) above except that brown ankle boots to be worn by those participating in the parade, rest of those attending the parade will wear brown derby shoes (with toe cap).

iii) **General Parade**

Same as 1B(i) & (ii) above except that Sam Browne belt will be worn instead of brown leather belt.

iv) **Ceremonial – Review Order** Same as in Part I A (iv) except Cotton drill khaki trousers, khaki cellular shirt (sleeves rolled) and khaki nylon socks.

v) **Mess**

1. White buttoned-up short coat with White trousers/lounge suit unless otherwise ordered.
2. Plain black leather derby shoes with plain toe-caps.

vi) **P.T.**

White T-Shirt, White TC Trousers, White nylon Socks, Sports shoes white, White-patka for Sikh male Officers.

N.B. See Rule 38 and 39 of The IPS (Uniform) Rules, 1954 (Annexure I &II) regarding:-

I) Special Provisions for women officers.

II) Alternative uniform for lady officers in advanced stage of pregnancy.

General Instructions

i) When mounted, breeches (khaki strechlon) and field boots will be worn instead of khaki drill trousers and ankle boots.

ii) Swords will be carried only on formal occasions and on ceremonial parades. Specific orders should be issued by Senior Officers on the occasion, regarding the wearing of swords.

iii) Wearing of only the approved pattern of leather belt is allowed on Parade, as well as with Working Dress.

iv) The carrying of a baton when in uniform is optional.

v) The wearing of Sam Browne belt is compulsory when the CP, Delhi or other Flag Officers are to attend the parade, also while officers reporting on duty on first assignment after completion of training and while calling on Senior Officers on first posting and also on reporting on transfer.

vi) Only IPS officers of the rank of Selection Grade and above are authorized to wear embroidered crest on their Peak/Beret cap.

vii) Ceremonial Dress will be worn on the under mentioned occasions, or when specifically ordered, only by those who actually participate in the investiture ceremony or are to be introduced to or are to receive a dignitary:

a. Republic Day Parade - 26th January
b. Independence Day Parade - 15th August
c. Police Commemoration Day Parade - 21 October
d. Investiture Ceremonies.
e. Passing out OR Attestation Parade.
f. Farewell Parade of The Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
g. Delhi Police Raising Day. (16th Feb.)

viii) General Parade Dress will be worn on the following occasions unless otherwise ordered:

a. Funeral Parade.
b. Inspections.

PART 2: UPPER SUBORDINATES – MEN/WOMEN (EXECUTIVE)

Part 2 A WINTER UNIFORM

(i) Working uniform

Khaki beret cap with red chindi/Peak cap and DP Cap badge (Sikh Male Officers will wear khaki turban), Serge Khaki Trousers & Shirt full sleeves (with or without Jersey), khaki lanyard with brass whistle, DP title shoulder badge, Stars according to rank with shoulder cloth ribbon (Red & Blue), Plastic Name plate (bilingual-Hindi,English) in black letters on white background with Rank, DP emblem on left bicep, medal ribbons, Cane stick (Optional), leather belt, Oxford Shoes (brown coloured belt & shoes for Inspector rank officers and black for SIs & ASIs) and woollen khaki socks.

(ii) Parade

Same as 2 A(i) above with leather ankle boots (brown for Inspectors and black for SI/ASI) will be worn by those participating in the parade while the rest shall wear Oxford shoes unless otherwise ordered.

(iii) General Parade

Same as 2A(i) & (ii) above except that leather cross-belt (brown for Inspectors and black for SI/ASI) shall be worn.

(iv) Ceremonial Parade

Same as in 2 A(iii) above, except Cotton KD trousers, Angola khaki Shirt, four inch wide Kamarband of blue & red with khaki stripes, Medals, decorations and Zari Name Plate with golden letters on blue background for those participating in the parade shall be worn.

(v) P.T.

(a) Men:

White woolen vest (half sleeves), Jersey woolen khaki, KD Shorts, Khaki Woolen Socks and White Sports shoes (Sikh male Officers will wear white patka).

(b) Women:

Light blue Track Suit with dark blue stripe on the sides, white T.Shirt (with 3 front buttons, high collar and D.P. monogram printed on the front). White sports shoes and blue nylon socks.

Part 2 B SUMMER UNIFORM

(i) Working

Same as 2A(i) above, except that khaki TC trousers and shirt (sleeves rolled) and khaki nylon socks shall be worn.

(ii) Parade

Same as 2B(i) & 2A(ii) above.

(iii) General parade

Same as 2B(i) & 2B(ii) above except that leather cross-belt will be worn (brown for Inspectors and black for SI/ASI).

Ceremonial

Same as in 2A(iv) above except that khaki cotton cellular shirt (Sleeves rolled) and khaki nylon socks shall be worn.

(v) P.T.

(a) Men:

Same as in 2 A (v) (a) above except that white cotton vest (half sleeves) and Khaki nylon socks shall be worn.

(b) Women:

Same as in 2 A (v) (b).

General Instructions:

1. The leather strap in the Peak cap of Inspectors shall be brown, and black for SIs/ASIs.
2. Inspectors will wear DP title shoulder badges with three stars alongwith red and blue cloth ribbons while SIs & ASIs will wear two stars and one star respectively with DP shoulder badge and red and blue ribbons (the star should be five pointed-dotted-silver colour) and one point will be vertical towards the collar.
3. Male trainees will wear khaki drill shorts instead of khaki drill trousers on parade.
4. While carrying weapon on duty, a khaki safety cord and holster (brown for Inspectors and black for SI/ASI) shall be worn.
5. In extremely cold weather, winter jackets of the approved pattern may be worn.

PART 3. LOWER/SUBORDINATES MEN/WOMEN (EXECUTIVE)

3(A) WINTER UNIFORM

(i) Working

(a) Men: Khaki beret cap with red chindi and DP Cap badge (crest) (Sikh Male Officers will wear khaki turban), Serge Khaki Trousers & Shirt full sleeves (with or without Jersey), khaki lanyard with brass whistle, DP title shoulder badge, Three stripes (Red on Blue

background) pheet will be worn by all Head Constables, Plastic Name plate (bilingual-Hindi, English) in black letters on white background with Rank, DP emblem on left bicep, medal ribbons, Cane stick (Optional), Black leather belt, Black Oxford Shoes, woollen khaki socks and black leather holster with khaki safety cord will be worn.

(b) **Women:** Same uniform items as prescribed for male Lower Subordinates or same items with salwar and kameez as prescribed for women.

(ii) **Parade**

Same as 3A(i) above except that black ankle boots and bayonet frog will be worn.

(iii) **General Parade**

Same as 3A(ii) above.

(iv) **Ceremonial**

Safa Khaki with red end, safaband red, Fringes red, Kullah Blue, Turra Red & Blue with khaki stripes (Sikh Jawans will not wear kullah), DP crest (Silver Colour) on red chindi, Scarf Red & Blue with khaki stripes also embroidered with DP monogram in golden zari, Whistle- Brass with khaki Lanyard, Zari Name Plate, four inch wide kammar-band (Red & Blue) with Khaki stripes, Trousers khaki Cotton drill, Angola khaki shirt, khaki woolen socks, Black leather belt with white metal plate and D.P. crest, Red and blue DP insignia with golden zari on arm, Red guide patta with golden stripes with DP monogram shall be worn by all the markers. The three stripes (Red & Blue) pheet will be worn by all Head Constables. The bayonet frog will be black with bayonet clubbed at the back and decorations, if any, may be worn.

(v) **P.T.**

(a) **Men:** Woollen Vest (half sleeves) white, Jersey-woollen-khaki, Shorts Cotton khaki, Socks-woollen-khaki, Sports shoes white, (Sikh male jawans will wear white patka/ Rumaal).

(b) **Women:** Women trainees will wear navy blue Track Suit (with D.P. printed on back of the top), inner white T-Shirt (D.P. monogram printed on front), white sports shoes and blue socks.

3 (B) SUMMER UNIFORM

i) **Working**

Same as 3A(i) above except that khaki TC trousers and shirt (with sleeves rolled) and **nylon khaki** socks shall be worn.

(ii) **Parade**

Same as in 3 B(i) above except that black ankle boots will be worn.

(iii) **General Parade**

Same as in 3 B(ii) above.

(iv) **Ceremonial**

Same as in 3 A(iv) except that Shirt-cotton cellular- khaki (sleeves rolled) shall be worn.

(v) **P.T**

Men: Cotton half sleeved vest, cotton khaki shorts, nylon socks khaki and white sports shoes.

Women: White T.Shirt (D.P. crest printed on front left side), Navy Blue trouser with red stripe on sides, blue nylon socks and white sports shoes.

NOTE

1. In working dress, Head Constables and Constables will carry cane stick (optional).
2. Chevrons three stripes (Red & Blue) shall be worn by Head constables on both arms mid-way between the elbow & shoulder with the 'V' pointing towards the elbow.
3. Trainees will wear khaki drill shorts on Parade instead of trousers and will wear web belt on parade.
4. While carrying a hand weapon on duty, a khaki safety cord and black leather holster shall be worn.
5. In extremely cold weather, a winter jacket of the approved pattern may be worn.
6. Leather strap in peak cap of inspectors will be brown and black for SIs/ASIs.
7. Inspectors will wear three stars (five pointed, dotted and silver colour) with red and blue cloth ribbons while SIs and ASIs will wear two stars and one star respectively with red & blue cloth ribbon.
8. For women, shoes and socks only of regular pattern will be worn even with salwar-kameej and under no circumstances sandals/ sleepers would be worn with Uniform.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL WOMEN (EXCEPT Gazetted Officers)

1. There is an option to wear khaki salwar kameez and Dupatta as working dress after specific permission in writing from concerned DCP.
2. The wearing of uniform belts is mandatory as worn by male counterparts even with salwar-kameej.
3. The wearing of headgear and caps is mandatory- even with a salwar kameej.
4. They should keep their hair properly tied up.
5. No cosmetics will be used except a bindi and sindhur. No ornaments should be worn except a mangal sutra, wedding rings and ear-studs.

PART-4

TRAFFIC POLICE- Upper Subordinates (Men/Women)

Part4-A. WINTER UNIFORM

(i) **Working :-** For inspectors, it is same as in 2 A(i) above with blue beret cap with Red chindi and white belt. For SIs and ASIs also, it is blue baret cap with red chindi (Sikh jawans will wear blue turban), Black Leather belt, white woollen shirt; Blue serge trousers; Blue woollen Socks; Blue woollen Jersey; Blue Jacket of the approved pattern with Blue TC Scarf, Double braided lanyard of red colour with brass whistle, Black oxford shoes, Plastic Name plate (bilingual-English & Hindi) in black letters on white background with rank, D.P. emblem on left bicep. White gloves when on VIP duty.

(ii) **Parade :-** Same as in 4 A (i) above, except that ankle boots (brown for Inspectors and Black for SI/ASI) shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade:-** Same as in 4 A(i) & (ii) above. Besides this, brown leather cross belt for Inspectors and black leather cross belt for SI/ASIs shall be worn. Neck scarf should be as per approved pattern.

(iv) **Ceremonial:-** Same as 4 A(iii) above. Besides Peak cap (traffic pattern), DP cap badge (Crest) (Sikh officers will wear blue turban). A four inch wide kammar-band of blue & red with khaki stripes and a zari name plate with golden letters on a blue background for those participating in the parade shall also be worn.

Part 4 B SUMMER UNIFORM

(i) **Working :-** For Inspectors it is same as in 4A(i) except that Inspectors shall wear TC khaki trousers & shirt, nylon khaki socks and SI/ASI shall wear Shirt TC white, trousers TC blue and socks nylon blue.

(ii) **Parade:-** Same as in 4 B (i) above except that ankle boots (brown for Insprs and Black for SI/ASI) shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade :-** Same as in 4 B(ii) above with cross Belt (brown for Insprs. and black for SI/ASI) shall be worn.

(iv) **Ceremonial:-** Same as in 4 B(iii). Besides Peak cap (traffic pattern) DP cap badge (Crest) (Sikh officers will wear blue turban), four inch kammar-band of blue & red with khaki stripes and zari name plate with golden letter on blue background for those participating in the parade shall also be worn.

PART 5
TRAFFIC POLICE-Lower Subordinates (Men/Women)

Part 5 A WINTER UNIFORM

(i) **Working**
Blue beret cap with red chindi (Sikh Jawans will wear blue turban with red safa band and white fringes), blue serge trousers, white woollen shirt (with or without blue jersey), double braided lanyard of red colour with brass whistle, DP title shoulder badge, woollen blue socks, black oxford shoes, black leather belt, medal ribbons, blue winter **jacket** as per approved pattern. Plastic Name plate (bilingual-Hindi and English) in black letters on white background with rank, D.P. emblem on left bicep. White gloves while on VIP duty.

(ii) **Parade** – Same as in 5 A(i) above, except that ankle boots shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade** Same as in 5 A(ii) above.

(iv) **Ceremonial**
Same as in 5 A(ii) above, except that scarf blue with DP monogram embroidered in golden zari, zari name plate, four inches kamarband (red & blue) with khaki stripes, trousers blue cotton drill, white woolen shirt, white leather belt with white metal plate and DP crest shall be worn. Red guide patta with golden stripes with DP monogram shall be worn by all the markers. The three stripes (red & blue) pheet shall be worn by all Head Constables, the bayonet frog will be white with bayonet clubbed at the back. Medals & decorations, if any, may be worn.

Part 5 B SUMMER UNIFORM

(i) **Working uniform**
Same as in 5 A(i) above except that Blue TC trousers, white TC shirt (full sleeves) and nylon blue socks shall be worn.

(ii) **Parade** Same as in 5 B(i) above except that ankle boots shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade** Same as in 5 B(ii) above.

(iv) **Ceremonial** Same as in 5-A(iv) above except that white cotton cellular shirt shall be worn.

NOTE :

1. Wearing of chevrons shall be as in NOTE (2) under 3 B(v).
2. Normally blue Beret cap will be worn on duty except when they have to wear helmet.
3. While carrying small arms on duty white holster with safety cord (khaki for Insprs and white for SI/ASIs) shall be worn.

PART 6. MOUNTED POLICE (Upper Subordinates)

6 A WINTER UNIFORM

(i) **Working**
Same as in 2 A(i) above.

(ii) **Parade**
Same as in 6 A(i) above except that Khaki strechlon breeches, black ankle boots and boot patti shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade**
Same as in 6 A(ii) above except that Peak cap, cross belt and Ankle boots shall be worn (Brown for Insprs and Black for SI/ASI).

(iv) **Ceremonial**
Turban consisting of a golden kullah, red safa, turban band (blue with golden stripes), golden fringes, turha (red and blue with golden stripes), red woollen coat with DP silver buttons and golden stripes, golden lanyard of the type worn by G.O's, golden Zari shoulders with golden buttons, kammarband, white breeches, brown long riding boots, khaki woollen socks, white hand gloves, belt Zari with a golden jhallar, cane stick (optional) and medals. Zari name plate, Neck scarf as per approved pattern and D.P. emblem on left bicep shall be worn.

6 B SUMMER UNIFORM

(i) **Working**
Same as in 6 A(i) above except that Khaki TC trousers & shirt (sleeves rolled) shall be worn.

(ii) **Parade**
Same as in 6 B(i) above except that khaki strechlon breeches, TC shirt (sleeves rolled), black ankle boots and boot patti shall be worn.

(iii) **General Parade**
Same as in 6 B(ii) above except that SI/ASIs will wear Peak Caps and cross belts.

(iv) **Ceremonial**
Same as in 6 A(iv) above.

PART 7 MOUNTED POLICE (Lower Subordinates)

Part 7 A WINTER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as in 3 A(i) above except that rider shall carry riders baton.

ii) **Parade**
Same as in 3 A(ii) and 7 A(i) above except that khaki strechlon breeches, black ankle boots and long woollen patti shall be worn.

iii) **General Parade**
Same as 7 A(ii) above.

iv) **Ceremonial**
Turban consisting golden kullah, red safa, turban band (blue with golden stripes), golden fringes, turha (red and blue with golden stripes), red woollen coat with DP silver buttons and golden stripes, golden GO's type lanyard, golden Zari shoulders with golden button, kamar band, breeches white, brown long riding boots, khaki woollen socks, belt Zari with golden jhallar, lance with flag and medal ribbons, D.P. emblem on left bicep and white hand gloves shall be worn.

Part 7 B SUMMER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as in 7 A(i) above except that khaki TC trousers and shirt (sleeves rolled) and **nylon** khaki socks shall be worn.

ii) **Parade**
Same as in 7 A(ii) above except that khaki TC shirt (sleeves rolled) shall be worn.

iii) **Ceremonial**
Same as in 7 A(iv) above.

NOTE

1. Wearing of chevrons will be as in NOTE(2) under 3 B(v).
2. When not on mounted duty, all mounted staff (Upper & Lower subordinates) will wear the same dress as worn by the Delhi Police Upper & Lower subordinates.

PART 8 BAND POLICE (Upper Subordinates)

Part 8 (A) WINTER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as of Delhi Police Upper Subordinates (Executive) as in 2 A (i)

ii) **Parade**
Same as in 2 A(ii) except that Band Officers will carry a 'conductor's stick'.

iii) **General Parade**
Same as 8 A(ii) above.

iv) **Ceremonial**
Golden Zari kullah (Sikh Officers will not wear kullah), Navy Blue turban with golden crest, safa band, golden Zari blue and red, golden fringes, blue woollen coat with golden buttons, golden DP title shoulder badge with golden badges according to rank, golden dress cord, golden belt, blue woollen trousers with red lining, wollen blue socks, ankle boots (brown for Inspectors and black for SI/ASI), conductor sticks for band staff and drum major sticks for the pipe band, golden title patta for pipe band, medal, decorations.

v) **Engagements uniform**
Same as 8 A(iv) above except that oxford shoes, peak cap and black leather belt will be worn.

vi) **P.T./ Practice** – same as in 2 A(v).

Part 8 (B) SUMMER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as of Delhi Police Upper Subordinates (Executive)

ii) **Parade**
Same as of Delhi Police Upper Subordinates (Executive), except that 'conductor's stick' will be carried by Band officers.

iii) **General Parade**
Same as 8 B(ii) above.

iv) **Ceremonial**
Wearing of summer ceremonial dress will be the same as Winter Ceremonial Dress, except that white TC coat with white buttons and blue TC trousers with red lining will be worn.

v) **Engagements uniform**
Same as in 8 A(v) above.

vi) **P.T./ Practice** – same as in 2 B(v).

PART-9:- BAND POLICE (Lower Subordinates)

Part 9(A) WINTER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower Subordinates (Executive).

ii) **Parade**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower Subordinates (Executive), except band articles.

iii) **General Parade**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower-Subordinates (Executive), except band articles.

iv) **Ceremonial**
Golden Zari kullah (Sikh Jawans will not wear kullah), navy blue cotton turban with golden crest, safa band golden Zari blue and red, golden fringes, blue woollen coat with sign badge on right hand with golden buttons, golden D.P. shoulder badge, silken dress cord, kamarband red and blue with golden stripes, belt with brass buckles and D.P. crest, side pallu red and blue with golden stripes with golden Zari DP monogram, golden DP title red and blue on both biceps, blue woollen trousers with red lining, woollen blue socks, black ankle boots, white drill legging (anklet) with red and blue stripes, band articles in hand, medals, decorations red end, Zari Name Plate, and D.P. emblem on left bicep shall be worn.

v) **Engagements uniform**
Same as 9 A(iv) above, except that black oxford shoes will be worn instead of black ankle boots and white drill legging, blue peak cap, black leather belt without kamarband and side pallu.

vi) **P.T./ Practice** – same as in 3 A(v).

Part 9 (B) SUMMER UNIFORM

i) **Working**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower Subordinates (Executive)

ii) **Parade**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower Subordinates (Executive), except band articles.

iii) **General Parade**
Same as of Delhi Police Lower Subordinates (Executive).

iv) **Ceremonial**
Golden Zari kullah (Sikh Jawans will not wear Kullah), navy blue turban with golden crest, safa band golden Zari blue and red, golden fringes, white TC coat with sign badge on right hand with white silver buttons, golden DP shoulder badge, silken dress cord,

kamar band red and blue with golden stripes, belt with brass buckles and DP crest, side pallu red and blue with golden stripes with golden Zari DP monogram, golden DP formation red and blue on both biceps, blue TC trousers with red lining, blue nylon socks, black ankle boots, white drill legging (anklet) with red and blue stripes, band articles in hand, medals, decorations red end, Zari Name plate, neck scarf as per approved pattern will be worn.

v) **Engagements uniform**
Same as 9 B(iv) above, except that black oxford shoes will be worn instead of black ankle boots and white drill legging, blue peak cap, leather black belt without kamarband and side pallu.

NOTE : PIPE BAND personnel will wear woollen shawl and cross leather patta on ceremonial parade.

vi) **P.T./ Practice** – same as in 3 B(v) above.

PART-10 COMMUNICATION STAFF OF DELHI POLICE

Wireless staff will wear the same dress as officers and men (Executive) of Delhi Police on all occasions.

PART-11 DRIVERS OF DELHI POLICE

Drivers of Delhi Police will wear the same dress as officers and men (Executive) of Delhi Police on all occasions except that they will wear shoes (derby with toe cap) instead of ankle boots on parade and ceremonial occasions.

PART-12 . LICENSING BRANCH

Part 12(A) WINTER UNIFORM (MEN)

Blazer of blue terry wool, red tie with blue stripes, grey trousers of terrywool, blue shirt TC, shoes oxford brown for Inspectors and black for other subordinates i.e. Constable to Sub-Inspector, socks woollen dark grey colour, plastic name plate (bilingual – Hindi and English) with white letters on sky blue background.

(B) **SUMMER UNIFORM (MEN)**

Trousers-TC normal grey colour, Shirt-TC sky-blue colour, tie red with blue stripes, Shoes-Oxford brown for Inspectors and black for other subordinates i.e. Constable to Sub-Inspector, Socks-Nylon-dark grey colour, plastic name plate (bilingual – Hindi and English) with white letters on sky blue background.

(C) **WINTER UNIFORM (WOMEN)**

Blazer-terry-wool-blue, Saree and Blouse (silk)-turquoise colour with border of matching colours, Belly shoe –brown/black according to rank, Socks woollen (Dark grey colour), plastic name plate (bilingual – Hindi and English) with white letters on sky blue background.

(D) **SUMMER UNIFORM (WOMEN)**

Saree and Blouse (silk)-turquoise colour with border of matching colours, Belly shoe -black/brown(rankwise), Socks-nylon (dark grey colour), plastic name plate (bilingual – Hindi and English) with white letters on sky blue background.

PART-13: SECURITY UNIT STAFF (MEN/WOMEN) including those in the HIGH COURT, SUPREME COURT, RP BHAWAN etc.

(DEPLOYED ON SECURITY DUTIES)

Part 13 (A) **WINTER UNIFORM** Woollen-blue blazer, trousers woollen worsted grey, Light blue shirt -TC, tie- stripes of Royal blue & sky blue, shoes- oxford (brown for Inspectors and above, and black for other subordinates), woolen socks of grey colour.

13(B) **SUMMER UNIFORM**

Dark and light grey safari suit, Shoes-oxford (brown for Inspector & black for other subordinates), nylon socks of grey colour.

13(C) **Guards and Mobile Escorts:-** All police personnel performing security duties as Security Guards and uniformed staff in mobile escorts during summer & winter shall wear uniform as mentioned in Part- 2 and 3 above.

PART-14:- COMMANDOS OF DELHI POLICE

14(A) **WINTER UNIFORM** Commando monkey cap in working dress and black beret cap in all parades; Dangri-woollen in working dress and dangri cotton in all parades; Shoulder badges-embroided black DP badge; black web belt; Socks woollen-khaki; Shoes- Black ankle or jungle, only jungle shoes in PT; Medal ribbon except Medals & decorations in Ceremonial; Name Plate- embroided black letters on khaki background; Jersey-woollen khaki; Black ammunition pouch- one in working & two black stripes pouch in all parades; During Training-Two stripes black ammunition pouch with bag on back;

14(B) **SUMMER UNIFORM** – Same as in winter except Jersy:- Dangri-TC Khaki & Socks-Nylon khaki shall be worn.

14(C) **SUMMER UNIFORM FOR COMMANDOS IN PLAIN CLOTHES ON SECURITY DUTIES :-** Same as for security duties (Part 13).

PART-15:- MINISTERIAL STAFF

Ministerial staff of Delhi Police except in the Licensing Branch shall wear the same uniform as officers and men (Executive) of Delhi Police mentioned at Part 2 and 3 above on all occasions.

PART-16:- Multi – Task Staff (MTS)-MEN

(A) **WINTER** Trousers-Woollen-Khaki; Coat (Button up)-woollen-Khaki; Jersey-woollen-Khaki; Socks-woollen-Khaki; Gandhi cap-woollen-khaki: Shoes-Derby-Black;

(B) **SUMMER** Cap-Gandhi-KD for all; Chef Cap-KD for Cook only, Shirt-TC- khaki colour, Trousers- TC-Khaki; Shoes- derby-Black for all; chappals black for all except cooks, Shoes-high neck-Rubber-Monsoon for Sweepers; Sports shoes white and Apron KD for cooks only.

PART-17:- Multi – Task Staff (MTS)-WOMEN

(A) **WINTER**– Half Coat-Woollen-Khaki; Jersey-woollen-Khaki; Suit-ladies with dupatta of TC light blue colour; Socks-woollen-Khaki; Belly-Black;

(B) **SUMMER** – Suit-ladies with dupatta-of TC light blue colour; Apron KD & Chef cap KD for cook only; Chappal black for all except cooks, sports shoes white for cooks, Belly shoes black for all ladies.

CARE OF UNIFORM

In order to ensure that all articles of uniform are kept neat and clean and in good condition, a kit inspection will be held once a month in the Police Lines and Police Stations. The Company Commanders/D.A.P., R.I.s /Lines and the Station House Officers will be responsible for holding of these inspections. Gazetted Officers will inspect the kits once in three months and during their inspection of the Lines/Police Stations. Kits will be checked against the sanctioned scales and the entries in the kit cards and the deficiency or instances of damage will be reported to the Dy. Commissioner of Police who will issue such appropriate orders as he considers necessary. Deficiencies, if any, will be made good from the available stock. If loss has resulted on account of carelessness or neglect or wilful damage, the whole or part of the cost will be recovered from the person at fault in accordance with the prevailing orders on the subject.

Kit inspection diagrams have been supplied to the Police Lines and Police Stations which will be followed at the time of laying out the kit items.

'KITS' will also be inspected by the Dy. Commissioners of Police during inspections of Lines/Police Stations.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. In terms of directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, a police officer while effecting arrest of an individual must be wearing a name plate which should also indicate the name and rank of the officer.

2. Police officers are expected to be in uniform on all working days. However, all officers and other ranks posted in the PHQ would wear uniform only on Tuesdays and Fridays. This shall, however, not apply to field officers such as those of District DCsP, Armed Police Lines, Training, Traffic etc. where officers and other ranks are expected to be in uniform during the duty hours.
3. Winter uniform is normally worn from 15th November to 15th March. However, the dates may be changed by issuing prior orders by PHQ on account of change in weather. Woollen Vest will be issued to all ranks (upto Insprs.) as a special arrangement for Winter in accordance with PHQ's Order No.2553/Admin.IX/ PHQ,Delhi, dated 1/02/2007.
4. Khaki Jersey will be worn but the Traffic Police L/Ss will wear the jersey of Air Force blue colour. A lanyard will not be worn with a Jersey. The Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of the unit may issue specific order regarding wearing of jerseys on parade according to the severity of weather.
5. Name plates in Hindi and English will be worn by all ranks on the right chest above and in the centre of the breast pocket. The Non - Gazetted Officers and lower subordinates will also have their ranks mentioned on the name plates.
6. Ankle boots of brown/black leather will have six pairs of eye-lets whereas the brown/black shoes will have five pairs of eye-lets for all ranks.
7. Width of the trouser at the bottom will not be less than 16 inches and not more than 18 inches in the case of uniforms. This can be extended to 20 inches as far as safari suit/security working dress is concerned.
8. Underclothing must not be visible at any time while in uniform.
9. **(i)** R.I.s of battalions, Prov. & Logistics, PTC, PTS and District Lines will be personally responsible for inspecting the police contingents detailed for duties prior to their departure from the Lines/Police Stations and ensuring a proper turn - out according to the occasion.

   (ii) Duty officers of Police Stations, Crime Branch and Traffic, Officers in command of police parties, as well as Head Constables in-charge of guard contingents will be personally responsible for ensuring a proper turn - out of the staff under their command.
10. The uniform, emblem, signs or marks of Delhi Police shall not be used during any dramatic performances or in any other inappropriate manner.
11. No Officer or man shall appear at any time dressed partly in uniform and partly in mufti articles.
12. Officers of all ranks, including Non-Gazetted Officers who have rendered approved service of not less than 15 years, are permitted after retirement to wear, on ceremonial occasions, the uniform of

the highest rank they held during their Police Service. Prior Permission should be obtained in each case from the Commissioner of Police.

13. Unless otherwise ordered, General Parade Dress without medals and ribbons will be worn by all officers and men on Funeral Parade.
14. All Non-Gazetted Officers and other police personnel, while appearing in Orderly Room and in the Police Hdqrs. before Sr. Officers of the rank of Dy.Commissioners of Police and above will wear Working uniform.
15. Ceremonial Dress will be worn only on the occasions listed in Para (vii) of General Instructions below Part I B (vi)
16. While appearing in any Court, the officers and men will wear proper working uniform.
17. It is mandatory for all ranks to display the Non-Clonable Identity card at the time of duties.

WEARING OF MEDALS AND DECORATIONS

The order of precedence of wearing the various medals and decorations will be as per **ANNEXURE - 3**.

LIFE SPAN OF UNIFORM ARTICLES:

The life span of uniform articles will be as per **ANNEXURE 4.**

Suppression:

This S.O. supersedes all Standing Orders issued so far on this subject.

(B.K. GUPTA)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
DELHI.

OB No.44/RB/PHQ dated 21.11.2011

No.5901-6150/RB/PHQ, dated Delhi the, 21.11.2011

ANNEXURE – 1

THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE (UNIFORM) RULES 1954
(RULE 38)

SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR WOMEN OFFICERS

(a) **Working Dress** – This will consist of same items as prescribed for male officers with the following alterations in the specifications in respect of slacks and footwear:-

(i) **Slacks** – Pleatless trousers of Khaki colour with two side pockets similar in pattern to those prescribed for the male officers with front flap closed and a zip flap on the right side at a position under the arm, the front flap being optional.

(ii) **Shoes** – Derby brown leather shoes or plain brown leather shoes with heels not more than 1 – ½" measured from the base of the rear stitching of the uppers.

(iii) Ankle Boots and Field Boots – Of the same specifications as those prescribed for male officers, with heels not more than 1 – ½" measured from the base of the rear stitching of the uppers.

(b) **Mess Dress** – This will consist of –

(i) **Saree** – Cream colour silk saree in winter and cotton or terrycot saree of the same colour in summer, normal length with red zari border of minimum width 3" and maximum width 5". The zari border may be either of gold plated silver thread or silk thread in a floral pattern.

(ii) **Blouse** – Colour matching with saree, air hostess sleeves. The saree being draped over the left shoulder and anchored by an Indian Police Service badge chromed or in silver metal. The blouse would be of waist length with minimum of four buttons and the length of the blouse ending where the saree begins and without stand and fall collars, concealed hooks may be used instead of buttons in appropriate numbers, if desired.

(iii) **Footwear** – Cream coloured sandals/shoes with straps and covered toes; heels not exceeding 2-½".

(iv) **Medals** - May be worn on the saree over the left breast.

(c) **P.T.Kit** – It will consist of :–

(i) Shorts/white track pants (white with police blue stripes)

(ii) High collared white "T" Shirt with Indian Police Service colours with 3 buttons in the front.

(iii) White socks with appropriate footwear as prescribed for male officers.

(d) **Cosmetics** – No cosmetics will be used by lady officers except a 'bindi' on the forehead and 'sindhur' filling in the head parting and special cream which does not leave a shade on the skin and which otherwise suited may be used according to the requirement of the weather. Both 'bindi' and 'sindhur' shall be as inconspicuous as possible.

(e) **Ornaments** – Women officers may wear 'Mangal sutra', wedding rings and ear-studs. But these will be as inconspicuous as possible. No other ornaments should be worn by lady officers when in uniform.

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ANNEXURE – 2

THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE (UNIFORM) RULES 1954
(RULE 39)

ALTERNATIVE UNIFORM FOR LADY OFFICERS IN ADVANCED STAGE OF PREGNANCY

Lady Officers with about 16 weeks of pregnancy may switch-over to the following alternative working dress:

(a) **Khaki Saree** – Khaki silk saree in winter and khaki cotton or khaki terry-cot saree in summer to be draped over the left shoulder passing under the shoulder straps with Indian Police Service badge.

(b) **Khaki blouse** – Khaki cotton blouse of waist length worn upto the elbow; buttoned up all the way down in the front with front buttons or concealed hooks; stand and fall collar; shoulder straps to be sewn at the outer end and fixed by a single button at the inner end; two breast pockets; and back plain without pleats.

(c) **Badges of ranks** – To be worn on the shoulder straps of the blouse.

(d) **Footwear** – Brown leather sandals/shoes with straps; toes not visible; heels not exceeding 2-1/2".

(e) **Khaki socks.**

(f) **Head-gear (optional)** – Same as worn in normal times.

*****

ANNEXURE – 3

WEARING OF MEDALS AND DECORATIONS

The order of precedence of wearing the various medals and decorations will be as under:

a. Bharat Ratna
b. Param Vir Chakra
c. Ashok Chakra Class I
d. Padma Vibushan
e. Padma Bhushan
f. Param Vishisht Seva Medal (Vishisht Seva Medal Class-1)
g. Maha Vir Chakra
h. Ashok Chakra Class-II (Kirti Chakra)
i. Padma Shri
j. Ati Vashisht Seva Medal (Vishisht Seva Medal Class-II)
k. Vir Chakra
l. Ashok Chakra class III (Shaurya Chakra)
m. The President's Police & Fire Services Medal for Gallantry
n. Seva/Nav Seva/Vayu Seva Medal
o. Vishisht Seva Medal (Vishisht Seva Medal Class-III)
p. The Police Medal for Gallantry
q. The General Services Medal 1947
r. The Samar Seva Star 1965
s. The Raksha Medal 1965
t. The Sainya Seva Medal
u. Videsh Seva Medal
v. The President's Police & Fire Services Medal for Distinguished Service.
w. The Meritorious Services Medal
x. The long service and good conduct medal.
y. The Police Medal for Meritorious Service
z. The Territorial Army Decoration
aa. The Territorial Army Medal
bb. The Indian Independence Medal 1947
cc. The Republic Day Medal 1950
dd. The Independence day (26th Anniversary) Medal 1972
ee. Common Wealth Awards
ff. Other Awards.

(Authority: - President's Notification No. 40-Dress/61 dated 13.11.1961 and 93-96 (1968), dated 18.05.1968).

NOTE

a. The Prime Minister Police Medal for life saving would fall in the category of (Other Awards') Authority-1-B.MHA letter No. 18/ Police /62(2) dated 13.4.1962

b. When Medals and Decorations are worn on the chest/ breast, the ribbon will be one inch in length. The upper most clasp will be one inch from the top of the ribbon. When two or more Medals and Decorations are worn, they will be so arranged that the lower edges are in line. The lengths of all ribbons will be regulated by that of the Decorations of Medals which including clasp, is the longest, subject to the condition that the total length of the ribbon and the Decorations of Medals together should be 6 1/8 inches. When the Decorations or Medals cannot on account of their number be suspended from the bar, so as to be fully seen, they are to overlap. The Medals are to be worn so as to show the State Emblem.

Standing order no.51 issued from this head quarter vide no. IV1235/08/10200-500/Genl.(1)PHQ dated 4.3.89 is cancelled.

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ANNEXURE-4

LIFE SPAN OF UNIFORM ARTICLES

SNO	Name of the Article	Life Span
1.	P.V.Set Khaki	1 yr
2.	Short K.D.	1 yr
3.	Shirt KCFS	4 yrs
4.	Slack K.D.	4 yrs
5.	Shirt Serge Khaki	2 in 5 yrs
6.	Trouser Serge Khaki	2 in 5 yrs
7.	Jersey Woollen Khaki	3 yrs
8.	Winter Jacket	5 yrs
9.	Socks Nylon Khaki	6 month
10	Socks woollen Khaki	6 month
11.	P.T Vest (Trainees) DAP & PTC	6 month1 yr
12.	Vest woolen	1 in three yrs.
13.	Over all K.D.	1 yr
14.	P.Cap SI/ASI type	3 yrs
15.	P. Cap Inspr. Type	3 yrs
16.	Barret (Cap) Khaki	1 yr
17.	Rain Coat with Hood	10 yrs
18.	Mosquito Net	5 yrs
19.	Ground Sheet	5 yrs
20.	Blanket Woollen	2 in 5 yrs
21.	Chindi Red	1yr
22.	Safa Khaki Malmal	2 yrs
23.	Ribbon Red & blue	1 yr
24.	Over all TC blue	4 yrs
25.	Sikh Pagari blue patti	2 yrs
26.	Breeches Cordary Khaki	1 yr
27.	Woollen patti	2 yrs
28.	Leather Belt brown	10 yrs
29.	Chevron III strip	2 yrs
30.	Whistle lanyard khaki	3 yrs
31.	Formation sign badge	1 year
32	Boot ankle brown	Initial issue
33.	Boot ankle black DMS	4 yrs in Distt/Unit, 2 yrs & 6 months in DAP/PTC

34.	Boot ankle black U/S	Initial issue
35.	Oxford Shoes Brown	1 yr
36.	Oxford Shoes Black	1 yr
37.	Jungle Shoes	1 yr
38.	P T Shoes*/Sports Shoe	1 yr
39.	Cross belt brown	10 yrs
40.	Cross belt black	10 yrs
41.	Leather belt black L/S	10 yrs
42.	Leather belt black U/S	10 yrs
43.	Whistle Brass	5 yrs
44.	DP Shoulder U/S	5 yrs
45.	D P Shoulder L/S	5 yrs
46.	DP Crest	5 yrs
47.	Sikh pagri Crest	5 yrs
48.	Star five pointed	5 yrs
49.	Cane stick U/S	5 yrs
50.	Cane Stick L/S	10 yrs
51.	Metal polish	4 months
52.	Shoe polish black	4 months
53.	Shoe brush	1 yr
54.	Blanko cake	6 months
55.	Web belt khaki	Intial issue for trainees
	TRAFFIC POLICE	
1.	Pant T/C blue	1 yr.
2.	Shirt T/C white (F/S)	1 yr.
3.	Trouser Serge blue	2 in 5 yrs
4.	Shirt white woollen	2 in 5 yrs
5.	Slack blue drill	4 yrs
6.	Shirt W/C/F/S	4 yrs
7.	Socks nylon blue	6 months
8.	Socks woollen blue	6 months
9.	Barret (cap) blue	1 yr
10.	Jersey woollen blue	3 yrs
11.	Whistle lanyard red	5 yrs
12.	Formation Sign Badge	1 yr.
13.	Safa Malmal blue (f/74)	2 yrs
14.	Woollen Jacket blue	5 yrs
15.	Scarf blue with traffic monogram	5 yrs

	SECURITY UNIT	
1.	Woollen Blazer	1 in 5 yrs.
2.	Terrywool Trouser	1 in 3 yrs.
3.	Terricotton Shirt	2 in 2 yrs.
4.	Tie	1 in 2 yrs.
5.	Safari Suit	2 in 2 yrs.

	LICENSING UNIT	
1.	Blazer	1 in 5 yrs.
2.	Woolen Trouser	1 in 3 yrs.
3.	Normal Trouser	2 in 3 yrs.
4.	Terricot Shirt	3 in 2 yrs.
5.	Tie	1 in 2 yrs.
6.	Blazer (for women)	1 in 5 yrs.
7.	Sari	2 in 2 yrs.
8.	Belly	1 in 1 yr. & six months
9.	Woolen socks	1 pair in 1 yr.

Multi – Task Staff (MTS) ITEMS.

1.	Buttoned up Coat Khaki Woollen	1 in 2 years
2.	Pant Khadi Woollen	1 in 2 years
3.	Gandhi Cap Woollen	1 in 2 years
4.	Gandhi Cap KD	2 in 3 years
5.	Ladies Suit with dupatta	2 in 1 year
6.	Chef Cap KD	1 in 1 year
7.	Ladies Half Coat Khadi	1 in 3 years
8.	Shirt PV Khaki	2 in 2 years
9.	Pant PV khaki	2 in 2 years
10.	Apron KD	1 in 1 year
11.	Chappal Black	1 pair in 1 year
12.	Ladies Shoe Belly	1 pair in 2 years
13.	Rubber Monsoon Shoes	1 pair in 2 years
14.	Jersey Woollen Khaki	2 in 3 years
15.	Derby Shoes Black IV Class	1 pair in 2 years
16.	PT Shoes	1 pair in 1 year
17.	Socks Woolen Khaki	2 in 3 yrs

*

Note: - It has been decided that one pair of good Sports (P.T.) Shoes should be issued to recruits in lieu of 3 pairs ordinary P.T. Shoes.

ADDENDUM

Subject:- Use of Fluorescent Jacket as a part of Uniform clothing articles for the rank of Constable to Inspector in Delhi Police.

In continuation of this office hdqrs. No.5901-6150/RB/PHQ dated 21.11.2011 regarding SO No.51 for Uniform Regulations of Delhi Police.

For the safety and to maintain proper visibility of Police Personnel detailed during night, it has been decided that Fluorescent Jacket will be an essential part of Uniform Clothing articles for the rank of Constable to Inspector. The life span of Fluorescent Jacket will be three years.

This has the approval of CP, Delhi

(S.K. GAUTAM) IPS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
GENERAL ADMN.,DELHI

OB NO. 46/2013

No.7071-7190/RB/PHQ dated 4.10.2013

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, DELHI

Subject:- Standing Order No.51- Uniform Regulations of Delhi Police- **Amendment for making Pollution Nose Mask as part of Traffic Uniform thereof.**

Delhi is facing serious pollution issues especially due to increasing motor vehicle emissions and higher concentration of pollutants in air due to various reasons including those originating beyond the borders of Delhi. Vehicular emission alone accounts for more than 60% of total air pollution in Delhi. The increased carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and other hydro carbon fuel related pollutants pose serious health hazard to the citizens of Delhi with a much grave threat to Delhi Traffic Police Officers, performing duties on roads of Delhi on 24 x 7 basis.

To protect the traffic police staff from the ill effects of these toxins, necessity to provide pollution nose masks to safe guard their health has been felt. Thus, facts of various news reports and studies including exposure of the Delhi Traffic Police officers and men to the pollution have been brought in notice of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi by Traffic Police in single fill system, who after realizing the effects of pollution stressed to form nose mask a part of uniform of Traffic Police.

A designed Technical Committee has also considered factors like easy wearability hygiene; maintenance and exhale valve for easy breathing alongwith conformity to best standards in the industry and finalized specifications for the purchase of Pollution Nose Mask with the span of two months or 140 hours for continuous inhalation. In view of this decision, amendment in S.O. No. 51 may be read as note SI. No.4, after note 3 at end of Part-4 as Part-5.

4. Henceforth, Pollution Nose Mask will be clothing/uniform article of traffic police officers and men who will were it regularly on duty. As on date, as per deliberations of the Technical Committee dated 20.12.2016, the durability of the mask will be two months and above of wearing regularly or of continuous inhalation. P&L Unit will purchase as per technical specifications fixed by Technical Committee and supply to the Traffic Unit, subject to the condition of change of specifications in quality and durability for best standard nose masks, in the long run in the national/international market from time to time.

ANIL CHHATWAL/ACP/HQ (G)
For Dy. Commissioner of Police
Genl. Admn., Delhi.

O B No. 07/2017

No. 779-910/ Record Branch/PHQ, Delhi, Dated 7/3/2017.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
SUB-DIVISION LAJPAT NAGAR
SOUTH-EAST DISTRICT, NEW DELHI

ORDER

Whereas, information has been received that members of Cockroach Janta Party may organize a protest and shall move towards Sansad Bhawan from Jantar Mantar, New Delhi, on 20th July, 2026, which may disturb public peace and law & order. And whereas, to maintain public peace, safety and tranquillity, immediate preventive action is necessary.

Therefore, I, Mihir Sakaria, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Lajpat Nagar, South-East District, Delhi, in exercise of powers conferred upon me under Section 163(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), hereby order that no gathering of more than two persons shall be allowed in any public place within the jurisdiction of Sub-Division Lajpat Nagar for the purpose of protest, dharna, demonstration, rally, procession or agitation till further orders, unless prior written permission is obtained from the undersigned.

1. Carrying of firearms, lathis, swords, explosives, stones, brickbats, acid, petrol bottles or any other dangerous article capable of causing injury or disturbance is also prohibited in public places.

2. Raising slogans, displaying banners/posters/placards, use of loudspeakers or making speeches without permission is also prohibited.

3. This order shall not apply to:

a) Government officials performing official duties.

b) Police, Armed Forces and emergency services personnel on duty.

c) Marriage ceremonies, funerals and religious functions conducted peacefully as per law.

Any person violating this order shall be liable for legal action under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and other relevant provisions of law. Since this order cannot be served individually to every person, it is being passed ex-parte and shall be published through notice boards, police stations, press and social media for public information.

This order shall come into force immediately and shall remain effective till further orders unless withdrawn earlier.

Sakaria

(Mihir Sakaria)
Assistant Commissioner of Police
Sub-Division Lajpat Nagar
South-East District, New Delhi

No. 4677-4706/R /ACP/Lajpat Nagar
Dated: 19/07/2026

Copy forwarded for information and necessary action to the: -

1. Secretary to Government of India, MHA, New Delhi.
2. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi.
3. Secretary to Lt. Governor, Delhi.
4. All Secretaries, Govt. of NCT of Delhi.
5. Deputy Director, IB, MHA, GOI, Delhi.
6. All Spl. CsP/Jt. CsP/Addl. CsP/Delhi.
7. Hon'ble ACMM/Lajpat Nagar, MMs H.N.Din & Sunlight Colony, (through concerned police station).
8. DC/ South East, MB Road.

9. DCsP/Addl. DCsP of all Districts/Units of Delhi including P/PTC & FRRO for communicating to all the ACsP/SHOs/Inspector. One copy of the order may be got pasted on the notice boards of the offices (20 copies for district and 10 for (units).
10. DCP/HQ, Delhi.
11. SO to CP, Delhi.
12. Secretary, NDMC (2 copies) with the request that one copy of the order may be got pasted on the notice board outside the committee's office.
13. Commissioner, MCD (with one spare copy for pasting it at the prominent notice board for the public).
14. PRO, Delhi Police with 30 spare copies for publicity in the local Press/Radio/Television through official mail.
15. District Magistrate, Delhi for pasting one copy of the order on the Notice Board.
16. Head Peshi Clerk to the Finance Commissioner (FC) Delhi for pasting outside the Court Room of FC, Delhi.
17. Director of New Service, AIR for Broadcasting.
18. Director of Information and Publicity, Government of the NCT of Delhi (2 copies) with the request for publicity in the press.
19. Director, Doordarshan Kendra, Parliament Street, New Delhi for telecasting on TV.
20. Tehsildar, Delhi/New Delhi/Mehrauli for pasting on the Tehsil's Notice Board.
21. DCsP/Special Branch, Traffic and PCR, Delhi.
22. L.A. to C.P., Delhi.
23. ACP (P), ACP (C&T) and ACP (G)/PHQ.
24. Inspr. (X)/PHQ.
25. PA to CP,Delhi.
26. All ACsP/ South East District.
27. PAs/SOs to DCP/Addl. DCsP/South East District.
28. HAX/South East.
29. AII SHOs/Sub Division Lajpat Nagar for strict compliance.

THE JULY 2026 DELHI YOUTH PROTESTS

AND THE RESPONSE OF THE INDIAN STATE

TRIBUNAL MEMBERS

Justice Anjana Prakash (Chair) · Aditi Mehta · Gopal Krishna Pillai · Mohan Gopal · Radha Kumar · Tanika Sarkar

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